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Abstract
The impressive technological advances in genomic analysis and the significant drop in the
cost of genome sequencing are paving the way to a variety of revolutionary applications
in modern healthcare. In particular, the increasing understanding of the human genome,
and of its relation to diseases, health and to responses to treatments brings promise of
improvements in better preventive and personalized medicine. Unfortunately, the impact
on privacy and security is unprecedented. The genome is our ultimate identifier and, if
leaked, it can unveil sensitive and personal information such as our genetic diseases,
our propensity to develop certain conditions (e.g., cancer or Alzheimer’s) or the health
issues of our family. Even though legislation, such as the EU General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) or the US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA), aims at mitigating abuses based on genomic and medical data, it is clear that
this information also needs to be protected by technical means.
In this thesis, we investigate the problem of developing new and practical privacy-
enhancing technologies (PETs) for the protection of medical and genomic data. Our goal
is to accelerate the adoption of PETs in the medical field in order to address the privacy
and security concerns that prevent personalized medicine from reaching its full potential.
We focus on two main areas of personalized medicine: clinical care and medical research.
For clinical care, we first propose a system for securely storing and selectively re-
trieving raw genomic data that is indispensable for in-depth diagnoses and treatments of
complex genetic diseases such as cancer. Then, we focus on genetic variants and devise a
new model based on additively-homomorphic encryption for privacy-preserving genetic
testing in clinics. Our model, implemented in the context of HIV treatment, is the first
to be tested and evaluated by practitioners in a real operational setting.
For medical research, we first propose a method that combines somewhat-
homomorphic encryption with differential privacy to enable secure feasibility studies on
genetic data stored at an untrusted central repository. Second, we address the problem
of sharing genomic and medical data when the data is distributed across multiple mis-
trustful institutions. We begin by analyzing the risks that threaten patients’ privacy in
systems for the discovery of genetic variants, and we propose practical mitigations to
the re-identification risk. Then, for clinical sites to be able to share the data without
worrying about the risk of data breaches, we develop a new system based on collective
homomorphic encryption: it achieves trust decentralization and enables researchers to
securely find eligible patients for clinical studies. Finally, we design a new framework,
complementary to the previous ones, for quantifying the risk of unintended disclosure
caused by potential inference attacks that are jointly combined by a malicious adversary,
v
when exact genomic data is shared.
In summary, in this thesis we demonstrate that PETs, still believed unpractical and
immature, can be made practical and can become real enablers for overcoming the privacy
and security concerns blocking the advancement of personalized medicine. Addressing
privacy issues in healthcare remains a great challenge that will increasingly require long-
term collaboration among geneticists, healthcare providers, ethicists, lawmakers, and
computer scientists.
Keywords: genomic privacy, medical data protection, genetic testing, inference at-
tacks, homomorphic encryption, property-preserving encryption, differential privacy, re-
identification, data sharing, privacy-enhancing technologies
Sommario
Gli impressionanti progressi tecnologici nell’analisi genomica e il notevole abbassamento
del costo di sequenziamento stanno spianando la strada a una varieta` di applicazioni
rivoluzionarie nell’ambito della medicina moderna. In particolare, la crescente conoscenza
del genoma umano e della sua interazione con la malattia, la salute e la risposta ai tratta-
menti promette notevoli miglioramenti nell’ambito della medicina preventiva e personal-
izzata. Sfortunatamente, tutto cio` ha un impatto sulla sfera privata dell’individuo senza
precedenti. Il genoma e` il nostro identificatore finale e, se fatto trapelare, puo` rivelare
informazioni personali e sensibili sulle nostre malattie genetiche, la nostra propensione
a sviluppare gravi patologie (per es. il cancro o il morbo di Alzheimer), o i problemi
di salute dei nostri famigliari. Sebbene esistano leggi come la nuova General Data Pro-
tection Regulation (GDPR) europea o l’Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act (HIPAA) americana che mirano a ridurre gli abusi basati sui dati medici e genetici,
e` sempre piu` evidente che queste informazioni richiedano anche una protezione di tipo
tecnologico.
In questa tesi, esaminiamo le problematiche legate allo sviluppo di nuove tecnologie
per la protezione della privacy dei dati medici e genetici con l’obbiettivo di acceler-
arne l’adozione e rispondere alle preoccupazioni sulla privacy e la sicurezza digitale che
impediscono alla medicina personalizzata di raggiungere il suo pieno potenziale. Ci fo-
calizziamo sull’utilizzo e la protezione dei dati in ambito clinico e di ricerca medica.
In ambito clinico, proponiamo inizialmente un nuovo sistema per la gestione sicura
dei dati genetici grezzi, indispensabili per diagnosi approfondite e trattamenti di patolo-
gie genetiche complesse come il cancro. Successivamente, ci concentriamo sull’utilizzo
clinico delle varianti genetiche, proponendo un nuovo modello basato sulla crittografia
omomorfica che permette di effettuare test genetici e preservare, simultaneamente, la pri-
vacy dei pazienti. Questo modello, implementato nel contesto del trattamento dell’HIV,
e` il primo ad essere stato testato e valutato in un ambito operativo.
In ambito di ricerca, prima proponiamo un metodo che combina crittografia omomor-
fica e privacy differenziale per permettere l’esplorazione sicura di una base di dati genetici
centralizzata. Poi, esaminiamo la condivisione sicura dei dati medici e genetici quando i
dati sono distribuiti tra diversi siti. In primo luogo, analizziamo i rischi che minacciano
la privacy nei sistemi di “discovery” per varianti genetiche e proponiamo delle contro-
misure pratiche contro il rischio di reidentificazione. In secondo luogo, proponiamo un
sistema basato sulla crittografia omomorfica collettiva che permette a diversi siti clinici
di proteggere collettivamente i propri dati da attacchi informatici e, allo stesso tempo,
di condividerli in maniera sicura con ricercatori interessati a trovare soggetti idonei per
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studi clinici. Infine, presentiamo un nuovo framework, complementare ai sistemi prece-
denti, per quantificare la perdita involontaria di privacy, in seguito ad attacchi d’inferenza
combinati, quando i dati genomici vengono condivisi con terzi.
In sintesi, in questa tesi dimostriamo che le tecnologie per la protezione della privacy,
finora ritenute troppo complesse o dispendiose, possono essere usate efficacemente in
campo medico rappresentando strumenti necessari per superare i problemi di privacy e
sicurezza che bloccano l’avanzamento della medicina personalizzata. Tuttavia, affrontare
le questioni legate alla privacy nel settore sanitario rimane un grande sfida che richiedera`
una sempre maggiore collaborazione a lungo termine tra esperti di genetica, etica, legis-
lazione e tecnologia.
Parole Chiave: privacy genetica, protezione dati medici, test genetici, attacchi
d’inference, crittografia omomorfica, crittografia deterministica, privacy differenziale, rei-
dentificazione, condivisione dati, privacy-enhancing technologies
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Privacy issues have a rather long history. The photo camera, introduced at the end of the
19th century, was the first revolutionary observation and identification tool that threat-
ened the privacy of individuals. Since then, several other tools have become widespread,
including video cameras, credit cards, Web browsers, and mobile phones. All these tools
can reveal much of our personal information: for example, our presence and habits in
various spheres of life, or our communication and mobility patterns [31]. The exponential
use of DNA sequencing of these last few years has the potential to greatly exacerbate
this problem. The genome represents our ultimate biological identity [160] and contains
much sensitive information about our health and kin. If misused, it can pave the way to
a variety of abuses and threats not yet fully understood.
The genomic era began in April 2003, when the Human Genome Project was declared
complete. Subsequently, as a result of the impressive decrease in genome-sequencing
costs and the rapid development of next-generation sequencing technologies, medicine
has undergone an outstanding genomic revolution. At the time of writing, an increas-
ing number of individuals are having their genome sequenced and it is not unrealistic
to believe that, in the near future, most of us will be systematically screened in order
to be able to benefit from new preventive diagnoses and treatments tailored to our ge-
netic makeup. Even though the current understanding of the complex relation between
genome, disease, health and phenotype is still in its infancy, it is already possible to col-
lect, store, process and share genomic data in a way that was unthinkable only a decade
ago. This rise in availability, use, and sharing of such genetic information, combined
with their increasing integration with electronic health records (EHRs) systems brings
great promise of improvements in better preventive and personalized medicine. Yet, it
also raises unprecedented ethical and privacy concerns.
In general, access to genomic data prompts several important privacy problems: (i)
The genome can be used to re-identify individuals, (ii) it can reveal information about
their genetic diseases such as cystic fibrosis, and their predispositions to severe medical
conditions such as Alzheimer’s, cancer, or schizophrenia, (iii) it contains information
about ancestors, siblings, and progeny, and sharing it could unveil telling insights into
a whole family’s health issues (possibly against the family’s will), (iv) the genome does
not (almost) change over time, hence revoking or replacing it (as with other forms of
identification) is impossible, and (vi) it is already being used both in law enforcement
1
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and healthcare, thus prompting also numerous ethical issues. Furthermore, today, it is
hard to assess or estimate the extent of the personal information that could be extracted
or derived from the genome in the future.
In the last few years, millions of people have seen their medical data compromised by
cyber attacks on data stored at hospitals, insurers, and clinical laboratories [16, 18, 17].
The healthcare sector has the highest incidence of attacks across all industries and EHRs
are favorite targets; once genomic data needed for precision medicine is fully integrated
with these records, the privacy impact of cyber attacks will be devastating. Some experts
worry that genetic information could be exploited, for example, for identity theft, spear
phishing, fraud [15, 12] or even genetic discrimination. Health or life insurance compa-
nies could obtain the genetic information of their customers and deny their services to
people with a high susceptibility of developing a chronic disease, or employers could hire
applicants based on their genetic features. Today, the science-fiction scenarios depicted
by the movie of 1997 “GATTACA” do not look very unrealistic anymore. Leakage of
genomic data not only could damage individuals but also medical institutions. For exam-
ple, a hospital setting up a medical study on genomic data could be severely discredited
if participants’ genomic and clinical information was leaked or compromised. Moreover,
the potential integration of genomic data with other privacy-sensitive data (e.g., location,
ancestry and other online social network – OSN – data) could exponentially increases
the risk of a privacy breach through cross-layer attacks.
Of course, in order to mitigate the risk of such discriminations, tight legislation such as
the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the US Health Insurance Portabil-
ity and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and the US Genetic Information Non-discrimination
Act (GINA), regulates the activities of companies and hospitals that manage personal
health information. Yet, today there exist only a few specific regulatory standards that
protect the sensitive health data (including genomic data) needed for precision medicine
and they are mostly outdated and insufficient. For example, though fingerprints, long
known to be useful for re-identification, are protected under the 2003 federal HIPAA
Privacy and Security rules as “biometric identifiers”, genomic data is still not [16]. Fur-
thermore, even if regulations are in place, it is extremely difficult to protect medical and
genomic data against the misdeeds of a hacker or a disgruntled employee. Hence, it is
clear that legislation alone is not enough and this data also needs to be protected by
technical means.
“There are privacy issues. We’ve got to figure out how do we make sure
that if I donate my data to this big pool that it’s not going to be misused, that
it’s not going to be commercialized in some way that I don’t know about. And
so we’ve got to set up a series of structures that make me confident that if
I’m making that contribution to science that I’m not going to end up getting
a bunch of spam targeting people who have a particular disease I may have.”
said US President Barack Obama, during a precision-medicine panel discussion of
the precision medicine Initiative Cohort Program in February 2016 [13].
Information security is the practice of protecting information from unauthorized ac-
cess, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, inspection, recording, or destruction [60].
Traditionally, information security has been widely used by governmental, military and
financial institutions. Only in the last few years has the field of information security
3grown and evolved significantly in the medical context. Tools that protect informational
privacy by eliminating or minimizing personal data without the loss of the functionality
of the information system are usually called privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) [204].
PETs generally protect users’ privacy by either breaking the link between individuals’
identities and the data they provide (e.g., by removing users’ identities from published
data), or by decreasing the amount of provided information (e.g., by using cryptographic
tools or obfuscation techniques).
The idea of using technical solutions to guarantee the privacy of genomic data raises
interesting debates. On one hand, the potential of genomic research for mankind is
tremendous, and PETs can be considered as an obstacle to achieving the promise of
personalized medicine. On the other hand, to expedite advances in personalized medicine,
genome-phenome association studies often require the participation of a large number
of research participants. To encourage individuals to enroll in such studies, it is crucial
to adhere to ethical principles, such as autonomy, reciprocity and, more generally, trust
(e.g., guarantee that medical and genomic data will not be misused) that PETs can
provide.
Unfortunately, traditional approaches to privacy, such as de-identification or aggre-
gation, currently used with EHR data, are ineffective in the genomic context because of
the identifying nature of the genome itself [107, 148, 79]. For example, in 2013, Gymrek
et al. [99] demonstrated the feasibility of re-identifying “anonymous” DNA donors by
matching Y-chromosome data with names posted in popular genealogy Web sites. Simi-
larly, in 2015, Hubert et al. [112] showed that it is possible, by using phenotypic traits,
to de-anonymize individuals who posted their genetic information to DNA-sharing Web
sites such as OpenSNP [152]. More recently, Lippert et al. [130] even proposed new
techniques for identifying “anonymous” individuals by predicting their facial traits from
the DNA.
Developing new PETs for medical and genomic data presents unique technical chal-
lenges, due to the architecture of the human genome, to the high dimensionality of the
data, to the complicated genome-phenome interaction, to the variety of stakeholders in-
volved, to the diversity of the legal frameworks, and to the rapidly evolving knowledge
in the medical field. Therefore, PETs that are already being used in other domains
(e.g., e-voting, location privacy, secure database management systems, fintech) cannot
be simply transferred and applied to the medical context. A sector-specific approach
and a thorough understanding of the complex privacy and security requirements, and
of the properties of the data, are necessary in order to adapt established PETs and to
develop new ones that can have a tangible impact on the way medical and genomic data
is managed today.
For example, current PETs based on cryptographic techniques prevent unauthorized
users from “viewing” the data, but typically reduce the efficiency of the algorithms by
introducing storage and computational overhead that are often unacceptable. Whereas,
PETs based on obfuscation techniques do not introduce computational overhead, but
they reduce the accuracy (or utility) of the data hence are highly criticized by practi-
tioners. Therefore, it is now more urgent than ever to develop new techniques that can
guarantee the security and privacy of medical and genomic data, without significantly
degrading the efficiency and accuracy of the use of this data in research and healthcare.
In this thesis, we investigate the problem of developing new privacy-preserving solu-
tions for personalized medicine in order to address these important and impelling chal-
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lenges. In particular, we study in detail the complex nature and use of medical and
genomic data, and we develop new privacy-enhancing solutions for storing, processing
and sharing it in two different areas of personalized medicine: clinical care and medical
research. Furthermore, we implement these solutions and bring them beyond the sta-
tus of academic prototypes by also testing and validating them in real-life operational
environments. We demonstrate that, with reasonable cost, PETs are practical and scal-
able enablers for new use-cases that are otherwise impossible due to privacy and security
constraints.
Finally, our ultimate goal in this thesis is to propose, throughout a series of con-
crete examples and contributions, a generic methodology that covers the entire develop-
ment cycle of new privacy-enhancing technologies for medical and genomic data. This
methodology should then guide future researchers in identifying the privacy and security
requirements of a dynamic application field, i.e., the medical field, developing new and
efficient technical solutions that address such requirements, and finally deploying these
solutions to the real world.
Contributions
In this thesis, we investigate the privacy and security problems regarding the management
of medical and genomic data, and we develop new privacy-enhancing technologies
for the protection of this data. In particular, we focus on the aspects of privacy and
security related to the confidentiality and control of this data under the semi-honest and
malicious-but-covert adversarial models. We provide solutions for two areas of person-
alized medicine: clinical care and medical research. For clinical care, we first propose
a system for securely storing and retrieving raw genomic data that is indispensable for
in-depth diagnoses and treatments of genetic complex diseases, such as cancer, and for
clinical trials. Then, we focus on genetic variants and propose a new model for privacy-
preserving genetic testing in the clinic. We implement the proposed solution in the
context of HIV treatment and also collect and evaluate, to the best of our knowledge for
the first time, the feedback of practitioners who use our privacy-preserving system.
For medical research, we first devise a method for securely exploring cohorts of genetic
data stored on an untrusted central repository in the context of feasibility studies for
medical research. Second, we look into genomic and medical data sharing, where the
data is distributed across multiple mistrustful institutions. In this context, we start by
analyzing the privacy risks that threaten systems for the discovery of genetic variants
and propose practical mitigations to the re-identification risk. Then, we look into the
protection of medical data confidentiality to mitigate the risk of data breaches and still
enable the use of the data. We develop a new system that achieves trust distribution
and enables clinical sites to securely share and to process sensitive medical and genetic
information under encryption in order to find similar patients to be included in clinical
studies. Finally, we design a new framework for systematically reasoning about the risk of
unintended disclosure when exact genomic data is shared; this risk is caused by potential
inference attacks jointly combined by a malicious adversary.
Our contributions are as follows:
1. Geneticists prefer to store patients’ aligned, raw, genomic data, in addition to their
variant calls (compact and summarized form of the raw data), mainly because of the
5immaturity of bioinformatic algorithms and sequencing platforms and in order to
conduct more in-depth analyses that would be impossible with just the information
about the variants. Therefore, we propose a new privacy-preserving architecture
for protecting the privacy of aligned, raw, genomic data. The raw genomic data of
a patient includes millions of short reads, each composed of between 100 and 400
nucleotides. We propose storing these short reads at a biobank in encrypted form.
The proposed scheme enables a medical unit (e.g., a pharmaceutical company or
a hospital) to privately retrieve a subset of the short reads of the patients (which
include a definite range of nucleotides, depending on the type of the genetic test)
without revealing the nature of the genetic test to the biobank. Furthermore, the
proposed scheme enables the biobank to mask particular parts of the retrieved short
reads if (i) some parts of the provided short reads are out of the requested range,
and/or (ii) the patient does not give consent to access some parts of the provided
short reads (e.g., parts revealing sensitive diseases). We evaluate the proposed
scheme to show the amount of unauthorized genomic data leakage it prevents.
Finally, we implement the proposed scheme and assess its practicality. This work
was done in collaboration with Sophia Genetics, a Swiss-based analytics company
that provides clinical genomic services.
2. The implementation of genomic-based medicine is hindered by unresolved ques-
tions regarding data privacy and the delivery of interpreted results to healthcare
practitioners. Hence, we propose a new privacy-preserving system for genetic tests
that uses patients’ genomic data encrypted under homomorphic encryption. We
used DNA-based predictions of HIV-related outcomes as a use case to explore its
acceptance in a clinical operational environment. In particular, we develop a new
architecture (between the patient and the medical unit) and propose a “privacy-
preserving genetic test with ancestry inference” by using homomorphic encryption,
proxy re-encryption and secure two-party protocols. Assuming the whole genome
sequencing is done by a certified institution, we propose to store patients’ genomic
data encrypted under their public keys at a centralized “storage and processing
unit” (SPU). Our proposed solution enables the medical unit to securely compute
the ancestry information of each patient from the encrypted genomic data and to
retrieve the encrypted genomic data from the SPU in order to securely process it
for genetic testing and preserve the privacy of patients’ genomic data. We also
implement the proposed model into a client-server system, and we deploy it at five
outpatient clinics of the Swiss HIV Cohort Study (SHCS). We evaluate the feedback
from physicians who tested our system on a total of 230 HIV-positive individuals
genotyped at 4,149 genetic markers.
3. The re-use of patients’ health records can provide tremendous benefits for clinical
research. Yet, when researchers need to explore cohorts of patients for inclusion
in clinical trials or population health studies, privacy issues represent one of the
major obstacles to accessing the data; especially when sensitive/identifying data,
such as genomic data, are involved. Hence, we design a new and efficient privacy-
preserving explorer for genetic cohorts. To maximize its adoption, our solution
is built on top of i2b2 (Informatics for Integrating Biology and the Bedside), the
state-of-the-art open-source framework for clinical cohort exploration. Moreover,
it uses cutting-edge privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) such as lattice-based
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somewhat-homomorphic encryption and differential privacy. Solutions involving
homomorphic encryption are often believed to be costly and still immature for use
in operational environments. Here, we show that, contrary to these assumptions,
the proposed solution outperforms the state of the art by enabling a researcher to
securely explore 3,000 genetic variants over a cohort of 5,000 individuals in less
than five seconds with commodity hardware. We successfully deployed and tested
our solution in the operational environment of the clinical research data-warehouse
of the Lausanne University Hospital (CHUV).
4. Systems for the discovery of genetic variants, such as the Beacon Project of the
Global Alliance For Genomics and Health (GA4GH), enable researchers to query
participating sites (or “beacons”) for the presence of a specified nucleotide at a
given position within a chromosome. Recent work has demonstrated that, given
a beacon with specific characteristics (relatively small sample size), an adversary
who possesses part of the genome sequence of a specific individual can infer the
membership of that individual in a beacon, by simply repeating queries for vari-
ants present in the individual’s genome. Based on this work, we show that the
original attack can be significantly improved by considering a smarter adversary
that uses public knowledge about allele frequency distribution in order to perform
the attack. Furthermore, we propose three practical strategies for mitigating the
re-identification risks stemming from such an attack. The first two strategies ma-
nipulate the beacon such that the presence of rare alleles is obscured; the third
strategy budgets the number of accesses per user for each individual genome. Us-
ing a beacon containing data from the 1000 Genomes Project, we demonstrate that
the proposed strategies can effectively reduce re-identification risk in beacon-like
datasets. These strategies are under evaluation by the European Bioinformatics
Institute for deployment in the Elixir Beacon network.
5. Being able to share large amounts of sensitive clinical and genomic data across sev-
eral institutions is crucial for precision medicine to progress. Unfortunately, because
of the increasing number of health-data breaches, clinical sites are uncomfortable
exposing their data to external parties if strong security and privacy guarantees are
not in place. As a result, currently, only very limited datasets of non-sensitive and
moderately useful information can be shared. We introduce MedCo, the first oper-
ational system that enables clinical sites to protect the confidentiality of their data
by means of collective homomorphic encryption and an investigator for securely
exploring sensitive medical information about patients. MedCo is built on top of
established and widespread technology from the biomedical informatics commu-
nity, such as i2b2 and SHRINE, and relies on state-of-the-art secure protocols for
processing encrypted distributed data and complying with regulations. As such,
MedCo can be easily adopted by clinical sites. This would pave the way to new
unexplored data-sharing use cases. We demonstrate that MedCo scales to several
clinical sites with millions of records by testing it on an oncology use-case with real
somatic tumor data in a network of three institutions (EPFL, UNIL and CHUV).
6. One major obstacle to developing precision medicine to its full potential is the
privacy risk stemming from the inference attacks that can be perpetrated when ge-
nomic data is disclosed to untrusted third parties. Even though the academic com-
7munity has proposed many solutions to mitigate these attacks, as of this writing,
these solutions have not been adopted by practitioners, mainly due to their impact
on the data utility. Therefore, we introduce GenoShare, a framework that enables
practitioners to systematically reason about the risk of revealing privacy-sensitive
attributes (e.g., health status, kinship, physical traits) from disclosed genomic data.
GenoShare enables data controllers to take informed decisions about sharing exact
genomic data. Through a novel mechanism based on synthetic versions of individ-
ual genomes (i.e., avatars), GenoShare also prevents potential inferences when the
decision is not to share. We demonstrate GenoShare’s capabilities by instantiating
it with three of the most important genomics-oriented inference attacks and show-
ing how it can be used to detect leakage of sensitive attributes by using real data
from the 1000 Genomes Project.
Thesis Outline
This thesis is organized as follows. First, in Chapter 2, we discuss the main genomic
and cryptographic concepts used throughout this thesis. Then, in Part I, we address the
challenge of protecting medical and genomic data in clinical care. In particular, we show
in Chapter 3 how raw genomic data can be securely stored and retrieved for in-depth
clinical analyses. In Chapter 4, we describe a new privacy-preserving model for genetic
testing by using HIV treatment as a real-life use case. Finally, in Part II, we study
the protection of medical and genomic data in the context of medical research. More
specifically, in Chapter 5 we show a new privacy-preserving system for exploring genetic
cohorts stored on a centralized (and potentially untrusted) database. In Chapter 6, we
evaluate the privacy risks that affect genetic variants discovery systems and propose a
set of practical mitigations to thwart re-identification attacks. In Chapter 7, we describe
in detail a new system that enables the collective protection and privacy-conscious shar-
ing of sensitive medical data. We conclude Part II, in Chapter 8, by proposing a new
framework for systematically reasoning about inference risks that stem from genomic
data disclosures.
Publications
Chapter 3 is an extended version of [32]. Chapter 4 is an extended version of [141]
and also contains the findings in [162]. Chapter 5 contains the techniques and findings
in [161]. Chapter 6 is an extended version of [163]. Chapter 7 rests on the results of [165].
Finally, Chapter 8 is an extended version of [164].

Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this preliminary chapter, we briefly summarize the main concepts of genomics and
cryptography used throughout this thesis.
2.1 Genomic Background
The human genome is encoded in double-stranded DNA molecules that consist of two
complementary polymer chains. Each chain consists of simple units called nucleotides
that are represented by letters of the alphabet {A,C,G, T}. The human genome is
composed of over 3 billion nucleotides (letters) distributed along 23 pairs of chromosomes.
Most of the DNA sequence is conserved across the whole human population and it is
estimated that no more than 0.1% of the DNA differs between any two individuals [64].
It is this difference that influences an individual’s health status and other aspects. In
recent years, due to the decreasing cost of sequencing technologies, the use of genomic
data has increased dramatically. Its applications can be grouped in four main areas:
clinical care, genomic research, recreational genomics, and legal and forensic genomics:
• Clinical Care. It has been proved that mutations in an individual’s genomic
makeup can influence his or her health status. In particular, genetic mutations
can be associated with change in the susceptibility to a certain disease and in the
response to pharmaceutical agents. The latter is used particularly in oncology.
Thus, early diagnosis and treatment can be tailored to an individual’s genetic
makeup [48].
• Genomic Research. Research studies that explore the genome function are being
conducted worldwide. Researchers are discovering new associations between the
genome and a number of disorders and variable responses to treatments almost on
a weekly basis. The challenge is to identify and validate associations with effect
sizes, sensitivity, and specificity that enable counseling about risk beyond what is
predicted by traditional clinical factors [54].
• Recreational Genomics. In the last few years we have witnessed the rise of
direct-to-consumer (DTC) services for medical data in general, and genomic data in
particular. These services have made it affordable for individuals to become directly
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involved in the collection, processing, and even in the analysis of their medical and
genomic data. Some well-known examples are 23andMe [19] and ancestry.com [1]
that provide their costumers with reports, based on their genotype, about their
ethnic mix, their potential kinship and disease susceptibility.
• Legal and Forensic Genomics. Given that genomic data has a static nature
and uniquely identifies an individual, this information is used also for investigative
purposes.
In this thesis, we focus on the protection of genomic data for the first two application
areas.
Genetic Variation
As already mentioned, around 99.9% of the whole human genome is identical for any
two individuals. The remaining part (∼0.1%) is referred to as genetic variation. Most
commonly, this genetic variation comes from differences in single nucleotides, called sin-
gle nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs). For example, in Figure 2.1, two sequenced DNA
fragments from two individuals contain a single different nucleotide at a particular ge-
netic position (i.e., locus). Yet, there exist many other types of genetic differences, also
involving multiple nucleotides, that are much less frequent such as insertions/deletions
(INDELs), duplications (DUPs), copy number variants (CNVs) and more complex struc-
tural variants (SVs).
Figure 2.1: Single nucleotide polymorphism
(SNP) with alleles C and T ( c© David Hall, Li-
cense: Creative Commons).
In the human population, a given ge-
netic locus can have several possible ver-
sions (or alleles) with different genetic
variations. Due to the diploid nature of so-
matic human cells, a human genome com-
prises two sets of chromosomes – one in-
herited from each parent. Therefore, each
individual either has two copies of the
same allele/variant (homozygous) or two
copies of different alleles/variants (het-
erozygous). Genetic variants in a given
individual genome are identified by com-
paring the genome with the reference hu-
man genome, a digital sequence of nu-
cleotides considered representative of the
human genetic makeup. In the vast ma-
jority of cases, a genetic variant is bial-
lelic, i.e., it can take two different alleles:
a reference allele, the one appearing on the
reference human genome, and an alternate
allele, the alternative version occurring in
the human population. The presence of
the latter is quantified by the alternate allele frequency. It is important to note that
a variant is such only when it carries at least one alternate allele. Hence, at a given
locus, an individual can be homozygous reference (i.e., taking two reference alleles) and
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not have a variant, or have a variant and then be heterozygous (one reference and one
alternate alleles) or homozygous alternate (two alternate alleles). For example, assume
that ‘A’ is the alternate allele and ‘R’ the reference allele for a potential SNP position
(both ‘A’ and ‘R’ are from the set {A,C,G, T}). Then, in Table 2.1, we illustrate the
probable states of this SNP for an offspring, for different combinations of the father’s
and mother’s alleles. In this thesis, we encode the value (or genotype) of a variant with
the number of alternate alleles it contains, i.e., 0, 1 or 2.
Genotype-Phenotype Association
Genomic variants can be associated with diseases and traits more generally denoted as
phenotypes. For example the presence of some specific variants can either increase the
predisposition of an individual to develop a disease at some point in time, or be protective
with respect to that disease. These associations are usually studied through genome-wide
association studies (GWAS) phenome-wide association studies (PheWAS).
MOTHER
R A
F
A
T
H
E
R R
RR
(homozygous reference)
AR
(heterozygous)
A
RA
(heterozygous)
AA
(homozygous alternate)
Table 2.1: Possible SNP states for an offspring,
given different combinations of his parents’ al-
leles for the same SNP position. ‘R’ represents
the reference allele and ‘A’ represents the alter-
nate allele.
The strength of the genome-phenome
association is generally quantified by the
effect size, denoted as ω = log(OR), where
OR is the odds ratio. The odds repre-
sent the ratio between the probability of
disease occurrence in a given group and
the probability of non-occurence in the
same group. The odds ratio is the odds
in the group of individuals carrying a ge-
netic variant divided by the odds in the
group of those not carrying it. If there are
Ndg individuals carrying a disease and a
variant, Nhg healthy individuals carrying
the same variant, Ndn individuals carrying the disease but not the variant, and Nhn
healthy individuals not carrying the variant, then the OR is
Ndg/Nhg
Ndn/Nhn
.
Genetic Correlations
Because genetic segments (or haplotypes) are inherited in blocks, physically close variants
are very often correlated. Such a correlation is called linkage disequilibrium (LD). LD is
usually measured by the correlation coefficient r2 and it can be used to infer the value
(or genotype) of a given variant from the genotype of other variants1.
Beyond intra-genome correlations, there exist inter-genome correlations that stem
from sexual reproduction. During the reproduction process, at each genetic position, a
child inherits one allele from his mother and one from his father. Under the Mendelian
inheritance assumption, each allele of a parent is passed to the child with equal probability
0.5, independently of the other positions. Moreover, given both parents’ genomes, a
child’s genome is conditionally independent of all other ancestors’ genomes. We illustrate
the Mendelian inheritance probabilities in Table 2.2
1r2 ∈ [−1, 1], where 1 is total positive correlation, 0 is no correlation, and -1 is total negative
correlation
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MOTHER
RR RA AA
F
A
T
H
E
R
R
R
RR RA AA RR RA AA RR RA AA
1 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 1 0
R
A
RR RA AA RR RA AA RR RA AA
0.5 0.5 0 0.25 0.5 0.25 0 0.5 0.5
A
A
RR RA AA RR RA AA RR RA AA
0 1 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 1
Table 2.2: Mendelian inheritance probability for the genotype of an offspring, given different
genotypes for the parents. R represents the reference allele and A represents the alternate allele.
2.2 Cryptographic Background
Modern cryptography can be defined as the scientific study of techniques for securing
digital information, transactions, and distributed computations [120].
Usually, the distinction is made between symmetric encryption and asymmetric en-
cryption. As illustrated in Figure 2.2A, in symmetric encryption, the same key is shared
between the sender and the receiver and it is used to encrypt and decrypt the message.
Symmetric encryption is mainly used for message encryption, message authentication
codes and hash functions. Instead, in asymmetric encryption, different keys are used
to encrypt and decrypt the message, as shown in Figure 2.2B. The receiver is provided
with a pair of keys composed of a public key and a secret key. The sender uses the
receiver’s public key to encrypt the plaintext, and the receiver uses his secret key to
decrypt the ciphertext. Asymmetric encryption is typically used for key exchange and
digital signatures. In general, cryptographic techniques reduce the efficiency of the al-
gorithms, introducing storage and computational overhead, while preventing users from
using the data and adversaries not in possession of the secret key from viewing or tam-
pering with the data. Yet, there exist special types of encryption that enable operations
of the encrypted data at the expense of decreased security or efficiency. In the following,
we provide a high-level explanation of property-preserving encryption and homomorphic
encryption.
Property-Preserving Encryption
Property-preserving encryption (PPE) is a special type of encryption that, as opposed to
standard probabilistic encryption which makes ciphertext indistinguishable and unusable,
preserves some of the properties of the plaintexts. Yet, it also leaks these properties. For
example, deterministic encryption encryption (DTE) [42], which always produces the
same ciphertext for a given plaintext and key, preserves and reveals the equality property
of the plaintext. By encrypting with DTE a set of messages, the resulting ciphertexts
reveal the equality of the original messages. More formally, for A,B ⊆ N with |A| ≤ |B|,
a function f : A→ B is equality-preserving if for all i, j ∈ A, f(i) = f(j) iff i = j. We say
that an encryption scheme with plaintext and ciphertext-spaces D and R, respectively, is
deterministic if EDTE(K, ·) is an equality-preserving function from D to R for all K ∈ K
(where K is the key space).
Similarly, order-preserving encryption (OPE) preserves and reveals the order property
of the plaintext. OPE was initially proposed by Agrawal et al. [21] and recently re-visited
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(B) Asymmetric Encryption
Figure 2.2: High-level representation of symmetric encryption (A) and asymmetric encryption
(B).
by Boldyreva et al. [47] and Popa et al. [155]. By encrypting a set of messages with OPE,
the resulting ciphertexts reveal the order of the messages. More formally, for A,B ⊆ N
with |A| ≤ |B|, a function f : A → B is order-preserving if for all i, j ∈ A, f(i) > f(j)
iff i > j. We say that an encryption scheme with plaintext and ciphertext-spaces D and
R, respectively, is order-preserving if EOPE(K, ·) is an order-preserving function from D
to R for all K ∈ K (where K is the key space).
PPE-based schemes have several advantages and are mainly used in the context of
encrypted database systems (e.g., CryptDB [156]) as they enable relational database
systems to operate on encrypted data in the same way as they would operate on the
plaintext data. Yet, they provide less security guarantees than standard probabilistic
encryption schemes, as they are vulnerable to inference attacks due to the amount of
information they leak. Hence, their application has to be carefully assessed.
Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption (HE) is a special type of asymmetric encryption that supports
computation on encrypted data as illustrated in Figure 2.3. Homomorphic encryption
is probabilistic. It provides semantic security, meaning that no adversary without the
secret key can compute any function of the plaintext from the ciphertext. In 2009, Craig
Gentry [91] introduced for the first time a special type of HE that enables for arbitrary
computations on ciphertexts called fully homomorphic encryption (FHE).
More formally, FHE could be described as follows. Let CS(Kp,Ks, P, C, E ,D) be a
cryptosystem with the public key space Kp, the secret key space Ks, the plaintext space
P , the ciphertext space C, the encryption function E : P ×Kp → C, and the decryption
function D : C × Ks → P . We say that the cryptosystem CS is fully homomorphic if
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Figure 2.3: High-level representation of homomorphic encryption enabling computations on
encrypted data. Different keys are used to encrypt and decrypt messages.
and only if for any function f : P ×P → P in the plaintext domain, there exists another
function h : C × C → C in the ciphertext domain such that
D(h(E(m1, kp), E(m2, kp)), ks) = f(m1,m2) (2.1)
for any m1,m2 ∈ P , (kp, ks) ∈ Kp ×Ks.
Yet, despite its complete functionality, FHE is unpractical as it introduces enormous
computational and storage overheads that make it unusable for real-world applications.
For this reason, many variations of FHE have been proposed in the past few years
with the goal to improve efficiency by sacrificing some flexibility. Such cryptosystems
are called practical homomorphic cryptosystems, and according to their functionality,
they can be classified as additively homomorphic if they satisfy only the addition of
ciphertexts, multiplicatively homomorphic if they satisfy only multiplication, or somewhat
homomorphic if they support addition and a limited number of multiplications.
Part I
Protecting Medical and Genomic
Privacy in Clinical Care
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Chapter 3
Privacy-Preserving Processing of Raw
Genomic Data
The exponentially increasing amount of raw genomic data produced by next-generation
sequencing technologies for clinical purposes poses important challenges in terms of se-
cure storage and privacy-preserving management. In this chapter, we propose the first
privacy-preserving system for the storage and selective retrieval of encrypted short reads
in sequence alignment/map (SAM) files from a centralized biobank.
3.1 Introduction
Genomics holds great promise for better predictive medicine and improved diagnoses.
However, genomics also comes with a risk to privacy [31] (e.g., revelation of an individ-
ual’s genetic properties due to the leakage of his genomic data). An increasing number
of medical units (pharmaceutical companies or hospitals) are willing to outsource the
storage of genomes generated in clinical trials. Acting as a third party, a biobank could
store patients’ genomic data that would be used by the medical units for clinical trials.
In the meantime, the patient can also benefit from the stored genomic information by
interrogating his own genomic data, together with his family doctor, for specific genetic
predispositions, susceptibilities and metabolical capacities. The major challenge here is
to preserve the privacy of patients’ genomic data while allowing the medical units to
operate on specific parts of the genome (for which they are authorized).
We can put the research on genomic privacy in three main categories: (i) re-
identification of anonymized genomic data [209, 85, 99, 220], (ii) cryptographic algorithms
to protect genomic data [200, 114, 35, 29, 30, 28], and (iii) private clinical genomics [59].
To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing works on genomic privacy addresses the
issue of private processing of aligned, raw genomic data (i.e., sequence alignment/map
files), which is crucial to enable the use of genomic data in clinical trials.
Sequence alignment/map (SAM and its binary version BAM) files are the de facto
standards used to store the aligned1, raw genomic data generated by next-generation
DNA sequencers and bioinformatic algorithms. There are hundreds of millions of short
1Alignment is with respect to the reference genome, which is assembled by the scientists.
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reads (each including between 100 and 400 nucleotides) in the SAM file of a patient.
Typically, each nucleotide is present in several short reads in order to have sufficiently
high coverage of each patient’s DNA.
In general, geneticists prefer storing aligned, raw genomic data of the patients (i.e.,
their SAM files), in addition to their variant calls (which include each nucleotide on
the DNA sequence once, hence is much more compact) due to the following reasons:
(i) Bioinformatic algorithms and sequencing platforms for variant calling are currently
not yet mature, and hence geneticists prefer to observe each nucleotide in several short
reads. (ii) If a patient carries a disease, which causes specific variations in the diseased
cells (e.g., cancer), his DNA sequence in his healthy cells will be different from those
diseased. Such variations can be misclassified as sequencing errors by only looking at the
patient’s variant calls (rather than his short reads). And (iii) due to the rapid evolution
of genomic research, geneticists do not know enough to decide which information should
really be kept and what is superfluous, hence they prefer to store all outcome of the
sequencing process as SAM files.
In this chapter, we propose a privacy-preserving system for the storage, retrieval and
processing of SAM files. In a nutshell, the proposed scheme stores the encrypted SAM
files of the patients at a biobank and enables a medical unit to retrieve a range of nu-
cleotides on the DNA sequence (for a genetic test) while protecting the patients’ genomic
privacy. It is important to note that the proposed scheme enables the privacy-preserving
processing of the SAM files both for individual treatment (when the medical unit is em-
bodied in a hospital) and for genetic research (when the medical unit is embodied in a
pharmaceutical company). The main contributions of this chapter are summarized in
the following:
• We develop a privacy-preserving framework for the retrieval of encrypted short
reads (in the SAM files) from the biobank without revealing the scope of the request
to the biobank.
• We develop an efficient system for obfuscating (i.e., masking) specific parts of the
encrypted short reads that are out of the requested range of the medical unit (or
that the patient prefers to keep secret) at the biobank before providing them to
the medical unit.
• We show the benefit of masking by evaluating the information leak to the medical
unit, with and without the masking is in place.
• We implement the proposed privacy-preserving system, evaluate its efficiency, and
show its practicality by using real genomic data.
We summarize the notations used in this Chapter in Table 3.1.
3.2 Sequence Alignement Map (SAM) Format
The DNA sequence data produced by DNA sequencers consists of millions of short reads,
each typically including between 100 and 400 nucleotides (A,C,G,T), depending on the
type of sequencer (Fig. 3.1). These reads are randomly sampled from a human genome.
Each read is then bioinformatically treated and positioned (aligned) to its genetic location
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Notation Description
CS Cigar string of a short read
OPE Order-preserving encryption
SC Stream cipher encryption
SE Semantically secure symmetric encryption
SAM Sequence aligned/map
Li,j = 〈xi|yj〉 Position of a short read, where xi represents the chromosome number and yj
represents the position of its first aligned nucleotide on chromosome
MP (.) Mapping function for patient P used before OPE encryption
Ki,j Key shared between parties i and j for semantically secure encryption scheme
KOP OPE key for patient P
MP Master key of patient P used to generate the keys of the stream cipher
K
Ci,j
P Stream cipher key used to encrypt the content of the short read at position Li,j
Ci,j Content of the short read at position Li,j
Si,j Random salt to provide different keys for the short reads with the same positions
H pseudorandom function
E(Ki,m) Public-key encryption of message m under public key of i
ESE(Ki,j ,m) Semantically secure symmetric encryption of message m under symmetric key Ki,j
EOPE(K
O
P ,m) OPE of message m using the OPE key of P
ESC(K
Ci,j
P , Ci,j) Stream cipher encryption of short read content
[RL, RU ] Requested nucleotide range
Γ Maximum number of nucleotides in a short read
Vm Binary masking vector indicating the positions to be masked by the biobank
ΠP Set of positions for which the patient P does not give consent
∆ Set of encrypted (with OPE) positions of short reads to be retrieved from the biobank
Table 3.1: Notation used throughout the chapter.
to produce a so-called SAM file. There are hundreds of millions of short reads in the
SAM file of one patient.
Figure 3.1: Format of a short read in a SAM file.
The privacy-sensitive fields of a short read are (i) its position with respect to the
reference genome, (ii) its cigar string (CS), and (iii) its content (including the nucleotides
from {A, T,G,C}). For simplicity of the presentation, from here on, we focus on these
three fields only. We note that the rest of the short read does not contain privacy sensitive
information about the patient, hence the rest of the short read can be encoded as a vector
and provided to the medical unit, along with the aforementioned privacy-sensitive fields.
A short read’s position denotes the position of the first aligned nucleotide in its
content, with respect to the reference genome. The position of a short read is in the form
Li,j = 〈xi|yj〉, where xi represents the chromosome number (xi ∈ [1, 23] as there are 23
chromosomes in the human genome) and yj represents the position of its first aligned
nucleotide on chromosome xi (yj ∈ [1, 240M] as the maximum number of nucleotides on
20 CHAPTER 3. PRIVACY-PRESERVING PROCESSING OF RAW GENOMIC DATA
Operaon Descripon
M alignment match (can be a sequence match or mismatch)
I inseron to the reference
D deleon from the reference
N skipped region from the reference
S
so clipping (misalignment), clipped sequences (i.e., 
misaligned nucleodes) present in the content
H
hard clipping (misalignment), clipped sequences (i.e., 
misaligned nucleodes) NOT present in the content
P padding (silent deleon from padded reference)
Table 3.2: Operations in the Cigar String (CS) of a short read [8].
Posion 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Reference A G C A T G T T A G A T A A G A T * * A G C T G T G C T A G T A
Content of the SR a t g T A A * A T G C . . . T A T G C G A G
3S 3M 1D 2M 2I 3N 8MCigar String (CS)
Figure 3.2: Content of a short read (SR) and its Cigar String (CS) with respect to the reference
genome. The position of the short read corresponds to the first aligned nucleotide in its content
and it is 12 in this example. The CS of the short read includes 7 pairs, each indicating an
operation from Table 3.2 and the number of nucleotides involved in the corresponding operation.
The non-aligned nucleotides (the 3 nucleotides represented with the operation “S” in the CS)
are represented in lowercase letters (i.e., a). The dots (at positions 18−20) and star (at position
15) represent a skipped region and a deletion in the SR, respectively, and they are not present
in the actual content.
a chromosome is around 240 million). The cigar string (CS) of a short read expresses the
variations in the content of the short read. The CS includes pairs of nucleotide lengths
and the associated operations. The operations in the CS indicate some properties about
the content of the short read such as which nucleotides align with the reference, which
are deleted from the reference, and which are insertions that are not in the reference
(without revealing the content of the short read).We illustrate descriptions of common
operations in the CS in Table 3.2. Finally, the content of a short read includes the
nucleotides. In Fig. 3.2, we illustrate how the content of a short read looks and how
the CS of the corresponding short read is generated. We note that the actual content
only includes nucleotides; the dots (at positions 18 − 20) and star (at position 15) in
Fig. 3.2 are not present in the content, and they are understood from the CS of the
short read. In practice, the position of a short read is in the form Li,j = 〈xi|yj〉, where
xi represents the chromosome (xi ∈ [1, 23]) and yj represents the position of the short
read on chromosome xi (yj ∈ [1, 240M]). For the clarity of the example in Fig. 3.2, we
simplified the representation of the position.
3.3 Overview of the Proposed Solution
In this work, we develop a privacy-preserving system for the storage, retrieval and pro-
cessing of the SAM files (details are in Section 3.6).
We assume that the sequencing and encryption of the genomes are done at a certified
institution (CI), which is a trusted entity. Short reads are encrypted after the sequencing,
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Figure 3.3: Parts to be masked in the short
reads for out-of-range content.
Figure 3.4: Parts to be masked in a short
read based on patient’s consent. The pa-
tient does not give consent to reveal the
dark parts of the short read.
and encrypted SAM files of the patients are stored at a biobank (for security, efficiency,
and availability). We note that a private company (e.g., cloud storage service) or the
government could play the role of the biobank. When a medical unit (MU) requests a
specific range of nucleotides (on the DNA sequence of one or multiple patients) for a
genetic test, the biobank provides all the short reads that include at least one nucleotide
from the requested range. We assume that an MU is a broad unit consisting of many sub-
units (e.g., physicians or specialized clinics) that can potentially request nucleotides from
any parts of a patient’s genome. To avoid the biobank from associating the conducted
genetic tests with the patients, we hide both the real identities of the patients (using
pseudonyms) and the types of the conducted tests from the biobank.2 We hide the types
of the conducted tests from the biobank by permuting the positions of the short reads,
and then using order-preserving encryption (OPE) on the positions of the short reads.
OPE is a deterministic encryption scheme whose encryption function preserves numerical
ordering of the plaintexts [21].
As each short read includes between 100 and 400 nucleotides, some short reads that
are provided to the MU might include information out of the MU’s requested range of
genomic data, as in Fig. 3.3. Similarly, some provided short reads might contain privacy-
sensitive SNPs of the patient, hence the patient might not give consent to reveal such
parts, as in Fig. 3.4. Therefore we mask such parts of the encrypted short reads at the
biobank, without decrypting them using an efficient algorithm.
The cryptographic keys of each patient are stored on a masking and key manager
(MK) by using the patient’s pseudonym (hence the participation of the patient is not
required in the protocol).3 The MK can also be embodied by the government or a private
company. To avoid the MK from associating the genetic tests with the patients, we do
not reveal the identities of the MUs or the patients to the MK.
3.4 Design Constraints and Options
For security, efficiency, and availability, we propose storing the SAM files at a biobank
instead of at the MU. Extreme precaution is needed for the storage of genomic data
due to its sensitivity. We assume that the biobank is more “security-aware” than an
2Knowing the MU (e.g., the name of the hospital) the biobank could de-anonymize an individual
using other sources (e.g., by associating the time of the test and the location of the MU with the location
patterns of the victim).
3Following our discussions with geneticists and medical doctors, we conclude that the patient’s
involvement in the genetic tests is not desired for the practicality of the protocol (e.g., when a pharma-
ceutical company conducts genetic research on thousands of patients).
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MU, hence it can protect the stored genomic data against a hacker better than an MU
(yet, attacks against the biobank cannot be ruled out, as we discuss next). Indeed, this
assumption is supported by recent serious medical data breaches from various MUs [7].
Furthermore, by storing the SAM files at one biobank, multiple MUs can reliably access
the patients’ genomic data from it (instead of each MU individually storing that same
large amount of data) at any time.
We propose outsourcing the storage of the cryptographic keys (of the patients) to
the MK instead of storing them on a patient’s device (e.g., a smartphone) due to the
following two reasons: (i) It is not realistic to assume that all the patients will take
sufficient precautions to protect their cryptographic keys (which will possibly be stored
in their smartphones), and (ii) if the keys are stored on a patient’s device, operations
involving the patient are done on the MU’s (e.g., the hospital) computer via the patient’s
device, hence this approach requires the involvement of the patient in the operation (e.g.,
physical presence at the hospital). Whereas, following our discussions with geneticists
and medical doctors, we conclude that the patient’s involvement in the genetic tests is
not desired for the practicality of the protocol (e.g., when a pharmaceutical company
conducts genetic research on thousands of patients).
In this work, we use OPE instead of private information retrieval (PIR), searchable
encryption [183, 117], or oblivious RAM (O-RAM) storage [94] techniques for the privacy-
preserving retrieval of the short reads for the following reasons: (i) As we discussed before,
the short reads are randomly sampled from the genomes of the patients, and hence the
positions of the short reads vary in each patient’s genome. The MU typically asks for a
particular range of nucleotides on the DNA sequence of one or multiple patients. However,
these requested nucleotides reside in different short reads for each patient and the MU
does not know which nucleotide is stored in which short reads of each patient (storing the
positions of all short reads and the list of nucleotides they accommodate for each patient
at every MU requires significant storage overhead). Thus, the MU does not know exactly
which short reads to ask for, and hence PIR or searchable encryption techniques would be
impractical for our scenario. And (ii) although O-RAM techniques completely hide the
data access patterns from the server (biobank), even the most efficient implementations
of O-RAM introduce high storage overhead to both the client (MU) and the server
(biobank) and introduce about 25 times more overhead with respect to non-oblivious
storage [186].
3.5 Threat Model and Security Considerations
We consider the following models for the attacker:
• A curious party at the biobank (or a hacker who breaks into the biobank), who tries
(i) to infer the genomic sequence of a patient from his stored genomic data and (ii) to
associate the type of the genetic test (e.g., the disease for which the patient is being
tested, which can be inferred from the nucleotides requested by the MU) with the
patient being tested.
• A curious party at the MK (or a hacker who breaks into the MK), who tries (i) to
infer the genomic sequence of a patient from his stored cryptographic keys and the
information provided by the biobank and (ii) to associate the type of the genetic test
with the patient being tested.
• A curious party at an MU, who can be considered either as an attacker who hacks
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into the MU’s system or a disgruntled employee who has access to the MU’s database.
The goal of such an attacker is to obtain the private genomic data of a patient for which
it is not authorized.
Apart from (potentially) being curious, we assume that the biobank, the MK, and
the MUs are honest organizations. That is, the biobank, the MK, and the MUs honestly
follow the protocols and provide correct information to the other parties. In the following,
we discuss how we prevent the aforementioned attacks.
SAM files are encrypted (at the CI) and stored at the biobank to prevent the biobank
from inferring the genomic data of the patients (details about encryption are in Sec-
tion 3.6.1). To avoid the biobank from associating the conducted genetic tests with the
patients, we hide both the real identities of the patients (using pseudonyms) and the
types of the conducted tests (using OPE on the positions of the short reads) from the
biobank. Note, however, that the biobank knows the real identity of an MU to make
sure that the request comes from a valid source.4 To avoid the MK from associating the
genetic tests with the patients, we do not reveal the identities of the MUs or the patients
to the MK. Alternatively (to further increase the security of the scheme), a group signa-
ture scheme or anonymous credentials can be integrated for the communication between
the MU and the MK. By this way, the MK can also make sure that a request is coming
from an authorized MU, without knowing the real identity of the corresponding MU.
Even though we encrypt the positions of the short reads (using OPE) to hide the
conducted genetic tests from the biobank, the biobank might still infer the approximate
positions of the short reads as a result of using OPE. The biobank does not see the
exact bounds of the queries, but it can sort all short reads of the stored genome based
on their offsets, which certainly gives it a rough idea which short read contains which
nucleotides, and hence which genetic test is being performed. To avoid this, for each
patient, we re-define the positions of the short reads before encrypting them using OPE
(as discussed in detail in Section 3.6.1).
We also make sure that the MK cannot infer the genomic data of the patients by using
the information it receives from the biobank and the cryptographic keys it stores. Indeed,
as we will discuss in Section 3.6.2, we only provide the positions and the cigar strings
(CSs) of a subset of the short reads (depending on the range of nucleotides requested by
the MU) to the MK, which is not enough to infer the nucleotides residing in the contents
of corresponding short reads (the contents of the short reads are never transferred to
the MK). By only analyzing the CS (without having access to the content), the MK can
learn the locations of some insertions and deletions in the patient’s genome (but not the
contents of these insertions or deletions). However, the MK cannot infer the locations
or contents of the patient’s privacy-sensitive point mutations (e.g., SNPs), which are
typically used to evaluate the predispositions of the patients to various diseases. These
privacy-sensitive point mutations can only be inferred when the CS is used together with
the content of the short read (which is not revealed to the MK). Furthermore, as we
mentioned in Section 3.3, by masking the encrypted short reads before providing them
to the MU, we avoid the MU acquiring more genomic data than it requests.
4Knowing the MU (e.g., the name of the hospital), the biobank could de-anonymize an individual
using other sources (e.g., by associating the time of the test and the location of the MU with the location
patterns of the victim). Thus, we hide the types of the conducted tests from the biobank to avoid it
associating the conducted genetic test with the individual.
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Collusion between the parties (i.e., the biobank, the MK, and an MU) is not allowed in
our threat model and we assume that laws could enforce this. Finally, all communication
between the parties are encrypted to protect the system from an external attacker.
3.6 Privacy-Preserving Processing of Raw Genomic Data
3.6.1 Cryptographic Keys and Encryption of the Short Reads
We represent the position of a short read (Li,j = 〈xi|yj〉) as a 35-bit number, where the
first 5 bits represent the chromosome number (xi) and the remaining 30 bits represent
the position of the short read in the corresponding chromosome (yj). If the positions of
the short reads were encrypted following this representation, the biobank could infer the
approximate positions of the short reads as a result of using OPE.
<Chromosome> | <Posion on the chromosome>
1 | 1-230M 2 | 1-240M …
PERMUTE
MAP
DIVIDE
1 | 200M-230M & 2 | 1-10M 1 | 1-40M 2 | 210M-240M & 3 | 1-10M 
91 122 11 26 232 81 201 221 132 171 16 43 …
11 12 13 14 15 16 21 22 23 24 25 26 …
<1> 91 <2> 122 <3> 11 <4> 26 <5> 232 <6> 81 <7> 201 <8> 221 <9> 132 <10> 171 <11> 16 <12> 43 …
<3> <1 | 1-40M>  
<4><2 | 210M-240M> & <4><3 | 1-10M> 
<11><1 | 200M-230M> & <11><2 | 1-10M> 
Figure 3.5: Division, permutation and mapping of the positions on the whole genome.
To avoid this, we first divide the positions on the whole genome into parts of equal
lengths, permute these parts, and then modify the positions in each part based on the
permutation. In Figure 3.5, we show such an example, in which the positions on the
genome are divided into parts of length 40 million (totaling 75 parts as there are 3 billion
nucleotides in the human genome). For example, chromosome 1 is divided into 6 parts
(11, 12, . . . , 16), where the last part includes positions from both the first and second
chromosomes. After division, all parts are permuted and mapped to different positions.
As a result of the new mapping, the new position of a short read at Li,j = 〈xi|yj〉 becomes
M(Li,j) = 〈k〉〈xi|yj〉, where M(.) is the mapping function for patient P, and k is the
mapping of the corresponding part. For example, the position of a short read located in
the first part of the first chromosome (part 11 in Fig. 3.5) becomes M(Li,j) = 〈3〉〈xi|yj〉
after the permutation and mapping. Thus, for each patient, we re-define the positions of
the short reads based on this new positioning, before encrypting the positions of the short
reads using OPE. By doing so, we also change the ordering of the encrypted positions of
the short reads. As a consequence, a curious party at the biobank cannot infer which part
of the patient’s genome is queried by the MU from the stored (encrypted) positions of the
short reads. Finally, we assume that the MK keeps the mapping table MP (showing the
mapping of each part in each chromosome) for each patient. Note that as the permutation
3.6. PRIVACY-PRESERVING PROCESSING OF RAW GENOMIC DATA 25
is done differently for each patient, the biobank cannot infer if two different patients are
having a similar genetic test.
Content of SR in 
the SAM ﬁle a t g T A A A T G C T A T G C G A G
Plaintext content 
in binary
0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
Key stream 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
Encrypted 
content (XOR)
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Masking vector 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Random masking
string
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
Masked enc. 
content (XOR)
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
Decrypted binary
content (XOR)
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Decrypted 
nucleodes
T G C T A A A G G C T G A T G G C A
Properes of the SR
CS of the SR before masking 3S3M1D2M2I3N8M
Posion of the SR 12
Input parameters
Requested range of nucleodes 10-20
Non-consented posions {3,5,11,17,21}
Output parameters CS of the SR aer masking 3O3M1D1M1O2I3N8O
Encoding nucleodes
A 00
T 01
C 10
G 11
(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 3.6: Illustrative example for the encryption, masking and decryption of the content of a
short read (SR). (a) Content of the SR (the 2 stars between positions 17 and 21 represent the
positions at which the SR has insertions, G and C), its binary representation, the key stream
to encrypt the corresponding content, and the format of the encrypted content. Furthermore,
following the discussion in Section 3.6.2, we illustrate the masking process considering the range
of the requested nucleotides and the patient’s consent (in (c)). Finally, we show the format of
the decrypted binary content. (b) Encoding format of the nucleotides. (c) Properties of the
corresponding short read.
The different parts of each short read are encrypted as follows: (i) The positions of the
short reads are encrypted using order-preserving encryption (OPE), (ii) the cigar string
(CS) of each short read is encrypted using a semantically secure symmetric encryption
function (SE), and (iii) the content of each short read is encrypted using a stream cipher
(SC). We note that an SC also provides semantic security, and although we really need
an SC for the encryption of the content, one can also use an SC for the encryption of the
CS.
We represent the key used for the semantically secure encryption scheme between
two parties i and j as Ki,j . The symmetric OPE key that is used to encrypt the po-
sitions of the short reads of patient P is represented as KOP . Further, the master key
of patient P, which is used to generate the keys of the SC is represented as MP . We
denote K
Ci,j
P as the SC key used to encrypt the content of the short read whose po-
sition is Li,j (where Ci,j represents the content of the short read with position Li,j).
We compute K
Ci,j
P = H(MP ,F(Li,j , Si,j), Li,j), where Li,j is the (starting) position of
the corresponding short read (on the DNA sequence), Si,j is a random salt to provide
different keys for the short reads with the same positions, and H is a pseudorandom
function. Moreover, F(Li,j , Si,j) is a function that generates a nonce from the position
and the random salt of the corresponding short read. We represent the public-key en-
cryption of message m under the public key of i as E(Ki,m), the encryption of message
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EOPE( ,POSITION) ESE( ,CS) ESC( ,CONTENT) RAND.SALT
Figure 3.7: Format of an encrypted short read. The size of each field is discussed in Section 3.8.
m via a semantically secure symmetric encryption function (SE) using the symmetric
key between i and j as ESE(Ki,j ,m), and the OPE of message m using the OPE key of
P as EOPE(K
O
P ,m). Furthermore, we represent the SC encryption of the content of a
short read as ESC(K
Ci,j
P , Ci,j), where Ci,j represents the content of the short read at Li,j .
In Fig. 3.6(a), we illustrate how the content of a short read is translated to plaintext
bits and encrypted using SC (by XOR-ing the content with the key stream). Finally, in
Fig. 3.7, we illustrate the format of an encrypted short read.
We assume that the certified institution (CI), where the patient’s DNA is sequenced
and analyzed, has KOP , MP , and KP,CI (KP,CI is used to encrypt the CSs of the short
reads) for the initial encryption of the patient’s genomic data. These keys are then
deleted from the CI after the sequencing, alignment, and encryption. We also assume
that for each patient P, the MK stores KOP , MP , and KP,CI along with the mapping
table MP (as discussed before). Finally, the MU only stores the public key of the MK,
KMK .
3.6.2 Proposed Protocol
Typically, a specialist at the MU (e.g., a physician at the hospital or a specialized clinic
connected to the hospital) requests a range of nucleotides (on the DNA sequence of one
or more patients) from the biobank (either for a personal genetic test or for clinical
research). For simplicity of the presentation, we assume that the request is for a specific
range of nucleotides of patient P. We illustrate the connections between the parties that
are involved in the protocol in Fig. 3.8(a). In the following, we describe the steps of the
proposed protocol (these steps are also illustrated in Fig. 3.8(b)).
• Step 1: The patient (P) provides a sample (e.g., his saliva) along with his permission
to the certified institution (CI) for sequencing.
• Step 2: The CI does the sequencing and constructs the SAM file of the patient. The
short reads of the patient are also encrypted at the CI (as discussed in Section 3.6.1).
• Step 3: The CI sends the encrypted SAM file to the biobank along with the corre-
sponding pseudonym of the patient. The CI also sendsKOP ,MP , KP,CI , and the mapping
table MP for patient P directly to the MK via a secure channel (we do not illustrate this
step in Fig. 3.8). We note that the first 3 steps of the protocol are executed only once.
• Step 4: A specialized sub-unit at the MU requests nucleotides from the range [RL, RU ]
(RL being the lower bound and RU being the upper bound of the requested range) on the
DNA sequence of patient P for a genetic test. We note that an access control unit stores
the authorizations (i.e., access rights) of the original request owners (e.g., specialist at
a hospital) to different parts of the genomic data. In our setting, the MU checks the
access rights of the original request owner before forwarding the request to the biobank.
Once, the MU verifies that the original request owner has the sufficient access rights to
the requested range of nucleotides, the MU generates a one-time session key KMK,MU ,
which will be used for the secure communication between the MU and the MK. The MU
encrypts this session key with the public key of the MK to obtain E(KMK ,KMK,MU ).
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(a) (b)
Paent CI Biobank MK MU
1) Sample
2) Sequencing and 
Encryption @ CI
3) Encrypted short reads
4) E[Requested range of nucleotides], ID of the MU, E[session key], E[consent] 
6) E[upper and lower bound of the range]
7) Private retrieval of 
the reads @ biobank
8) E[positions], E[CSs]  and random salts of short reads
9) Construction of the 
masking vectors @ MK
11) Masking @ biobank
12) E[masked short reads], E[modified CSs]
E[positions] and E[decryption keys]
10) Masking request, E[modified CSs]
E[positions] and E[decryption keys]
5) E[Requested range of nucleotides], E[session key], E[consent] 
Paent
Cerﬁed 
Instuon 
(CI)
Biobank
Medical Unit 
(MU)
Curious 
Party
Masking and 
Key Manager 
(MK)
Curious 
Party
Curious 
Party
Specialized
Sub-unit
Figure 3.8: (a) Connections between the parties in the proposed protocol. (b) The operations
and message exchanges in the proposed protocol.
The MU encrypts the lower and upper bounds of the requested range withKMK,MU to
obtain ESE(KMK,MU , RL||RU ) and sends the corresponding request to the biobank along
with the pseudonym of the patient P, the identification of the MU5, E(KMK ,KMK,MU ),
and ESE(KMK,MU ,ΩP ), where ΩP is the pseudonymized consent of the patient.
6 The
MK uses this pseudonymized consent ΩP to generate the masking vectors (as in Step 9).
• Step 5: Once the biobank verifies that request comes from a valid source7, it for-
wards ESE(KMK,MU , RL||RU ), and ESE(KMK,MU ,ΩP ), along with the pseudonym of
the patient, and the encrypted session key E(KMK ,KMK,MU ) to the MK.
• Step 6: The MK decrypts the session key to obtain KMK,MU and decrypts the request
(ESE(KMK,MU , RL||RU )) to obtain RL and RU . As we discussed before, the position of
a short read is the position of the first aligned nucleotide in its content. Let Γ be the
maximum number of nucleotides in a short read. Then, the short reads with position
in [RL − Γ, RL − 1] might also include nucleotides from the requested range ([RL, RU ])
in their contents. Thus, the MK re-defines the lower bound of the request as RL − Γ in
order to make sure that all the short reads (which include at least one nucleotide from
the requested range of nucleotides) are retrieved by the biobank.
Next, the MK determines where (RL − Γ) and RU are mapped to following the
mapping table MP of patient P (as discussed in Section 3.6.1). If both (RL − Γ) and
RU are on the same part (e.g., in Fig. 3.5), then the MK computes the range of short
read positions (to be retrieved by the biobank) as [M(RL − Γ),M(RU )], where M(.) is
the mapping function for patient P. Otherwise (if they are not on the same part), due to
the permutation of the parts, the MK generates multiple ranges of short read positions
to make sure all short reads including at least one nucleotide from [RL, RU ] are retrieved
by the biobank. For simplicity of the presentation, we assume (RL − Γ) and RU are
on the same part. Finally, the MK computes the encrypted range [EOPE(K
O
P ,M(RL −
Γ)),EOPE(K
O
P ,M(RU ))], and sends this encrypted range to the biobank (with pseudonym
of P).
5We reveal the real identity of the MU to the biobank to make sure that the request comes from a
valid source.
6ΩP denotes the positions on the patient’s genome for which the patient does not give consent to
the original request owner (e.g., specialized sub-unit at the MU).
7We assume that the biobank has a list of valid MUs, whose requests it will answer.
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• Step 7: The biobank retrieves all the short reads (in the SAM file of patient P) whose
encrypted positions (EOPE(K
O
P ,M(Li,j))) are in the set ∆ = {EOPE(K
O
P ,M(Li,j)) :
EOPE(K
O
P ,M(RL − Γ)) ≤ EOPE(K
O
P ,M(Li,j)) ≤ EOPE(K
O
P ,M(RU ))}. As OPE pre-
serves the numerical ordering of the plaintext positions, the biobank constructs the set
∆ without accessing the plaintext positions of the short reads.
• Step 8: The biobank provides ∆ along with the corresponding encrypted CSs and the
random salt values of the short reads to the MK.
• Step 9: The MK decrypts the corresponding positions and the CSs of the retrieved
short reads by using KOP and KP,CI in order to construct the masking vectors for the
biobank. These masking vectors prevent the leakage of out-of-range content (in Fig. 3.3)
and non-consented nucleotides (in Fig. 3.4) to the MU, as we discussed in Section 3.3.
We note that from the positions and the CSs of the short reads, the MK cannot infer the
locations or contents of the patient’s privacy-sensitive point mutations (e.g., SNPs), which
are typically used to evaluate the predispositions of the patients for various diseases.
These privacy-sensitive point mutations can only be inferred when the CS is used together
with the content of the short read (which is not revealed to the MK).
The MK can determine the actual position of a short read from its mapped position
as the MK has the mapping table MP for patient P (i.e., it can infer Li,j from M(Li,j)
using MP ). Using the position and the CS of a short read, the MK can determine the
exact positions of the nucleotides in the content of a short read (but not the contents of
the nucleotides, because the contents are encrypted and stored at the biobank). Using
this information, the MK can determine the parts in the content of the short read that are
out of the requested range [RL, RU ]. Furthermore, the MK can also determine whether
the short read includes any nucleotide positions for which the patient P does not give
consent. Therefore, the MK constructs binary masking vectors indicating the positions
in the contents of the short reads that are needed to be masked by the biobank before
sending the retrieved short reads to the MU.
Let ΠP be the set of nucleotide positions (on the DNA sequence) for which the patient
P does not give consent (e.g., set of positions including privacy-sensitive SNPs of the
patient). Then, the set Σ = [RL, RU ] \ΠP includes the positions of the nucleotides that
can be provided to the MU without masking. The masking vector for a short read (with
position Li,j) is constructed following Algorithm 1. In Figure 3.6(a), we illustrate how
the masking vector is constructed for the corresponding short read, when the requested
range of nucleotides is [10, 20] and for a given set of nucleotide positions (on the DNA
sequence) for which the patient P does not give consent (as in Fig. 3.6(c)).
The MK also modifies the CS of each short read (if it is marked for masking) according
to the nucleotides to be masked. That is, the MK modifies the CS such that the masked
nucleotides are represented with a new operation “O” in the CS. By doing so, when the
MU receives the short reads, it can see which parts of them are masked. In Figure 3.6(c),
we illustrate how the CS of the corresponding short read changes as a result of the
masking vector in Figure 3.6(a). Then, the MK generates the decryption keys for each
short read (whose position is in ∆) by using the master key of the patient (MP ), positions
of the shorts read, and the random salt values.8
• Step 10: The MK encrypts the positions, the (modified) CSs, and the generated
decryption keys of the contents of the short reads, using KMK,MU . Then, it sends the
8The generation of the decryption keys for the SC is the same as the generation of the encryption
keys as we discussed in Section 3.6.1.
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Algorithm 1: Construct the masking vector Vm for short read with position Li,j =
〈xi|yj〉
Input : Li,j = 〈xi|yj〉, CS of the short read at Li,j , positions of authorized nucleotides (Σ)
Output: Vm // Each nucleotide is represented by 2-bits, initially all bits are set
to 0
1 Np ← # pairs in the CS of the short read
2 P0 ← yj // Assign the position of the short read on chromosome xi to P0
3 I ← 0 // Index of the nucleotides in the content of the short read
4 for i← 1 to Np do
5 Get the ith pair of the CS with the fields ni and ℓi
6 ℓi ← Operation noted in the i
th pair of the CS (from Table 3.2)
7 ni ← # nucleotides following the operation noted in ℓi
8 if ℓi = H ∨ ℓi = P then
9 do nothing
10 else if ℓi = S then
11 for j ← 0 to (ni − 1) do
12 Vm(1, 2(I + j))← 1, Vm(1, 2(I + j) + 1)← 1 // Mark the (I + j)th nucleotide in
the content of the short read for masking
13 end
14 I ← I + ni
15 else if ℓi =M then
16 for j ← 0 to (ni − 1) do
17 if (P0) /∈ Σ then
18 Vm(1, 2(I + j))← 1, Vm(1, 2(I + j) + 1)← 1
19 end
20 P0 ← P0 + 1
21 end
22 I ← I + ni
23 else if ℓi = I then
24 if (P0) /∈ Σ then
25 for j ← 0 to (ni − 1) do
26 Vm(1, 2(I + j))← 1, Vm(1, 2(I + j) + 1)← 1
27 end
28 end
29 I ← I + ni
30 else if ℓi = D ∨ ℓi = N then
31 P0 ← P0 + ni
32 end
masking vectors along with the encrypted positions, CSs and decryption keys to the
biobank. We note that in this step, the MK encrypts the actual positions of the short
reads (e.g., Li,j instead of M(Li,j)) as these positions will be eventually decrypted and
used by the MU, and the MU does not need to know the mapping table MP of the
patient.
• Step 11: The biobank conducts the masking by XOR-ing the bits of the encrypted
content of each short read (whose position is in ∆) with a random masking string. Each
entry (bit) of the random masking string is assigned as follows: (i) If the corresponding
entry is set for masking in the masking vector, it is assigned with a random binary value,
and (ii) it is assigned with zero, otherwise. We describe this process in Algorithm 2.
Furthermore, in Figure 3.6(a), we illustrate how the masked encrypted content for the
corresponding short read is constructed by XOR-ing the random masking string with the
encrypted content.
• Step 12: Finally, the biobank sends the encrypted positions, CSs and decryption
keys (generated in Step 10 by the MK) along with the masked contents (generated in
Step 11 by the biobank) to the MU. The MU decrypts the received data and obtains the
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Algorithm 2: Construct the random masking string Vs and conduct the masking
for short read with position Li,j = 〈xi|yj〉
Input : Vm // Masking vector for the short read with position Li,j
1 ESC(K
Ci,j
P
, Ci,j) // Encrypted content with (encrypted) position
2 EOPE(K
O
P ,M(Li,j)) in ∆
Output: M{ESC(K
Ci,j
P
, Ci,j)} // The masked content
3 Vs ← zeros(1, size(Vm, 2))
4 for i← 1 to size(Vm, 2) do
5 if Vm(i) = 1 then
6 Vs(i)← Rand // Rand generates a random number from {0, 1}
7 end
8 end
9 M{ESC(K
Ci,j
P
, Ci,j)} ← ESC(K
Ci,j
P
, Ci,j)⊕ Vs
requested nucleotides of the patient.
3.7 Evaluation
Focusing on the leakage of genomic data, we evaluate the proposed privacy-preserving
system by using real genomic data to show (i) how the leakage of genomic data from
the short reads threatens the genomic privacy of a patient, and (ii) how the proposed
masking technique helps to prevent this leakage. We assume that the MU requests a
specific range of nucleotides of patient P (e.g., for a genetic test) from the biobank. In
practice, the requested range can include from one to thousands of nucleotides depending
on the type of the genetic test.
First, without the masking in place, we observe the ratio of unauthorized genomic
data (i.e., number of nucleotides provided to the MU that are out of the requested
range) to the authorized data (i.e., number of nucleotides within the requested range)
for various request sizes. For simplicity, we assume that all the nucleotides within the
requested range are considered as consented data (i.e., the situation in Figure 3.4 is not
considered); and only those that are out of the requested range (but still provided to
the MU via the short reads) are considered as the unauthorized data. For the patient’s
DNA profile (i.e., SAM file), we use a real human DNA profile [6] (with an average
coverage of 8, meaning each nucleotide is present, on the average, in 8 short reads in
the SAM file, and each short read includes at most 100 nucleotides) and we randomly
choose the ranges of requested nucleotides from the entire genome of the patient. We
illustrate our results in Fig. 3.9. We observe that for small request sizes, the amount of
leakage (of unauthorized data) is very high compared to the size of authorized data. As
the leakage vanishes (e.g., the ratio in Figure 3.9 becomes 0) with the proposed masking
technique, we do not show the leakage when the proposed masking technique is in place
in Figures 3.9 and 3.12.
Using the same DNA profile, we also observe the evolution in the amount of leaked
genomic data over time. For simplicity of the presentation, we assume slotted time and
that the MU conducts a genetic test on the patient at each time slot (by requesting a
particular range of nucleotides from a random part of his genome). In Figure 3.10, we
illustrate the amount of genomic data (i.e., number of nucleotides) that is leaked to the
MU in 100 time-slots. The jumps in the number of leaked nucleotides (at some time-
slots) is due to the fact that some requests might retrieve more short reads comprised of
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Figure 3.9: Ratio of unauthorized genomic
data to the authorized data vs. the size
of the requested range of nucleotides, when
there is no masking in place.
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Figure 3.10: Number of leaked nucleotides
vs. time for various request sizes, when
there is no masking in place.
more out-of-range nucleotides. As before, leakage becomes 0 when masking is in place,
which shows the crucial role of the proposed scheme.
We also study the information leakage, focusing on the leaked single nucleotide poly-
morphisms (SNPs) of the patient as a result of different sizes of requests (from random
parts of the patient’s genome). In Figure 3.11, we illustrate the number of SNPs leaked to
the MU in 100 time-slots. We observe that the number of leaked SNPs is more than twice
the number of authorized SNPs (which are within the requested range of nucleotides).
When the proposed masking technique is in place, the number of leaked SNPs (outside
the requested range) becomes 0 in Figure 3.11.
Finally, we study the genomic data leakage (number of leaked nucleotides and SNPs)
when the MU tests the susceptibility of the patient [6] to a particular disease (i.e., when
the MU asks for the set of SNPs of the patient that are used to test the corresponding
disease). For this study, we use real disease markers [9]. We note that for this type of test,
the size of the requested range of nucleotides (by the MU) for a single SNP is typically 1,
but the SNPs are from several parts of the patient’s genome. In Figure 3.12, we illustrate
the genomic data leakage of the patient as a result of various disease susceptibility tests
each requiring a different number of SNPs from different parts of the patient’s genome
(on the x-axis we illustrate the number of SNPs required for each test). We again observe
that the leaked SNPs, as a result of different disease susceptibility tests, reveal privacy-
sensitive data about the patient. For example, leaked SNPs of the patient as a result of a
test for the Alzheimer’s disease could leak information about the patient’s susceptibility
to “smoking behavior” or “diabetes”.
In Table 3.3, we list a small subset of the leaked SNPs, along with their clinical nature,
as a result of the disease susceptibility tests in Figure 3.12.9 For the patient’s genomics
data (i.e., SAM file), we used a real DNA profile [6] including around 300 million short
reads with a coverage of 10. We also use real disease markers [9].
It is worth noting that the SNPs in Table 3.3 are not the ones that are used to test
the patient’s susceptibility for the corresponding disease; they are the leaked SNPs due
to the corresponding genetic test (when there is no masking in place). For example, in
Table 3.3, the SNP with ID “rs6265” is not required to check the patient’s susceptibility
9We used the Ensembl database (http://www.ensembl.org/info/docs/variation/index.html) to de-
termine the clinical nature of the leaked SNPs.
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Figure 3.11: Number of leaked SNPs vs.
time for various request sizes, when there
is no masking in place.
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Figure 3.12: Number of leaked SNPs and
nucleotides during the susceptibility test to
different diseases when there is no mask-
ing in place. The values on the right y-
axis correspond to the number of leaked
nucleotides.
to the Alzheimer’s disease. However, it is leaked to the MU as one of the short reads of
the patient that include a marker for Alzheimer’s, also includes “rs6265” (as each short
read includes around 100 nucleotides, a short read could include more than one SNP).
We observe that as a result of this leakage, the patient’s (i) susceptibility to certain
diseases, and (ii) physical attributes (e.g., body mass index, susceptibility to be over-
weight, etc.) are revealed. Furthermore, a SNP might reveal more than one attributes
(e.g., “rs6265” in Table 3.3). We emphasize that leakage of SNPs (listed in Table 3.3)
is avoided when the proposed masking technique (described in Section 3.6.2) is in place
(i.e., similar to the previous cases, the number of leaked nucleotides and SNPs is 0 when
masking is in place).
3.8 Implementation and Complexity Analysis
We implemented the proposed system and assessed its storage requirement and complex-
ity on an Intel Core i7-2620M CPU with a 2.70 GHz processor under Windows 7, using
Java. As before, for the patient’s SAM file, we used a real DNA profile [6] including
around 300 million short reads (each short read including at most 100 nucleotides).
We used the Salsa20 stream cipher[43] and the implementation of OPE from [156].
We also used CCM mode of AES (with key size of 256-bits) for the secure communication
between the MK and the MU, and RSA (with key size of 2048-bits) for the public-key
encryption.
We structured the fields in the encrypted short read (in Fig. 3.7) as follows: We
reserved the first 8-bytes for the encrypted position of the short read (via OPE). To
save storage, we devoted the next 64-bytes of the encrypted short read to the CS and the
content of the short read. As the input size of the stream cipher is 64-bytes, we encrypted
the CS together with the content and other (header) information of the short read using
the stream cipher. That is, out of the 64-byte input of the stream cipher, we allocated
the first 20-bytes for the CS, the next 25-bytes for the content (as each short read in the
used DNA profile includes at most 100 nucleotides), and the remaining 19-bytes for the
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DISEASE TESTED LEAKED SNP NATURE OF THE LEAKED SNP
Alzheimer's Disease
'rs4420638' Coronary Artery Disease
'rs4420638' Type II Diabetes
'rs6265' Smoking behavior
'rs6265' Weight
Breast Cancer
'rs2273535' Suscepbility to Colon Cancer
'rs12255372' Type II Diabetes Mellitus
Cardiovascular Disease
'rs3091244' Ischemic Stroke
'rs599839' LDL Cholesterol
Crohn’s Disease
'rs17234657' Alzheimer's Disease
'rs1893217' Type 1 Diabetes
Ischemic Stroke
'rs10757278' Familial Abdominal Aorc Aneurysm
'rs10757278' Suscepbility to Coronary Heart Disease
Leukemia
'rs13397985' Crohn’s Disease
'rs872071' Interferon Regulatory Factor
Lung Cancer
'rs2273535' Suscepbility to Colon Cancer
'rs1051730' Nicone Dependence
'rs1051730' Smoking Behavior
Mulple Sclerosis
'rs6897932' Type 1 Diabetes
'rs12722489' Crohn's Disease
Parkinson's Disease 'rs356219' Alpha Synuclein
Type II Diabetes Mellitus
'rs1801282' Alzheimer's Disease
'rs1801282' Early Onset Extreme Obesity
'rs1042713' Suscepbility to Asthma, Nocturnal
'rs1042714' Suscepbility to Obesity
'rs7901695' Coronary Heart Disease
Table 3.3: Nature of the leaked SNPs as a result of various genetic tests for different diseases.
remaining information about the short read (or padding). Finally, the last byte of the
short read includes the plaintext random salt. Consequently, we computed the storage
cost as 21.6 GB per patient. We note that stream cipher encryption does not increase
the size of the data as it is the XOR of the key stream with the plaintext. The storage
overhead (due to the proposed privacy-preserving scheme) is due to the encryption of
the positions of the short reads by using OPE. A plaintext position is around 40 bits
(depending the number of parts in Fig. 3.5) and an encrypted position is 8-bytes using
the implementation of OPE in [156].
We also evaluated the computation times for different steps of the proposed scheme
(following the operations in Figure 3.8(b)) in Table 3.4. As shown in Table 3.4, the
computation time of the whole process is dominated by the retrieval of the reads at the
biobank. However, we observe that this operation can be parallelized. We note that
encryption of the SAM file at the CI (Step 2) is a one-time operation and the encryption
time is dominated by the execution of OPE. We used the implementation in [156] for
the OPE. However, the OPE encryption and decryption are shown to be about 80 times
faster using the more recent and secure version of the OPE in [155].
Overall, it takes approximately 5 seconds for the MU to receive the requested range
of nucleotides of the patient (Steps 4-12) after privacy-preserving retrieval and masking
(for a range size of 100, which includes on the average 23 short reads), which shows the
efficiency and practicality of the proposed scheme. We note that the computation time
of the whole process is dominated by the retrieval of the reads at the biobank (which
does not involve any cryptographic operations). Therefore, we can easily claim that the
cost of cryptographic operations is not a bottleneck for the proposed protocol.
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Encrypon at the CI (Step 2) Request of nucleodes at the MU (Step 4)
OPE encrypon: 7 ms/SR SC encrypon: 0.00048 ms/SR RSA encrypon: 0.216 ms AES encrypon: 0.064 ms
Private retrieval at the MK (Step 6) Private retrieval at the biobank (Step 7)
RSA decrypon: 
7.8 ms
AES decrypon: 
0.031 ms
2 x OPE encrypon: 
14 ms
Search and retrieve:
4.5 sec. (for a request size of 100)
Construcng the masking vectors at the MK (Steps 9 and 10)
OPE decrypon: 
7 ms/SR
SC decrypon (for CS): 
0.00048 ms/SR
Construct the masking vector: 
0.016 ms/SR
Generate decrypon keys for SC: 
0.026 ms/SR
Encrypt posions (using AES): 
0.029 ms/SR
Encrypt CSs (using AES): 
0.028 ms/SR
Encrypt the decrypon keys: 
0.030 ms/SR
Masking at the biobank (Step 11)
Masking: 0.015 ms/SR
Decrypon at the MU (aer Step 12)
AES decrypon (for posions): 
0.018 ms/SR
AES decrypon (for CSs): 
0.017 ms/SR
AES decrypon (for decrypon 
keys): 0.016 ms/SR
SC decrypon (for the 
content): 0.00048 ms/SR
Table 3.4: Computation times at different steps of the proposed scheme (following the steps in
Fig. 3.8(b)), where SR stands for the short read.
3.9 Summary
In this chapter, we have introduced the first privacy-preserving system for the storage,
retrieval, and processing of aligned, raw genomic data (i.e., SAM files). The proposed
scheme stores the SAM files of the patients at a biobank and lets the medical units
(hospitals or pharmaceutical companies) privately retrieve the data (they are authorized
for) from the biobank for genetic tests. We have shown that the proposed scheme effi-
ciently prevents the leakage of genomic data and preserves the genomic privacy of the
patients. We are confident that the proposed scheme will accelerate genomic research,
because clinical trial participants will be more willing to consent to the sequencing of
their genomes if they are ensured that their genomic privacy is preserved.
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Chapter 4
Privacy-Preserving Genomic Testing in
the Clinic: A Model Using HIV
Treatment
In the previous chapter, we have seen how to securely store and process raw genomic
data stored in SAM files that are required for in-depth bioinformatics analyses and clini-
cal trials. Yet, the implementation of routine genomic-based medicine is mostly based on
variant call formats (VCF) that store only the information related to the genetic varia-
tion. In this chapter, we address unresolved questions regarding the privacy-preserving
storage and process of genetic variants and the delivery of interpreted test results to
health-care practitioners. We used DNA-based prediction of HIV-related outcomes as a
use case for our model and we report its successful implementation in the context of the
Swiss HIV Cohort Study.
4.1 Introduction
The clinical use of genomic data has the potential to improve healthcare by allowing
for more individualized preventive and therapeutic strategies. However, such use raises
critical issues regarding the protection of the data, its predictive power, the interpretation
and delivery of results.
Currently, the majority of clinical genetic testing consists of targeted genotyping of
one or a few markers. However, it is likely that future testing will involve the in silico
selection of relevant markers from a large set of previously genotyped variants (e.g. by
whole genome sequencing). Large-scale genetic data will thus be stored and analyzed
routinely in a clinical context, still they have specificities that differentiate them from the
rest of health-related information: genomic data have the potential to inform on identity,
ancestry and risks of multiple diseases in a given patient and their relatives [191]. Addi-
tionally, many of the approaches used in research (e.g. anonymization, de-identification)
are not applicable to genetic information, as the genome is the ultimate identifier for
each individual. Thus, there is a requirement for additional strategies that preserve the
privacy of genomic data while not compromising the accuracy of results.
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Clinical genetic tests vary in number of informative markers and overall predictive
power. Some tests are deterministic (or nearly deterministic), and thus are associated
with a clear interpretation (e.g., HLA-B*57 and severe hypersensitivity reaction to aba-
cavir [136, 166]). However, other variants are largely non-deterministic (e.g., multiple
variants moderately impact risk of metabolic disorders) and are best summarized by ge-
netic risk scores, and reported as modifying an individual’s basal risk. Thus, a real-world
framework for genomic testing needs to provide a calculation and reporting infrastructure
that incorporates both classes of results.
Another roadblock to implementing genomic-based medicine is the challenge of trans-
mitting clinically useful information to healthcare practitioners. Most clinicians lack both
the time and the specialized knowledge that are required for an expert interpretation of
genotyping results. Reports of genetic risk should, therefore, be formatted similarly to
other common laboratory tests results and include only actionable, interpreted results.
In this study, we have chosen clinical aspects of HIV care as a model setting for an
implementation of privacy-preserving genetic testing and results reporting in the clinic.
Human genetic variation impacts multiple aspects of HIV disease including rate of disease
progression off therapy (recently reviewed in [140]), response to therapy [39] and adverse
events [131] and susceptibility to metabolic disorders [97, 171, 172]. Today, decisions for
clinical care of HIV are based on guidelines, local preferences, clinical and demographic
data, viral resistance analyses, and (increasingly) cost [98]. The fact that there are now
multiple alternatives for first and second line treatments sets the stage for more informed
treatment decisions.
We surveyed 55 physicians of the Swiss HIV Cohort Study [10] who used our privacy-
preserving model for genetic testing. We evaluated their feedback on three different
aspects: clinical utility, ability to address privacy concerns and system usability. The
purpose was to identify the key aspects of our model that could represent general drivers
for a faster adoption of privacy-enhancing solutions in clinical genomics.
The main contribution of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
• We develop the first system for privacy-preserving genetic testing with ancestry
inference and delivery of interpreted results to health-care practitioners.
• We deploy our framework in the context of the Swiss HIV Cohort Study and sur-
vey physicians that used it with 230 HIV-positive individuals genotyped at 4,149
markers.
• We evaluate physicians feedback and discuss key insights that will improve the
design of privacy-preserving systems for personalized medicine in the future.
We summarize the notation used in this Chapter in Table 4.1.
4.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we summarize the main concepts in genomics and cryptography that we
use throughout the chapter, as a complement to those we have seen in Chapther 2.
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Notation Description
VCF Variant call format
OR Odds ratio
PCA Principal component analysis
SNP Single nucleotide polymorphism
HBC Honest-but-curious
DTE Deterministic encryption
Ai Set of ancestry information of participant i
Si Set of SNPs genotypes of participant i
Ni Set of values for clinical and environmental factors of participant i
PCi Set of principal components of participant i
W Set of SNP weights obtained as a result of the PCA
C Set of cluster means
G(X) Genetic risk score
R(X) Overall risk score (including clinical and environmental factors)
βj Regression coefficient where ORj = exp(βj) for the j-th covariate
pij(X) Contribution of the j-th value (or genotype) of the i-th variant to the genetic risk
α Baseline risk
[m] Paillier encryption of message m
〈m〉 Paillier partial decryption fo message m
m DGK encryption of message m
Ki Paillier public key for the i-th participant
ki Paillier secret key for the i -th participant
k1i Paillier partial secret key for the i -th participant provided to SPU
k2i Paillier partial secret key for the i -th participant provided to MU
fC([a], [b]) Encrypted result of the two-party comparison protocol with input [a] and [b]
[a]⊗ [b] = [a · b] Encrypted result of the two-party multiplication protocol with input [a] and [b]
Table 4.1: Notation used throughout the chapter.
4.2.1 Genomic Background
Computation of the Genetic Risk
As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, the strength of the association between each
variant and a disease is usually expressed by the odds ratio (OR), where the odds is the
ratio of the probability of occurrence of the disease to that of its non-occurrence in a
specific group of individuals. Thus, the OR is the ratio of odds in the group of individuals
carrying a genetic variation (exposed) to that of those who do not carry it (unexposed).
In other words, the OR illustrates by how much the risk of disease is multiplied in an
individual carrying a genetic variation compared to another individual not carrying the
same variation.
When multiple variants are associated with a disease, the overall genetic risk (G) of
an individual for the corresponding disease can be computed as a weighted average, based
on the OR of each associated variant by using an additive model [184]. In such a model,
the OR of a given variant is generally represented in terms of regression coefficient (β),
where OR = exp(β). Then, assuming Prg(X) is the susceptibility of a given individual to
disease X (only considering his genomic data), his overall genetic risk can be computed
as below:
G(X) = ln(
Prg(X)
1− Prg(X)
) = α+
∑
i∈ϕX
βip
j
i (X), (4.1)
where pij(X) is the contribution of the j-th value (or genotype) of the i-th variant
to the genetic risk (for disease X), α is the baseline risk and ϕX is the set of variants
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associated with disease X. Without loss of generality, in the rest of the chapter, we
consider pij(X) to be the number of risk alleles for each variant, hence p
i
j(X) ∈ {0, 1, 2}.
For simplicity, we only focus on the most common type of genetic variant, i.e., single
nucleotide polymorphism (SNP). Yet, we note that also other types of genetic variants
can be used.
Ancestry Inference
Ancestry inference is a necessary step to correct for population stratification before con-
ducting genetic risk tests. Indeed, predictive markers for some genetic risk tests may
have been validated only for specific populations, thus necessitating ancestry inference
from genetic data to establish clinical relevance.
According to recent studies [159], ancestry information can be accurately inferred
by applying principal components analysis (PCA) to genotype data from an admixed
population. Intuitively, PCA infers continuous axes (or principal components) of genetic
variation; these axes reduce the data to a small number of dimensions, and describe as
much variability as possible. In data sets with ancestry differences between samples,
these axes often have a geographical interpretation.
4.2.2 Cryptographic Background
In the following, we describe the properties of the two cryptosystems used in our algo-
rithm for privacy-preserving genetic association studies: a modified version of Paillier
cryptosystem [50, 26] and the DGK cryptosystem [69].
Modified Paillier Cryptosystem
The modified Paillier cryptosystem [50, 26] is a public-key cryptosystem supporting
additively homomorphic operations and providing semantic security. To the best of
our knowledge, it is the most efficient additively homomorphic scheme supporting all
the requirements of the proposed system. Other additively homomorphic cryptosys-
tems, such as ElGamal on elliptic curves, that have better performance in terms of
computation and storage costs, do not support neither Algorithm 3 nor Algorithm
4, described in Section 4.4.3. We use the modified Paillier cryptosystem to encrypt
the privacy-sensitive data of the participants. Semantic security is particularly re-
quired because the messages to be encrypted, during the proposed protocol described
in Section 4.4.4, have low entropy and could otherwise be recovered by statistical attacks.
LetK = (n, g, h = gk) represent the public key for the modified Paillier cryptosystem.
Then, the strong private key is the factorization of n = pq (p, q are safe primes), and the
weak private key is k ∈
[
1, n2/2
]
. Furthermore, let g be of order (p− 1)(q− 1)/2. Then,
by selecting a random a ∈ Z∗n2 , it can easily be computed as g = −a
2n.
• Encryption: After generating a random r ∈ [1, n/4], the encryption of a message,
m ∈ Zn, is defined as:
E(m,K) = (T1, T2), (4.2)
where (T1, T2) is the ciphertext pair such that T1 = g
r mod n2 and T2 = h
r(1+mn)
mod n2.
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• Decryption: The decryption of a ciphertext E(m,K) is performed as follows:
D(E(m,K), k) = ∆(T2/T
k
1 ) = m, (4.3)
where ∆(u) = (u−1) mod n
2
n , for all u ∈ {u < n
2 | u = 1 mod n}.
• Proxy re-encryption: Let us assume that the secret key is randomly split into
two shares k1 and k2, such that k = k1 + k2 mod n
2. The modified Paillier
cryptosystem enables an encrypted message (T1, T2) to be partially decrypted into
a ciphertext pair (T˜1, T˜2) using k1 as below:
T˜1 = T1 and T˜2 = T2/T
k1
1 mod n
2. (4.4)
Then, to recover the original message, (T˜1, T˜2) can be decrypted using k2, with the
aforementioned decryption function.
• Additive Homomorphic Property : The modified Paillier is an additively homomor-
phic cryptosystem and, as such, it supports some computations in the encrypted
domain. In particular, let m1 and m2 be two messages encrypted with the same
key K. Then, the encryption of the sum of m1 and m2 can be computed as:
E((m1 +m2),K) = E(m1,K) · E(m2,K). (4.5)
As a consequence of this property, any ciphertext E(m,K) raised to a constant
number c is equal to the encryption of the product of the corresponding plaintext
and the constant as follows:
E((m · c),K) = E(m,K)c. (4.6)
For simplicity, throughout the chapter, we represent the Paillier encryption of a message
m as [m] and its partial decryption as 〈m〉. Operations between squared brackets, [ ],
denote homomorphic operations in the ciphertext domain.
DGK Cryptosystem
The DGK cryptosystem [69] is optimized for the secure comparison of integers. Com-
pared to the modified Paillier cryptosystem, it is more efficient in terms of encryption
and decryption due to its smaller message space of a few bits. Let z represent the
number of bits of the RSA modulus n, t be the size of two small primes vp and vq, and
l be the message space size in bits such that z > t > l. Also let p and q be two distinct
primes of equal bit length, such that p − 1 is divisible by vp and q − 1 is divisible by
vq. Then, the public key is represented as KDGK = (n, g, h, u), where u is a l-bit prime,
g ∈ Z∗n with order uvpvq, and h is an integer with order vpvq. Furthermore, the private
key is represented as kDGK = (p, q, vp, vq).
• Encryption: The encryption of a message m ∈ Zu is:
E(m, r,KDGK) = g
m · rn mod n2, (4.7)
where r is a random number in Z∗n.
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• Decryption: The decryption needs a look-up table for all values of Zu. Because the
message space is very small, this can be achieved efficiently. However, DGK has
a particular feature: the encryption of a zero can be checked even faster just by
raising the ciphertext c to the power of w = vp · vq since c
w mod n = 1 if and only
if c encrypts 0.
For simplicity, we represent the DGK encryption of a message m as m.
4.3 System and Threat Models
System Model
The proposed system, illustrated in Figure 4.1 involves four parties: (i) the patients
(P), (ii) a certified institution (CI) responsible for genotyping, and system initialization,
i.e., generation of cryptographic keys and encryption of patients’ genetic data, (iii) a
storage and processing unit (SPU) where the encrypted genetic variants are stored and
(iv) health care practitioners, or medical units (MU), wishing to perform genetic tests
on the patients. We note that, since sequencers generating encrypted data do not exist
yet, the CI would currently have access to unprotected raw genetic variants and therefore
must be a trusted entity. Additionally, we are assuming a model where the encrypted
genetic variants are stored in a centralized SPU rather than at the MU which maximizes
efficiency and security. This is similar to applications used in business and government
where the trust in the server (SPU) is much higher than in the client (MU) and allows
access to be provided to several different clients (MUs) from a trusted central resource
whose key task is preserving security.
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Figure 4.1: Privacy-preserving architecture for genetic testing. Genotype data and encryption
keys are generated at a certified institution (CI). The patient is provided the full key, which also is
randomly split between the data storage and processing unit (SPU) and the medical unit (MU).
The privacy-preserving algorithms for ancestry inference and genetic risk test computation take
place between the MU and the SPU.
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Figure 4.2: Data encoding and encryption: (a) Genetic information represented in a matrix. (b)
Each genotype is encoded by following the additive model. For example, SNP1 has reference
allele A and alternate allele T , hence AA = 0, AT = 1, and TT = 2. (c) The genotypes of
a given participant are individually encrypted with his own public key. Different row colors
represent encryption under different public keys as each participant owns a different key.
Threat Model
We consider the honest-but-curious (HBC) adversary model where the MU and the SPU
are non-colluding parties and are computationally bounded (i.e., with limited computa-
tional power). In particular, both the MU and the SPU honestly follow the protocols
without altering the data; but they might try to passively infer sensitive information
about the patients. The HBC adversary model is a realistic assumption in healthcare
where, on a daily basis, different MUs honestly collaborate and share sensitive data about
patients based on mutual trust and privacy policies. We recently discussed in [38] how
the HBC adversary model can be extended with negligible computational burden to the
case of malicious MUs trying to actively infer a patients’ sensitive data by tampering the
protocols parameters.
4.4 Privacy-Preserving Genetic Risk Test with ancestry Inference
4.4.1 Overview
The main goal of the proposed solution is to compute genetic risk scores in a privacy-
preserving way without leaking patients’ genetic information to neither HBC adversaries.
We can summarize it as follows. First, the patients provide to CI their biological
samples for genotyping. The CI encrypts each patient’s variants and sends them to
the SPU for secure storage. Then the MU and SPU run a secure protocol to infer the
ancestry information of each patient from his encrypted variants. This protocol is run
only once, oﬄine. Finally, during the online phase, the MU and SPU securely and jointly
compute the genetic risk test computation through a secure two-party protocol without
ever decrypting patients’ data. In such a protocol, the MU specifies a set of markers to
the SPU for each test to be run and obtains only the correspondent final genetic risk
scores.
4.4.2 System Initialization and Data Encryption
During the initialization phase, the patients enrolled in the study provide, upon consent,
their biological samples for genotyping to the CI that generates and distributes to each of
the patients a pair of cryptographic keys for the modified Paillier cryptosystem (described
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in Section 4.2.2). Each key pair is composed of a public key and a secret key (Ki, ki).
The public key of each participant is also distributed to both the SPU, and the MU. After
key distribution, CI encrypts each participant’s SNPs individually. SNPs are encoded
with the additive model [167], where each copy of the risk allele modifies the association
with genetic risk in an additive form (see Figure 4.2(a-b)). We assume the alternate
allele to be the risky allele, hence we encode SNPs that are homozygous reference with 0,
heterozygous with 1 and homozygous alternate with 2. Let Ki represent the public key
for the i -th participant; then [Sji ]Ki denotes the encrypted genotype of his j -th SNP. For
the sake of simplicity, in the rest of the paper we refer to [Sji ]Ki as [S
j
i ], unless specified
otherwise.
The secret key is randomly divided into two shares that are distributed to the SPU and
the MU, respectively. In particular, let ki denote the secret key for the i -th participant.
Then, ki is randomly split into k
1
i and k
2
i , such that ki = k
1
i +k
2
i mod n
2. As a result, k1i
is provided to the SPU and k2i to the MU, thus no party, except the participant himself,
has the complete secret key.1 Note that for simplicity, we assume the presence of a single
MU. However, in the case of multiple MUs, k2i will be provided to all of them.
The CI also establishes symmetric cryptographic keys to protect the communication
between the parties from eavesdroppers. We assume that the CI, as a trusted entity, can
also handle the update and the revocation of the cryptographic keys but cannot replace
the SPU for the storage of the genetic data.
SNPs’ identifiers are encrypted through a deterministic encryption (DTE) scheme
by using the symmetric key established between the CI and the MU. Note that this
type of encryption prevents the SPU from knowing which SNPs are being used during
the genetic test but allows the MU to still select them as the equality property of the
plaintext identifiers is preserved.
Finally, after encryption, the CI sends the encrypted SNP genotypes to the SPU for
storing them in the data model illustrated in Figure 4.2(c)). Participants’ data is stored
using pseudonyms (without revealing the identities of the participants) to prevent the
SPU from associating a SNP to a specific individual.
4.4.3 Privacy-Preserving Ancestry Inference
As mentioned in Section 4.2.1, ancestry inference is a necessary step to correct for pop-
ulation stratification before conducting genetic risk tests. Our main goal is to infer the
participants’ ancestry groups without revealing any sensitive information, neither to the
SPU nor to the MU. The proposed algorithm for secure ancestry inference consists of a
secure two-party protocol that takes place only once between the MU and the SPU dur-
ing the “oﬄine” phase. The protocol takes in input the encrypted SNP genotypes stored
at the SPU and outputs the encrypted ancestry information for each patient, without
leaking any private genetic information of the patients. Such ancestry information is en-
coded as a binary vector (Ai) per participant of length equal to the number of ancestry
groups considered in the study. Each element Agi of the vector contains a binary value
(either 0 or 1) indicating whether the patient belongs to the g-th ancestry group or not.
Below, we describe the protocol in detail. The main operations are also illustrated in
Figure 4.3.
1We assume in our solution that only the participant, who is the owner of the data, has the full
control on his genetic information.
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Figure 4.3: Main steps of the protocol for privacy-preserving ancestry inference.
- Step 1: SNPs Principal Components Analysis.
The first step of the proposed privacy-preserving ancestry-inference algorithm con-
sists in the MU performing a PCA on an external reference panel (or training set) of
plaintext SNP genotypes of its choice. Such reference panel can be retrieved from inter-
national genomics-related projects like the HapMap project [196] or the 1000Genomes
project [194], where admixed populations have been extensively studied.
As a result of such a PCA, the MU obtains a set of SNP weights (W) that are then
sent to the SPU to compute the encrypted principal components (PCs) for each patient.
- Step 2: Computation of the Encrypted SNP Principal Components. Once
the SPU receives the SNP weightsW, it homomorphically computes for each patient the
encrypted principal components [PCi] as
[PCli ] = [
V∑
v=1
Svi ·W
l
v] =
V∏
v=1
[Svi ]
W lv , l = 1, ..., L (4.8)
where V is the number of SNPs and L is the number of principal components. We
note that L = 2 has been proved to be a reasonable value for identifying continental
ancestry groups in admixed populations [159].
- Step 3: Cluster Analysis. While the SPU computes the encrypted principal
components from the encrypted SNPs of the study participants, the MU performs a
cluster analysis on the principal components of the individuals in the reference panel in
order to identify the reference ancestry groups. As such, the MU keeps the L plaintext
principal components obtained from the reference panel computed at Step 1 and performs
a k-means clustering in order to partition the N individuals of the reference panel into
k clusters or ancestry groups.2 Each individual belongs to the ancestry group with the
nearest mean, that serves as an identifier of the ancestry group itself. The set of cluster
means C is sent by the MU to the SPU so that they can be securely compared with the
encrypted PCs of each participant in order to obtain his encrypted ancestry information.
- Step 4: Secure Similarity Protocol Given the patients’ encrypted principal
components [PCi] and the plaintext vector of cluster means C, the SPU infers the
2The value of k depends on the reference panel selected for the PCA. Note that different MUs can
choose different reference panels.
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Algorithm 3: Secure Comparison fC([a], [b])
Input : @SPU: [a], [b] and prk1. @MU: prk2.
Output: @SPU: fC([a], [b]) = [(a ≤ b)]. @MU: ⊥. // a and b are two l-bit integers
1 SPU computes [z]← [a] · [b]−1 · [2l] = [a− b+ 2l]
2 SPU generates a random number r, 0 ≤ r < n2, and blinds [z] [zˆ]← [z] · [r] = [z + r].
3 SPU partially decrypts [zˆ], 〈zˆ〉 ← D([zˆ], prk1), and sends 〈zˆ〉 to MU.
4 MU decrypts 〈zˆ〉 with prk2, zˆ ← D(〈zˆ〉, prk2)
5 MU computes β ← zˆ mod 2l.
6 SPU computes α← r mod 2l.
7 SPU and MU run a modified DGK comparison protocol [205] with private inputs α and β and
obtain δSPU (@SPU) and δMU (@MU).
8 MU computes
zˆ
2l
and sends
[
zˆ
2l
]
and [δMU ] to SPU.
9 SPU computes [(β < α)]:
10 if δSPU = 1 then
11 [(β < α)]← [δMU ]
12 else
13 [(β < α)]← [1] · [δMU ]
−1.
14 end
15 SPU computes [(a ≤ b)]←
[
zˆ
2l
]
· (
[ r
2l
]
· [(β < α)])−1
encrypted ancestry group of each participant through a secure similarity protocol. Intu-
itively, without revealing any sensitive information, the SPU assigns each participant to
one of the G ancestry groups based on the maximum similarity between his encrypted
PCs and the cluster means. In summary, for each participant, the protocol consists in (i)
securely computing the similarity between his encrypted PCs and each cluster’s mean,
(ii) finding the maximum encrypted similarity, and (iii) computing the encrypted binary
values that indicate the ancestry group he belongs to.
To design such a protocol, we rely on two secure subprotocols adapted from [78]. The
first one, described in Algorithm 3, consists of a secure two-party comparison protocol
that, given two ciphertexts [a] and [b] encrypted under the same public key, outputs
the encrypted result of their comparison. Let fC([a], [b]) represent the encrypted result
of the comparison protocol with inputs [a] and [b], where a and b are l-bit integers.
Then, fC([a], [b]) outputs the encryption of 1 when a  b and, otherwise, the encryption
of 0. Note that homomorphic encryption does not preserve any order in the ciphertext
domain, hence Algorithm 3 is needed to let a party compare two ciphertexts in a privacy-
preserving way.
The second protocol, described in Algorithm 4, is a secure two-party multiplication
protocol that, given two ciphertexts [a] and [b] encrypted under the same public key,
provides the multiplication of their corresponding plaintexts. We denote by ⊗ the se-
cure multiplication protocol, such that [a]⊗ [b] = [a · b]. Note that the modified Paillier
cryptosystem used in the proposed solution is only additively homomorphic and does not
support multiplication between ciphertexts. Hence, Algorithm 4 is needed to obtain the
encrypted product of two plaintext messages, given only their corresponding ciphertexts.
The secure similarity protocol requires as input parameters the set of encrypted princi-
pal components [PCi] along with the vector of clusters’ meansC; it outputs the encrypted
ancestry information [A]. The details of the protocol are described in Algorithm 5.
Once [Ai] is obtained, this can be used to establish clinical relevance for genetic risk
testing.
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Algorithm 4: Secure Multiplication [a]⊗ [b] = [a× b]
Input : @SPU: [a], [b] and prk1. @MU: prk2.
Output: @SPU: [a · b]. @MU: ⊥.
1 SPU generates two random numbers r1 and r2
2 SPU blinds [a] and [b]: [aˆ]← [a] · [−r1] = [a− r1], [bˆ]← [b] · [−r2] = [b− r2]
3 SPU partially decrypts [aˆ] and [bˆ] with prk1: 〈aˆ〉 ← D([aˆ], prk1), 〈bˆ〉 ← D([bˆ], prk1)
4 SPU sends 〈aˆ〉 and 〈bˆ〉 to MU
5 MU decrypts 〈aˆ〉 and 〈aˆ〉 with prk2: aˆ← D(〈aˆ〉, prk2), bˆ← D(〈bˆ〉, prk2)
6 MU computes [aˆ · bˆ] and sends it to SPU
7 SPU computes [a · b]← [aˆ · bˆ] · [a]r2 · [b]r1 · [−r1 · r2] = [aˆ · bˆ+ r2 · a+ r1 · b− r1 · r2]
Algorithm 5: Secure Similarity Protocol
Input : @SPU: [PCi] and C; @MU: ⊥
Output: @SPU: [Ai]. @MU: ⊥
// Let I be # of participants, G # of ancestry groups (or clusters), and L # of
selected top PCs.
// SPU computes the encrypted similarities between encrypted PCs and cluster means:
1 foreach g : 0 < g ≤ G do
2 [Simgi ]← [
∑L
l=1(PC
l
i − C
g
l
)2] =
∏L
l=1([PC
l
i ] · [−C
g
l
])⊗ ([PCli ] · [−C
g
l
])
3 end
// SPU computes the maximum similarity:
4 [M ]← [Sim1i ]
5 foreach g : 1 < g ≤ G do
6 [M ]← [M · (Simgi ≤M) + Sim
g
i · (M ≤ Sim
g
i )] =
{[M ]⊗ fC([Sim
g
i ], [M ])} · {[Sim
g
i ]⊗ fC([M ], [Sim
g
i ])}
7 end
// SPU computes the encrypted value of each ancestry group for each participant:
8 foreach g : 0 < g ≤ G do
9 [Agi ]← fC([M ], [Sim
g
i ])
10 end
4.4.4 Privacy-Preserving Genetic Risk Test Computation
The privacy-preserving computation of the risk test is performed as follows. Once a
clinician at the MU wants to compute the genetic risk of given patient i for condition X,
the MU sends to the SPU the set of encrypted identifiers of the SNPs correlated with X,
ϕ. The SPU retrieves from its database the corresponding set of encrypted SNPs of that
patient, {[Si(X)]}, and sends them back to the MU, along with the relevant encrypted
ancestry information [Agi ]. We assume that the genetic risk score, G(X), is computed
with an additive model as proposed in [170]. This means that each copy of the risk
allele modifies the association with genetic risk in an additive form. The computation
of its encrypted version, [G(X)], is based on the homomorphic properties of the Paillier
cryptosystem, as shown below:
[G(X)] =
[
Agi ×
(
α+
∑
j∈ϕ
βjS
j
i
)]
= [Agi ]⊗
(
[α]×
∏
j∈ϕ
[Sji ]
βj
)
, (4.9)
where βj represents the contribution of S
j to condition X, α represents the baseline risk,
and ⊗ represents the secure multiplication protocol described in Algorithm 4.
Finally, the encrypted genetic risk score is sent back to the SPU, where it is partially
decrypted by using the first part of the patient’s secret key k1 to obtain [Gˆ(X)]. The
SPU sends [Gˆ(X)] back to the MU, where it is finally decrypted with the second part of
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the patient’s secret key k2P to obtain the final plaintext risk score G(X).
4.4.5 Privacy-Preserving Integration of Clinical and Environmental Factors
The proposed solution also enables for the integration of non-genomic (clinical and envi-
ronmental) factors that are usually required in the computation of the risk when there are
strong known influences of environment on a particular trait, such as metabolic disorders,
in order to increase the accuracy of the test.
During the initialization phase, along with their biological samples, patients can also
provide the CI with their clinical and environmental information such as age, disease
conditions, smoking behavior, etc.. This information is encoded as a set of categorical
variables and encrypted for secure storage at the SPU.
At the time of the risk test computation, the MU asks the SPU to also provide
the encrypted clinical environmental factors of the patient that are correlated with the
condition being tested X along with the encrypted genetic markers. Let [Ni] be the set
of encrypted values of the clinical and environmental attributes of the i-th patient and
∆ be the set of encrypted identifiers the clinical, where N ji ∈ {0, 1} for the simplicity
of the presentation, and environmental attributes that are required for the computation
of the risk for disease X. That is, N ji = 1 if the patient has the corresponding clinical
or environmental attribute, and N ji = 0 otherwise. Then, the (final) risk score of the
patient (for disease X) is computed as below:
[R(X)] =
[
Agi×
(
α+
∑
j∈ϕ
βjS
j
i +
∑
t∈∆
β¯tN
t
i
)]
= [Agi ]⊗
(
[α]×
∏
j∈ϕ
[Sji ]
βj×
∏
t∈∆
[N ti ]
β¯t
)
, (4.10)
where β¯t is the regression coefficient of the t-th clinical or environmental attribute.
As for the encrypted genetic risk score [G(X)], the encrypted final risk score [R(X)] can
be partially decrypted at the SPU with k1 and finally decrypted at the MU with k2.
Finally, the MU computes the final risk of the patient for condition X as e
R(X)
1+eR(X)
.
4.5 Use Case: Pharmacogenetics Tests for HIV Treatment
We deployed and evaluated the proposed model in five of the seven outpatient clinics of
the Swiss HIV Cohort Study (SHCS) [178] for genetic testing in HIV treatment. The
SHCS central data center was used as SPU and the EPFL played the role of the CI.
4.5.1 Patient Characteristics and Genetic Variant Selection
A total of 230 HIV infected individuals initiating Antiretroviral Therapy (ART) enrolled
in the SHCS were included in this study and were genotyped for 4,149 variants. All
patients signed consent for genetic testing and the institutional review boards of the
SHCS centers approved the study.
We identified 71 markers from the literature that were informative for 17 traits rele-
vant to HIV outcomes. Clinically informative markers fell into 3 categories 1) HIV/HCV
progression [71, 83, 188, 198, 72] and response to therapy [136, 131, 103, 63, 173, 90, 84],
2) pharmacokinetics of efavirenz (EFV) [168, 23, 100, 73, 44], nevirapine (NVP) [168, 23],
etravirine ETV35 or lopinavir (LPV) [133], 3) metabolic traits including vitamin D de-
ficiency [97], coronary artery disease [171, 179], cholesterol and triglyceride levels [169]
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and type 2 diabetes [98]. Testing included single and multi-marker deterministic tests,
where the presence of a risk variant or combination of variants is highly likely to cause
the associated trait, and multi-marker risk scores, where several variants combine to-
gether to moderately impact trait risk. The prediction scheme for each reported results
is provided in [141]. Additional markers predictive of patient ancestry (n=111) [126], or
HLA type (n=250) were also incorporated. Markers capturing variation across a set of
absorption metabolism distribution and excretion (ADME) genes (n=3,717) were also
included [132]. Though these variants were not used for clinical prediction they were
used to improve the precision of ancestry inference.
The majority of variants were genotyped using a custom array on the Illumina In-
finium platform. Informative variants that could not be included on the genotyping
array due to technical issues, (CCR5∆32 (rs333), CYP2B6 *6 (rs3745274), UGT1A1 *28
(rs8175347)), were genotyped by TaqMan allelic discrimination from Applied Biosystems
or fragment size-based analysis [41]. Samples and variants were filtered out if they did
not pass quality thresholds for genotyping rate and Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium. Four-
digit classical class I HLA allele genotypes were imputed for individuals with inferred
European ancestry using the SNP2HLA pipeline [115]. This operation was performed
during the initialization phase after genotyping at the CI. Only alleles with an imputation
quality above 0.98 were kept.
4.5.2 Interpretation and Result Reporting
To maximize clinical utility, clinicians were provided with interpreted test results for
each trait, rather than the raw patient genotypes through a dedicated client application
implemented in Java. Semantics were adapted to indicate the confidence of each test
individually, thus, when significant genetic markers were observed, an alert specific to
the test was returned, otherwise a result of “no significant alleles found” was given. An
example report returned to physicians is shown in Figure 4.4. Each report included a
disclaimer indicating the investigational nature of the study. Importantly, the release of
genetic data to the clinics was delayed and, by design, not meant to modify choice of
treatment.
4.6 Performance Evaluation
To assess the feasibility of applying genetic testing in the clinical setting, we imple-
mented the proposed privacy-preserving solution as a client-server Java application (see
Figure 4.5 for a screen shot of the front-end graphical user interface).
We performed all operations on encrypted data stored in a MySQL server at the
SHCS data center (playing the role of the SPU) based on the secure protocol outlined
in Figure 4.1 and described in detail in Section 4.4 (with the exception of HLA allele
imputation that was directly performed on the plaintext data at the CI during the ini-
tialization). We used a modified version of the Paillier cryptosystem [50] supporting both
additively homomorphic encryption and proxy re-encryption to encrypt the genetic vari-
ants of each patient, and the CCM mode [76] of the advanced encryption standard [185]
to deterministically encrypt their identifiers. We tested the performance on off-the-shelf
hardware (an Intel Core i7-2620M CPU with 2.70 GHz processor running the Windows 7
Operating System) by using a Paillier’s security parameter of 4096 bits size. The encryp-
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Figure 4.4: Example report returned to clinicians. Interpreted test results are shown for each
trait. An alert specific to the test was returned when a significant test score or genetic marker
was observed. Otherwise, a result of “no significant alleles found” was displayed.
tion time of the genotype scales linearly with the number of markers and takes 171ms
for a single marker with a storage size of 1KB. Thus, total encryption time per patient
for all genotypes took 12 minutes generating a ciphertext size of 4MB. We note, the
encryption of 4 million markers (the approximate number of variant genotypes carried
by a given individual) would take approximately 200 hours. Yet, importantly, this initial
encryption is only required once (in the initialization phase of the system) and could be
expedited by pre-computation of certain exponents required for encryption ((gr, hr) in
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(A) Through this graphical user interface the physician can select one or multiple tests to be run on a
given patient.
(B) Encrypted results are decrypted, interpreted and presented as a standardized text report.
Figure 4.5: Front-end graphical user interface.
Equation 4.2) and parallel computation, resulting in an encryption time on the order of
minutes.
By design, this study incorporated genetic tests where the predictive markers have
only been validated in European populations, necessitating ancestry inference from ge-
netic data to establish clinical relevance. We used the HapMap reference panel [65] as a
training dataset for the privacy-preserving ancestry inference algorithm. The total time
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to privately compute the ancestry information was 11.6s per individual, which could be
reduced to 3.8s by also pre-computing pairs of (gr, hr) used in the encryption algorithm
in Equation 4.2.
After ancestry inference, a set of 169 individuals predicted to be of European ancestry
was identified (Figure 4.6) for whom full results and HLA alleles could be reported. For
the remaining individuals, a result of “Prediction not available for this population” was
reported for the ancestry-limited tests. Predicted ancestry was highly similar to self-
reported ancestry (94%) and was incorporated solely to determine which test results
were valid on an individual basis, and not reported to the clinician or patient.
Figure 4.6: Clustering of patient samples (grey diamonds) with populations of different ances-
tries. Principal component (PC) analysis and ancestry inference were performed in a privacy-
preserving way through a secure two-party protocol between the storage and processing unit
(SPU) and the medical unit. Encrypted ancestry information was generated and stored at the
SPU. Sample clustering with the HapMap CEU (Utah residents with Northern and Western Eu-
ropean ancestry collected by the Centre d’Etude du Polymorphisme Humain) and TSI (Tuscans
in Italy) populations (i.e., those within the circle) were considered European for the purposes
of report generation. ASW, African ancestry in southwest United States; CHB, Han Chinese
in Beijing, China; CHD, Chinese in Metropolitan Denver, Colorado; GIH, Gujarati Indians in
Houston, Texas; JPT, Japanese from Tokyo, Japan; LWK, Luhya in Webuye, Kenya; MKK,
Massai in Kinyawa, Kenya; MXL, Mexican ancestry in Los Angeles, California; YRI, Yoruba in
Ibidan, Nigeria.
For risk test computation, we observed an average time of 865ms for a theoretical test
using 50 markers. Thus, after encryption and ancestry inference, all tests in the current
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study could be performed and reported in less than 1 second.
4.7 Security Analysis
The proposed system preserves the privacy of patients’ genomic (and potentially clini-
cal and environmental) data in the honest-but-curious adversarial model by relying on
the security guarantees provided by the modified Paillier cryptosystem and the DGK
cryptosystem. Provided that both the MU and the SPU do not collude, none of the
two parties can reconstruct a patient’s secret key and individually decrypt his genetic
information. Only the MU can eventually obtain the result of the test. For the extensive
security evaluation of the modified Paillier and DGK cryptosystems we refer the reader
to [50] and [68], respectively.
Yet, we note that the proposed system may be susceptible to a brute force attack (i.e.
systematically checking all possible keys until the correct one is found). The feasibility
of this type of attack depends on the length of the key used (a cipher with a key length
of N bits can be broken in an average time of 2N-1). In our implementation, we used a
key of 4096 bits, a key size that is compliant with the recommendations of the National
Institute of Standards and Technology and will provide security for the next 30+ years
based on the envisioned improvement in computing power [37]. However, for some test
results reported, there is a strong linkage between the results and the underlying causal
genotype (e.g. HLA-B*57:01 and Abacavir hypersensitivity). Thus, the inclusion of a
large number of such tests may present it’s own risk to patient privacy. In the case where
many such conditions are to be included in the same report, other techniques, such as
result obfuscation, may be desirable [33].
Finally, we also note that to prevent the SPU from inferring the nature of the con-
ducted test based on the number of requested SNPs, the MU can include an arbitrary
number of “dummy” SNPs with null contribution to the condition being tested. We leave
for future work the study of the dummy addition strategy that ensures the best privacy
vs. efficiency trade-off.
4.8 Acceptability Questionnaire
Physicians were asked to complete a survey aimed at gauging their acceptance and inter-
est in the proposed privacy-preserving system for pharmacogenetics tests. The question-
naire was directly embedded into the front-end Java application used to run the tests
and obtain the interpreted reports. Prior to filling the questionnaire, physicians had
to read a short description of the project illustrating the key elements of the privacy-
preserving system they were testing. Upon completion, surveys were automatically sent
to the SHCS Data Center for incorporation into an anonymized database.
4.8.1 Questionnaire Structure
The questionnaire consisted of two sections. The first section included four questions
covering physicians’ basic demographics such as age, gender, grade (options: Resident,
Attending and Head of Department) and SHCS center. This information was necessary
to verify that our sample was representative of the general physician population.
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The second section of the questionnaire aimed at obtaining insights on physicians’
acceptance level regarding our privacy-preserving system for genetic testing, and more
generally, on their attitude toward the adoption of privacy-enhancing technologies for
the protection of genetic data in the clinical context. As such, we studied physicians’
acceptance level under three different angles represented by the following three observ-
able variables: clinical utility, privacy concerns and system usability. For each of these
variables we proposed a set of statements, representative of the concept, about which
participants had to indicate their level of agreement with a score from 0 to 4, where 0
means “strongly disagree”, 1 means “disagree”, 2 means “neutral”, 3 means “agree” and
4 means “strongly agree”. For the three above-mentioned variables we designed four, six
and four statements, respectively.
Prior to this study, we pilot-tested the questionnaire with two attending doctors
working on infectious diseases at a clinic not involved in our study. The goal was to
assess if the statements were fully understandable and without ambiguity. Both doctors
completed all sections without reporting any ambiguity. Hence, the questionnaire was
used for the study without further validation.
4.8.2 Quantitative Analysis
We analyzed survey responses with Python Data Analysis Library and with STATATM
software version 14.2. For each statement, we first computed the proportions of physicians
per agreement level. Then, for each participant we aggregated his/her scores grouped
by variable (i.e., clinical utility, privacy concerns, system usability) in order to obtain
a triplet score where each element represented the sum of the scores for the statements
related to a given concept. We hypothesize that the three observed variables are the col-
lective expression of the general acceptance level of our system. This is an unmeasured
(latent) variable whose relationship with the 3 indicators can be quantified via Confirma-
tory Factor Analysis (CFA) [124] in the framework of structural equation models (SEM).
We derived the relative importance of each indicator from SEM, by estimating standard-
ized coefficients. We assessed the goodness of fit of the model using the following indices:
Comparative Fit Index (> 0.95), Tucker Lewis Index (> 0.95), and root mean square
error of approximation (< 0.06).
4.8.3 Results
Of 55 SHCS-affiliated doctors invited to the study, 38/55 (69%) tested the proposed
system at least once and completed the survey. There were 8 (21%) females and 30
(79%) males with mean age of 41 years and a maximum of 65. Of the 38 participants,
12 (31%) were attending physicians, 11 (29%) were heads of department and 15 (40%)
were residents. Our sample is marginally younger and with some over-representation of
male than the overall physician population as compared to the 2016 Report of the Swiss
Doctors’ Federation (FMH), which reported that the mean age of physicians is 46 and
that 60% of physicians in Switzerland are male [108].
We report the distributions of physicians’ scores for the different statements in the
survey in Figure 4.7. We observed that statements for all three variables received high
consensus (i.e., agreement level of 3 or 4) from a large majority of the physicians. Con-
cerning the clinical utility of our system, 71% of participants considered the information
provided useful and 68% that it was worth a therapy modification when actionable. Only
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Figure 4.7: Distributions of scores per claim in the questionnaire grouped by observed variable.
The category “agree” includes scores > 2, while the category “disagree” includes scores < 2.
8% of physicians were unsatisfied with the level of information and wanted to have access
to the patient’s actual DNA sequence.
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Regarding the magnitude of participants’ privacy concerns, 76% agreed or strongly
agreed that the human genome actually contains privacy-sensitive information. Physi-
cians showed similar concerns for potential exposure of their patients’ clinical (65%) and
genomic (60%) data. Moreover, almost all (92%) thought that it is the responsibility
of the healthcare institution storing the genetic data to make sure that only authorized
people can access them. Finally, we observed that for a majority of physicians (68%), a
better diagnosis and treatment should not be at the expense of privacy and that in gen-
eral (71%), physicians prefer to obtain only the information necessary for the diagnosis
in order to avoid the risk of incidental findings.
Concerning the system usability, participants had a user-friendly experience with our
system. Physicians had no perception of the sophisticated privacy-preserving techniques
running behind the scenes as the encryption, result decryption and cryptographic key
management were performed automatically by the system. Only 10% of those surveyed
required technical support and were skeptical about the use of similar privacy-preserving
systems in their daily clinical practice.
APP_ACCEPT
1
clinical_utility
4.3
?1 .35
privacy_concerns
4.1
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3.9
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Figure 4.8: Confirmatory factor model where the oval indicates the latent (unmeasured) overall
acceptance of the system or factor, (APP ACCEPT), rectangles indicate the observed variables
and single-headed arrows show causality from the factor to the indicators. Numbers along the
arrows are the SEM standardized weights that indicate the relative importance of the observed
variables as measures of general acceptance of the system. Numbers at the epsilon circles are
the error term coefficients of the SEM. Goodness of fit criteria of CFA were satisfied.
Figure 4.8 shows the results of CFA. The reported standardized weights measure the
relative importance of each of clinical utility, privacy concerns and system usability for
participants’ overall acceptance of the system. We can observe that the impact on the
acceptance level of clinical utility (0.8) is twice the impact of privacy concerns (0.39).
4.9 Discussion
In this chapter, we assessed the steps required for deployment of privacy-preserving ge-
netic testing in clinical care. We proposed a new privacy-preserving model for genetic
testing with ancestry inference and delivery of interpreted information to clinicians and
tested its applicability in a real-life operational setting based on HIV treatment. Our
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model included the protection of patients’ genetic data against honest-but-curious ad-
versaries and the possibility to conduct various operations (ancestry analysis, generation
of genetic scores and report generation) within an encrypted environment without sig-
nificant additional cost in terms of computation and storage overhead.
A central outcome of this study is the delivery of interpreted genetic data. Processes
such as correction for ancestry, retrieval of imputed HLA alleles, and calculation of
genetic scores were securely performed in the background and clinicians only received a
fully interpreted report rather than raw genetic data.
The design of the use-case study included the genotyping of several thousand markers
and the reporting of a number of HIV-related, potentially actionable variants. Specifi-
cally, the panel of genetic tests addresses some recognized issues in HIV care: abnormal
drug levels and toxicity, HIV and treatment associated metabolic disorders, co-infection
HIV-HCV and prediction of disease progression. For example, tests included determin-
istic information (e.g., HLA-B*57 and abacavir hypersensitivity), as well as informative
results on particular predispositions (e.g., metabolic risk). The language was controlled
to indicate this difference. By design, this was not a randomized analysis of the impact
of the specific genetic tests on clinical care. In particular, there was no opportunity to
modify treatment choice and no intervention based on the report. Instead, this study
defined procedures and strategies that are informative of the steps leading to the secure
use of genetic information in clinical practice. It provides the basis for future randomized
studies aimed at delivering actionable genetic results in real-time. Importantly, the pro-
posed framework could be easily used to incorporate also demographic, behavioral, and
laboratory parameters to more precisely estimate a patient’s risk of a particular outcome
(e.g. cardiovascular risk; a significant issue in the care of HIV infected individuals [171])
as described in Section 4.4.5.
Upon receipt of the interpreted report, physicians were queried as to their impressions
of the information content of the report and their attitude toward the proposed privacy-
preserving model for genetic testing. The overall response helped us to derive a more
general understanding about the key requirements for the adoption of privacy-enhancing
technologies in a routine clinical context.
The first important take-home message is that new systems based on sophisticated
privacy-enhancing technologies, such as homomorphic encryption, that can perform an-
alytics on genomic data and provide results without revealing sensitive information have
the potential to be useful. Despite their inherent complexity, tools as the one evaluated in
our survey are seen by a large majority of the physicians responding to the questionnaire
as important enablers for the implementation of genomic-based medicine.
As expected, our results show that more than two thirds of the physicians testing the
system acknowledged that protecting patient’s genetic privacy is crucial when dealing
with genetic data both in a clinical and research environment. Privacy-preserving sys-
tems such as ours have the potential to improve the management of patients’ sensitive
data, not only because they provide strong privacy and security guarantees, but also
because they can protect physicians from undesirable liability issues (e.g., in the case of
incidental findings not reported to patients) by limiting their access only to the necessary
information.
Our confirmatory factor analysis indicates that, in addition to the ability of ensuring
privacy and security of genetic data, the key requirement for the success and deployment
of this new kind of medical information systems resides in the ability to make them
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usable and understandable by end-users and, most importantly, in the clinical value
of the information made accessible to physicians. Our study shows that, despite the
fundamental tension between data privacy and data access, an acceptable trade-off can
often be found. Indeed, providing only the necessary information according the principle
of data minimization, as described in the international good practices for genomic data
management and in the data protection laws of Switzerland and Europe [3, 80, 92] , is
largely accepted by physicians for this kind of medical applications (e.g., genetic testing)
if such information can be clinically useful and actionable.
4.10 Summary
Privacy protection of sensitive medical data and particularly genetic data is an impor-
tant concern in clinical care as the healthcare sector is increasingly suffering from data
breaches. In this chapter, we have described the first privacy-preserving system based on
homomorphic encryption that was successfully deployed and tested in a real-life clinical
setting. The proposed system enables the secured storage and analysis of large-scale ge-
netic data at an unstrusted storage and processing unit, as well as the targeted delivery
of specific subsets of test results to the clinic [144] in full compliance with the principles of
“data minimization” and “privacy by design” imposed by international data protection
regulations (i.e., US HIPAA [202] and EU GDPR [80]). This will become increasingly im-
portant as many large-scale sequencing efforts are initiated with the goal of incorporating
the resulting genomic data in clinical care.
Moreover, we have studied for the first time physicians’ attitude toward the adoption
of this new type of privacy-preserving models for using genetic data in the clinic, by
evaluating the feedback of 38 HIV specialists who tested the proposed system. We
have derived unique insights that will guide the design and facilitate the adoption of
these systems in the future, by better addressing physicians’ requirements. In particular,
we have seen that, despite the general skepticisms around the apparent unpracticality
and complexity of these technologies, systems based on cutting-edge privacy-enhancing
techniques can be made efficient, deployable and usable in real operation settings. As
physicians’ primary scope is patients’ health, the inherent complexity of these tools
should be concealed as much as possible in order to facilitate physicians’ work and avoid
undesirable overheads.
Finally, we believe that this study, although limited to a small sample and specific use
case, represents a first step towards the full awareness among physicians, policy makers,
hospital administrators and the general public about the existence of sophisticated PETs
that can play a significant role in mitigating the incidence of data breaches without
preventing the use of the data.
Part II
Protecting Medical and Genomic
Privacy in Clinical Research
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Chapter 5
Privacy-Preserving Exploration of
Genetic Cohorts in Untrusted
Environments
In the first part of this thesis, we have addressed the problem of using genomic and clinical
data for clinical care in a privacy-preserving way. Yet, the ability to re-use these data
also for medical research is crucial in order to fully realize the promise of personalized
medicine. In this chapter, we show how a medical institution can enable researchers to
use, in a privacy-preserving way, its clinical and genomic data for feasibility studies by
securely outsourcing the storage of the data to a centralized (and potentially untrusted)
repository as, e.g., a public cloud.
5.1 Introduction
Re-use of patients’ electronic health records (EHRs) can provide tremendous benefits
for clinical research. One of the first essential steps for many research studies, such as
clinical trials or population health studies, is to effectively identify, from EHR systems,
groups of well-characterized patients who meet specific inclusion and exclusion criteria.
This procedure is called cohort exploration or feasibility study. Yet, because nowadays
clinical and omics data are stored across a variety of systems within the same medical
institution, getting the information that is needed into the hands of researchers often
requires substantial time and resources.
To address this problem and foster clinical research, many institutions have started
to integrate clinical and genomic information from multiple sources into centralized data
warehouses. These data warehouses store de-identified information on patients, such as
EHR data, lab results, genetic data, demographic information and, because of security
and privacy reasons, they are usually located in “militarized” (or trusted) environments
behind the institution’s firewall. Indeed, in these environments, all incoming connections
are blocked and only a very limited number of employees have the right to access the data
stored. This prevents researchers from easily accessing the data necessary for identifying
new predictive biomarkers and rapidly finding subjects with similar clinical and omics
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characteristics. Therefore, in order to facilitate the use of this vast amount of data,
it is common practice to create domain-specific “data marts” (i.e., subsets of the data
warehouse) and outsource them to less protected environments, outside the militarized
zone of the institution (e.g., a server within the research network of the institution or a
server on a public cloud), that allow for incoming connections and can be easily accessed
by researchers.
Yet, when it comes to outsource data marts of sensitive genomic and clinical data to
unprotected environments, privacy and security concerns represent major obstacles that
make the process extremely lengthy if not impossible.
For this reason, in the last few years, researchers from both the computer science and
medical fields have started collaborating to design new advanced solutions that could
enable the outsource of sensitive data while protecting individuals’ medical privacy and,
in particular, genomic privacy [79, 148]. However, to obtain acceptance and to be adopted
in the real world, these solutions need to be deployed and assessed in concrete operational
scenarios.
In this chapter, we describe how we effectively addressed this challenge. In particular,
in collaboration with the Lausanne University Hospital (CHUV), we developed a new
privacy-preserving solution that makes use of advanced privacy-enhancing technologies
such as differential privacy and homomorphic encryption (so far believed unpractical) to
enable the outsource and exploration of large amounts of genomic and clinical data. The
proposed solution is – to the best of our knowledge – the first of its kind to be deployed
and tested in a real operational environment.
Indeed, in order to be used in the real world, we built our system on top of the
most widespread open-source framework for exploring clinical research data-warehouses,
namely Informatics for Integrating Biology and the Bedside (i2b2) [146]. The i2b2 frame-
work was jointly developed by the Harvard Medical School and Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology to enable clinical researchers to use existing de-identified clinical
data and only IRB-approved genomic data for discovery research and design of target
therapies. i2b2 is currently used by more than 200 medical institutions worldwide for
translational research or academic purposes [4] and its software is maintained and con-
stantly upgraded by the i2b2 Foundation. Yet, as most cohort explorers, i2b2 is designed
to be primarily used in trusted environments as it does not provide any specific pro-
tection mechanism for genomic data, or other types of identifiable information, apart
from standard access control and data de-identification [145], both proven to be ineffec-
tive [107, 181, 99, 112, 135, 210, 220]. This limitation substantially restricts the scope
of potential feasibility studies that could be conducted in less controlled and protected
environments for accelerating medical research.
In our solution, patients’ genetic data are homomorphically encrypted and stored
in a centralized i2b2 server along with pseudonymized and de-identified clinical data.
Thanks to homomorphic encryption and as long as the decryption key is secret, such
a server can be located in an untrusted environment as the confidentiality of the data
is always ensured. Moreover, the use of homomorphic encryption not only guarantees
confidentiality at rest but also during computation, hence enabling for privacy-preserving
queries on the data (i.e., without ever decrypting the original genomic data) through the
standard i2b2 Web client. With our solution, researchers can obtain the aggregate total
number of patients (or other summary statistics such as allele frequency) who meet a
given set of inclusion and exclusion criteria that also include genomic or other identifiable
5.2. PRELIMINARIES 61
Notation Description
VCF Variant call format
DWH-RC Data warehouse for clinical research
REF Reference allele
ALT Alternate allele
CHR Chromosome
POS Position
|A| Cardinality of set A
‘|’ Separator used in VCF files for phased genotypes
‘/’ Separator used in VCF files for unphased genotypes
g1j j-th polynomial storing the first value of the unphased genotype encoding
for a set of variants
g2j j-th polynomial storing the second value of the unphased genotype encoding
for a set of variants
ncj j-th polynomial storing the no-calls value for a set of variants
p Public key for the FV encryption scheme
s Secret key for the FV encryption scheme
ǫtot Total privacy budget per user assigned by i2b2 administrators
ǫi Privacy budget for query i
n Number of patients in the database
⊕ Symbol denoting the homomorphic addition operation
P Set of patients satisfying the clinical predicate specified in the query
V Set of variants satisfying the range specified in the query
GP Set of encrypted genotypes for patients in P and variants in V
NP Set of the no-calls values for patients in P and variants in V
Table 5.1: Notation used throughout the chapter.
features. According to their different access rights, researchers can receive either slightly
perturbed (with noise satisfying the notion of differential privacy) – but still useful – or
unperturbed query results.
We extensively tested the performance of our solution in a real operational setting
for different cohort sizes, and we found the overhead introduced by privacy-preserving
techniques to be entirely acceptable thanks to the ciphertext packing technique enabled
by the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme on which our solution is based. The
response time is linear in the number of selected patients and always in the order of a
few seconds for standard queries and cohort sizes, which outperforms the state of the
art [119, 56, 118, 216, 212].
5.2 Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly summarize the main concepts in cryptography and genomics
that are used in the chapter, as a complement to those we have seen in Chapter 2. We
summarize the notation used in this chapter in Table 6.1. We denote x uniformly chosen
from the set X as x
U
←− X. Moreover, we use boldface letters to represent vectors, regular
letters for polynomials and capitalized letters for sets.
5.2.1 Cryptographic Background
In this section, we briefly introduce the additional cryptographic concepts used in this
chapter.
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Fan and Vercauteren Cryptosystem. The proposed solution is based on the Fan
and Vercauteren (FV) cryptosystem [82] which is the state-of-the-art lattice-based lev-
eled homomorphic encryption scheme based on the Ring Learning With Errors (RLWE)
problem. The FV scheme ensures indistinguishability against chosen plaintext attacks if
the standard RLWE problem is hard. Moreover, as other lattice-based cryptosystems,
it is supposed to be quantum-resistant. Let ℓ be a power of 2 and a polynomial degree,
q be a coefficient modulus, t be a plaintext modulus, X be a noise distribution over a
polynomial ring Zq[x]/(x
ℓ + 1), and m ∈ Zt[x]/(x
ℓ + 1) be a plaintext polynomial. Let
s
U
←− Zq[x]/(x
ℓ + 1) be the secret key and p = (p0, p1) = (−(a · s + e) mod q, a), be the
public key where e← X and a
U
←− Zq[x]/(x
ℓ+1). Then the FV scheme works as follows:
• Encryption (with u, e1, e2 ← X ):
Enc(m, p) = c = (c0, c1) = (5.1)
((p0 · u+ e1 + ⌊
q
t
⌋ ·m) mod q, (p1 · u+ e2) mod q),
• Decryption:
Dec(c, s) =
⌊ t
q
· ((c0 + c1 · s) mod q)
⌉
mod t, (5.2)
• Homomorphic addition:
Add(c, c′) = ((c0 + c
′
0) mod q, (c1 + c
′
1) mod q). (5.3)
We do not report the definition of homomorphic multiplication as it is not used in
our solution. For further details we refer the reader to the original paper [82]. Note
that we chose the FV scheme because, to the best of our knowledge, it provides the
best performance in terms of homomorphic computations and storage overhead for the
operations required in the proposed solution.
Ciphertext Packing. Ciphertext packing [49] is a technique that can be used
to reduce the overall size of the ciphertext and improve the efficiency of homomorphic
operations. Despite recent advances, practical HE is still quite expensive. This is because
security considerations require ciphertexts to be large, thus slowing down homomorphic
computations. Ciphertext packing represents the main technique for dealing with this
problem as a vector of plaintext values, and not a single value, can be encrypted in only
one ciphertext. Homomorphic operations are applied to these vectors component-wise.
More formally, let CS(Kp,Ks, P, C, E ,D) be a cryptosystem, and m0, m1, ..., be the
messages to be encrypted where mi ∈M, ∀i. Let also n =
⌊
|P |
|M |
⌋
and P1, P2, ..., Pn be
n independent subspaces of P where |Pj | ≥ |M |, ∀j. When |P | ≥ 2 · |M |, we can encrypt
at most n messages into one ciphertext by encrypting m′ = m1p1 +m2p2 + · · ·+mnpn,
where pj is the basis of the subspace Pj .
For example, when P = Zq[x]/(x
ℓ + 1) and M = Zt, we can encrypt at most ℓ
messages into one ciphertext with m′ = m0 +m1x+ · · ·+mℓ−1x
ℓ−1.
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Differential Privacy. Differential privacy is an approach to privacy-preserving re-
porting of results, introduced by Cynthia Dwork [74], that guarantees that a given ran-
domized statistic, f(D) = R, computed on a dataset D1 behaves almost the same when
computed on the neighbor dataset D2 that differs from D1 in exactly one element. More
formally we have that
Pr [f(D1) = R0] ≤ exp(ǫ) · Pr [f(D2) = R0] , (5.4)
where the parameter ǫ is a privacy parameter: the closer it is to 0 the more privacy
is ensured. The most straightforward method [75] for achieving ǫ-differential privacy
consists in perturbing the output of the statistic with noise drawn from the Laplace
distribution with mean 0 and scale ∆fǫ , where ∆f is known as the sensitivity of f :
∆f = max
D1,D2
||f(D1)− f(D2)||1. (5.5)
Differently from k-anonymity, differential privacy guarantees privacy against an adversary
regardless of his prior knowledge.
5.2.2 Genomic Background
In this section, we briefly introduce the additional genomic concepts used in this chapter.
Variant Call Format (VCF). The Variant Call Format (VCF) [11] is the main
format for storing genetic variants of one or more individuals with respect to the reference
genome. The VCF consists of two parts: header and content. The header contains
the meta-information about the file and data along with the definition of file variables.
The content holds the information about the genetic variants for a set of individuals.
Each variant is uniquely identified by (i) its chromosomal position (CHR, POS), (ii)
the reference allele (REF), and (iii) the alternate allele (ALT). Each line of the content
corresponds to the information about a single variant and the genotype (i.e., the value)
of this variant for each individual in the VCF. We call the information about the variant,
such as CHR, POS, REF, ALT, meta-data. Meta-data is not privacy-sensitive as it is
public information, as opposed to genotype information that is sensitive and must be
protected.
In the VCF file, a genotype is represented by two numbers separated by either ‘|’ or
‘/’. When it is separated by ‘|’, the genotype is phased (i.e, we know which of the two
chromosomes holds which allele). Whereas, when it is separated by /, the genotype is
unphased (i.e., there is no information on which chromosome holds which allele). Each
number represents the allele value. When it is 0, it means that the allele value is equal to
the reference allele. When it is 1, it means the allele value is equal to the alternate allele.
When the allele has not been genotyped correctly and there is no information about its
value, we put ‘.’ instead of any number. Such an event is named no-call.
In our solution, we assume that the VCF file was processed in such a way that entries
with multiple alternate alleles were separated in several lines, with one allele per line.
5.3 System and Threat Models
In this section, we introduce the system and threat models inspired by CHUV’s infras-
tructure. We then outline the functional requirements that our solution should satisfy
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and finally we describe our proposed privacy-preserving solution in detail. Note that these
system and threat models can be easily adapted to other similar healthcare providers will-
ing to outsource the storage of their sensitive clinical and genomic data to an untrusted
party (e.g., a public cloud).
5.3.1 System Model
The CHUV’s information system consists of two physically separated networks or envi-
ronments, as depicted in Figure 5.1: (i) the main network of the hospital, also called
clinical network and (ii) a research network that is shared with the University of Lau-
sanne (UNIL). Each of these two networks hosts different services.
• Clinical network. The clinical network is a trusted environment and is used for
hospital’s clinical daily activities. It hosts all services used for daily healthcare and
administration purposes along with the clinical research data-warehouse1 (DWH-
RC) that contains unencrypted pseudonymized clinical and genomic data of pa-
tients. This network is very controlled and protected by a firewall that blocks all
incoming network traffic. Authorized users are authenticated and their activities
are constantly logged.
• Research network. The research network is also protected by a firewall that blocks
unauthorized incoming network traffic (e.g., the firewall does not block the traffic
coming from the clinical network) but the level of control is weaker with respect to
the clinical network as users’ activities are not logged. This network hosts multiple
isolated data marts (i.e., specialized subset of the data extracted from the DWH-
RC) used by clinical or academic researchers in their research activities; i2b2 is
one of these services. The i2b2 service consists of an i2b2 server and a database to
which pseudonymized and de-identified clinical and genomic data are pushed from
the DWH-RC so that authorized researchers can efficiently explore it to conduct
feasibility studies. Researchers already in the network can access the i2b2 service
after authentication through an internal Web-client.
The main purpose of this type of IT architecture is to isolate data that is used for clinical
care and that is accessible only to a few trusted and authorized individuals from data
used for research activities that can be accessed by several researchers through less re-
strictive authorization and authentication procedures. We note that all communications
are protected through encryption.
5.3.2 Threat Model
In the above-mentioned system model, we consider two types of potential attackers: (i)
a honest-but-curious (or semi-honest) adversary at the i2b2 service who honestly follows
the protocol but tries to passively infer some private information about the patients, and
(ii) a malicious-but-covert adversary who wants to re-identify a patient by performing
multiple malicious, but legitimate, queries to the i2b2 service. We consider the DWH-RC
as a trusted party as it is the initial source of the data.
1The detailed description of the clinical network is out of the scope of this work.
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Figure 5.1: System and threat models.
• The honest-but-curious attacker can be represented by a careless or disgruntled
employee of the hospital (i.e., an insider) or a hacker who has illegitimate ac-
cess to the i2b2 service and tries to obtain patients’ private genomic and clinical
information without altering the protocol. Note that although this information is
pseudonymized and there is no direct link with patients’ identities, re-identification
would still be possible due to the identifying nature of the genome and to some
auxiliary (and often publicly available) information (e.g., public genomic databases,
recreational websites, online social networks, etc.) that the attacker might ex-
ploit [107, 181, 99, 112, 135, 210, 220]. As a consequence, a potential loss of clinical
and genomic data could be extremely dangerous, not only for the patients but also
for the reputation of the medical institution itself. Re-identified health-care records
are nowadays extremely valuable for hackers as, according to a recent report by
IBM [177], their value on the black market is as much as 60 times more than that
of stolen credit cards.
• The malicious-but-covert adversary can be represented by a malicious but legit-
imate user of i2b2 (e.g., a malicious researcher) or hacker who breaks into the
research network and uses the i2b2 service to re-identify an individual in a subset
of patients with specific clinical characteristics. In particular, an attacker with al-
ready some genomic information about the victim (e.g., the value of some of her
genetic variants) might repeatedly query the i2b2 service with this genomic infor-
mation and use the system as an oracle. As such, he could re-identify the presence
of the victim in a sensitive subset of individuals (e.g., all cancer patients or all
HIV-positive patients, etc.) and infer his/her health status. For example, the at-
tacker could exploit the aggregate information obtained from the cohort explorer
as described in well-known attacks such as Homer’s attack [107] and the Beacon
attack [181].
Therefore, with these adversarial models, there are two potential privacy threats that
we need to address with our proposed solution: (i) loss of patients’ health data confi-
dentiality due to illegitimate data access and (ii) patients’ re-identification and resulting
sensitive attribute disclosure from legitimate data access. Data confidentiality can be
protected at rest and during processing by using homomorphic encryption, whereas the
re-identification risk can be mitigated by perturbing the query result in order to satisfy
the notion of differential privacy.
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Figure 5.2: Architecture of the proposed solution.
5.4 Functional and Computational Requirements
The functional requirements of our privacy-preserving cohort explorer should be based
on other well-known tools for exploration of genetic cohorts such as the Beacon system
of Global Alliance for Genomics & Health (GA4GH) [87] and the ExAC browser of the
Broad Institute [2]. For example, through the Beacon system researchers can query a
database of genomes for the presence of a specific mutation, whereas researchers using the
ExAC browser can also have information about the alternate allele count and frequency
of the queried mutation.
As such, a user of our system should be able to obtain for all genetic variants in a
selected chromosomal range:
• Reference/alternate allele frequencies
• Number of mutated genotypes (i.e., genotypes composed by at least one alternate
allele)
• Number/frequency of genotypes that are homozygous with respect to the refer-
ence/alternate allele
• Number/frequency of genotypes that are heterozygous (with or without phase in-
formation)
Moreover, the storage and computational overhead introduced by the proposed solution
should be kept at the lowest possible level in order to provide the same smooth user-
experience as in the unprotected i2b2.
5.5 Proposed Solution
The architecture of the proposed solution is depicted in Figure 5.2. In order to protect the
confidentiality of the data stored at the i2b2 server from a honest-but-curious adversary
we introduce a new component to the i2b2 service, namely a proxy server, whose role
is to support the decryption phase and provide the storage of partial decryption keys.
Although part of the same service, the i2b2 server and the proxy server are physically
separated from each other, protected by different firewalls and equipped with an intrusion
detection system. Both servers cannot communicate with each other and we assume that
they do not collude or, in other words, that they are not simultaneously compromised.
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This assumption is reasonable in practice as in the CHUV research network the two
servers are located in two distinct physical locations and are administered by different
administrators. Ideally, to further minimize the risk of collusion, the proxy server should
be hosted by another independent institution.
Based on this architecture, the privacy-preserving exploration of genomic cohorts
consists of three main phases: (i) a system initialization phase where cryptographic
keys are generated and the genetic variants in the VCF file are encoded, encrypted and
pushed to the i2b2 server along with de-identified clinical data for secure storage, (ii) a
user assignment phase, where access rights and cryptographic keys are assigned to each
new user in the system and (iii) a query execution phase where the user builds a new
query that is then sent to the i2b2 server and processed in a privacy-preserving way, i.e.,
without ever decrypting the original data. The query result is then decrypted by the
user via the i2b2 Web-client.
5.5.1 System Initialization Phase
The system initialization phase takes place at the clinical research data-warehouse
(DWH-RC) where clinical and genomic data are stored with patients’ pseudonyms and
can be accessed only by a group of a few trusted and authorized individuals. The first
step consists in setting the parameters of the FV cryptosystem (l, t and q) used to en-
crypt the genomic data according to the desired security level (e.g., 80 bits security) and
the maximum number of additions and multiplications to be supported by the system.
In our case, the maximum number of additions should be at least twice the number of
individuals in the database because it corresponds to the maximum number of alleles
that could be involved in a counting query. Multiplication is not needed in this specific
use case but could be used for other more complex applications. For the optimal selection
of the FV parameters, we refer the reader to the original work by Fan and Vercauteren
[82]. Then, a public key p and a secret key s are generated as described in Section 5.2.1.
After key generation, the VCF file is parsed and each genotype is encoded following
the scheme described either in Table 5.2 (for phased genotypes) or in Table 5.3 (for
unphased genotypes). For simplicity, in the rest of the paper we describe only the
encoding for unphased genotypes described in Table 5.3 (but the encoding in Table 5.2 is
equally supported by the proposed solution). As the number of possible genotype values
is 6 (we are also including no-calls as they need to be used when allele or genotype
frequencies are computed), we use three values for genotype encoding: the first two
values indicate the presence of zero, one or two alternate alleles, whereas the third value
reports the number of no-calls in the genotype.
For each individual in the VCF file, consecutive genotypes are packed into 3
sets of polynomials by using the packing technique described in Section 5.2.1. Let
(gt1i, gt2i, no-calli) be the encoded genotype for variant i. Then, we can pack at most ℓ
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Genotype value Genotype encoding
gt1 gt2 gt3 no-call
.|. 0 0 0 2
.|0 0 0 0 1
.|1 1 0 0 1
0|. 0 0 1 1
1|. 0 1 0 1
0|0 0 0 0 0
0|1 1 0 0 0
1|0 0 1 0 0
1|1 0 0 1 0
Table 5.2: Encoding for phased genotypes.
Genotype value Genotype encoding
gt1 gt2 no-call
./. 0 0 2
./0 0 1 1
./1 1 0 1
0/0 0 0 0
0/1 1 0 0
1/1 0 1 0
Table 5.3: Encoding for unphased genotypes
genotypes in three polynomials
g1j =
ℓ−1∑
k=0
gt1jℓ+kx
k, (5.6)
g2j =
ℓ−1∑
k=0
gt2jℓ+kx
k, (5.7)
ncj =
ℓ−1∑
k=0
no-calljℓ+kx
k, (5.8)
where ℓ is the polynomial degree and j the ciphertext index. Polynomials g1j and g2j are
finally encrypted with the public key p at the DWH-RC to obtain c1j = Enc(g1j , p) and
c2j = Enc(g2j , p) which are pushed along with ncj , patients’ pseudonyms, de-identified
clinical data, and public key p to the i2b2 server for storage according to the data model
shown in Figure 5.3A. Note that ncj does not need to be encrypted as it does not leak
any information on the value of the genotype.
5.5.2 User Assignment Phase
Assignment of a new user also takes place at the DWH-RC. During this phase, for each
new user, the secret key s is randomly divided into two shares s1 and s2 such that
s = s1 + s2. The two partial secret keys s1 and s2 are then sent, for storage, to the i2b2
server and proxy server, respectively. This procedure avoids a single point of failure in
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(A) Model for storing encrypted genetic variants.
(B) Model for storing users’ access rights.
Figure 5.3: Data model used in the proposed solution.
the system: if one of the two servers is compromised, data are still protected because
only with the full secret key s the attacker can successfully decrypt. Note that ideally,
to ensure better security, the i2b2 server and the proxy server should be part of two
completely different organizations. Yet, because of the CHUV’s infrastructure these
two servers are within the same network. Nevertheless, they are physically separated,
managed by different administrators and cannot communicate with each other.
Access rights for each new user are also assigned during this phase and stored on the
i2b2 server, as shown in Figure5.3B. Different users might have different rights to access
patients’ private information. Our system provides full customization on three different
levels of access: (i) type of query result, (ii) set of accessible patients, and (iii) set of
accessible genetic variants. For example, a junior researcher might have access only to
perturbed query results, where some noise has been added on the true result to satisfy the
notion of differential privacy, whereas a senior researcher can obtain accurate information.
Also, depending on his specialization or on the IRB-approved study protocol, a researcher
might have access only to a given subset of patients or a given subset of genetic variants.
For example, an oncologist might have access only to data of patients with cancer and
might not be allowed to query genetic variants related to other diseases such as diabetes
or coronary artery disease.
We acknowledge that if the i2b2 server is compromised by a honest-but-curious
adversary, information on users’ access rights could leak because stored in cleartext.
Yet, protecting users’ access rights is not the focus of this project that addresses the
protection of patients’ data. Solutions based on attribute-based somewhat homomorphic
encryption (ABSHE)[147] can be use on top of our system in order to thwart this attack.
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5.5.3 Query Execution Phase
The query execution consists of five phases: (i) the query generation at the user-side and
(ii) the query processing at the server-side, (iii) result perturbation at the server-side, (iv)
result partial decryption at the server-side and (v) result decryption at the client-side.
(i) Query generation. In the query generation, after password-based authentication,
the user of our privacy preserving cohort explorer (i.e., CHUV researcher) builds
his query in two steps by using the i2b2 Web-client. In the first step, he selects a
set of inclusion and exclusion clinical criteria in order to identify the set of patients
for whom he wants to explore the genetic data. For example, a researcher might be
interested in aggregate genetic information on some specific variants for patients
with cancer who have undergone a specific treatment and who have had a positive
outcome. In the second step, once the desired patient set has been identified, the
user selects the set of variants of interest and the type of summary statistics he
wants to obtain and finally submits the query.
(ii) Query processing. During the query processing, the i2b2 server verifies the le-
gitimacy of the query and the access rights of the querier. If the verification is
successful, the server retrieves from the database the list of ciphertexts containing
the encrypted genotypes of the variants specified in the query. The ciphertexts
are then homomorphically combined in order to compute the encrypted query re-
sult. We designed different secure algorithms for computing the different summary
statistics described in Section 5.4. The details of these algorithms are explained in
Section 5.5.5.
(iii) Result perturbation. Depending on the role and access level of the user, the i2b2
server can perturb the encrypted query result to satisfy the notion of differential
privacy and prevent re-identification attacks. In particular, we assume users of the
system hold a single account and do not collude. Moreover, users are assigned a
total privacy budget ǫtot whose value is decided by i2b2 administrators in the user
assignment phase and may depend on the user’s role and level of trustworthiness.
For each new query i from the same user, the i2b2 server draws independent noise
from the Laplace distribution with mean 0 and scale ∆fǫi , where f is the requested
aggregation function, encrypts it and homomorphically adds it to the encrypted
query result in order to satisfy ǫtot-differential privacy. The user’s privacy budget
ǫtot is then reduced by ǫi and keeps decreasing every time a new query is answered;
the i2b2 server will keep on providing query answers to the user until his budget
runs out. The value of ǫi can be fixed, if set by the database administrator, or
adaptive, if set by the user who may use a small value of ǫi and incur more noise
for preliminary queries whose expected result is large and save the budget for more
specific queries. What is the right value of ǫi is out of the scope of this chapter.
We note that ∆f is equal to 1 for count queries and to 1n for predicate queries
(i.e., queries asking the fraction of elements in a database that satisfy a specific
predicate), where n is the number of patients in the database. For consecutive
queries, ∆f grows linearly.
(iv) Result partial decryption. After computation of perturbed/unperturbed encrypted
query result, the i2b2 server partially decrypts it with the first part of the users’
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secret key s1 (which is stored in the i2b2 database). In particular, from a cipher-
text c = (c0, c1) we obtain, after partial decryption, a new ciphertext c
′ = (c′0, c
′
1),
as described in Section 5.5.4. Finally, the i2b2 server sends back to the user the
encrypted polynomial c′1 and the coefficients of the encrypted polynomial c
′
0 match-
ing the variants specified by the query and user’s access level. Note that, for the
sake of information minimization, only the specified coefficients of the encrypted
polynomial c′0 are sent by the server to the user. In other words, we do not want
the user to obtain the summary statistics of all the variants packed in the same
ciphertext, but only the ones he has requested access to.
(v) Result decryption. At the user-side, the Web-client fetches the second part of the
user’s secret key s2 from the proxy server and performs the full decryption in order
to obtain the plaintext final results of the query, as described in Section 5.5.4. For
performance reasons, part of the full decryption (i.e., the polynomial multiplication
c′1 · s2) could be run at the proxy server. Note that, by observing only s2 and c
′
1,
the proxy server cannot infer anything about the plaintext.
5.5.4 Partial Decryption With FV Scheme
As the Fan and Vercauteren (FV) secret key s has been split into two shares stored at
the i2b2 server and at the proxy server respectively, decryption has to be done in two
steps. The original FV cryptosystem does not have a partial decryption algorithm. Here
we describe how this additional feature can be easily achieved.
Definition 5.1 (Partial Key Generation). Let q be the ciphertext modulus, ℓ be the
polynomial degree and s ∈ Zq[x]/(x
ℓ+1) be the secret key [82]. Then, the partial key set
(s0, s1) can be generated as s0
U
←− Zq[x]/(x
ℓ + 1) and s1 = s− s0.
Definition 5.2 (Partial Decryption). Let q be the modulus, ℓ be the polynomial degree, t
be the plaintext modulus, (s0, s1) be the partial key set from Definition 5.1 and c = (c0, c1)
be the ciphertext where c0, c1 ∈ Zq[x]/(x
ℓ+1). Then, we can define the partial decryption
and the full decryption as follows,
Partial Dec(c, s0) = c
′ = (c′0, c
′
1) = (c0 + c1 · s0, c1)
Full Dec(c′, s1) = Dec(c
′, s1), (5.9)
where Full Dec(Partial Dec(c, s0), s1) = Dec(c, s).
Proof. We have
Full Dec(Partial Dec(c, s0), s1)
=
⌊ t
q
((c0 + c1 · s0 + c1 · s1) mod q)
⌉
mod t
=
⌊ t
q
((c0 + c1 · s) mod q)
⌉
mod t (5.10)
= Dec(c, s)
By Definition 5.1, s0 + s1 = s, so (5.10) holds. Thus, Full Dec(Partial Dec(c, s0), s1)
is equivalent to Dec(c, s).

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5.5.5 Secure Algorithms
In this Section, we describe the algorithms developed to securely compute the summary
statistics outlined in Section 5.4. We use ⊕ to denote homomorphic addition. All secure
algorithms take as input the set of patients P satisfying the clinical predicate specified
in the query (e.g., patients with HIV), the set of variants V in the chromosomal range
specified in the query and packed into the same ciphertext, the set of no calls NP for all
patients in P , and the set of encrypted polynomials GP containing the genotypes of all
patients in P . Note that GP consists of two ciphertexts GP .c1 and GP .c2 representing
the encryption of the first and second values of the unphased genotype encoding, respec-
tively. The output of each algorithm is a map M containing the encrypted results per
set of variants that have been computed together. Algorithms 6-10 enable, respectively,
the secure computation of:
1. The reference/alternate allele frequency for variants in a specific range;
2. The number of mutated variants (i.e., with at least one alternate allele) in a specific
range;
3. The number or frequency of homozygous-alternate/heterozygous genotypes for vari-
ants in a specific range;
4. The number/frequency of homozygous-reference genotypes for variants in a specific
range.
Algorithm 6: Secure allele frequency
Input : P , V , NP and GP for each patient in P .
Output: M
1 M ← an empty set of key-value pairs M.addEntry(V, (Enc(0), 0))
2 for p ∈ P do
3 ones ← Set of variants in V whose Np = 1
4 twos ← Set of variants in V whose Np = 2
5 M ′ ← an empty map
6 for (key, value) ∈M do
7 if key ∩ twos = ∅ then
8 M ′.addEntry(key ∩ twos, value) // Computation for genotype ./.
9 end
10 if key ∩ ones = ∅ then
11 M ′.addEntry(key ∩ ones, (value[0]⊕Gp.c1, value[1] + 1)) // Computation for
genotypes ./0 and ./1
12 end
13 if key \ (ones ∪ twos) = ∅ then
14 M ′.addEntry(key \ (ones ∪ twos), (value[0]⊕Gp.c1⊕ 2 ·Gp.c2, value[1] + 2))
// Computation for genotypes 0/0, 0/1 and 1/1
15 end
16 end
17 M ←M ′
18 end
19 return M // value[0]/value[1] will be computed at the client side
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Algorithm 7: Secure mutation count
Input : P , V , NP and GP for each patient in P .
Output: M
1 M ← an empty set of key-value pairs M.addEntry(V,Enc(0))
2 for p ∈ P do
3 ones ← Set of variants in V whose Np = 1
4 M ′ ← an empty map
5 for (key, value) ∈M do
6 if key ∩ ones = ∅ then
7 M ′.addEntry(key ∩ ones, value⊕Gp.cipher gt1) // Computation for genotype
./0 and ./1
8 end
9 if key \ ones = ∅ then
10 M ′.addEntry(key \ ones, value⊕Gp.cipher gt1⊕Gp.cipher gt2) // Computation
for genotype ./., 0/0, 0/1 and 1/1
11 end
12 end
13 M ←M ′
14 end
15 return M
Algorithm 8: Secure homozygous-alternate/heterozygous frequency
Input : P , V , NP and GP for each patient in P .
Output: M
1 M ← an empty set of key-value pairs
2 M.addEntry(V, (Enc(0), 0))
3 for p ∈ P do
4 zeros ← Set of variants in V whose Np = 0
5 M ′ ← an empty map
6 for (key, value) ∈M do
7 if key \ zeros = ∅ then
8 M ′.addEntry(key \ zeros, value) // Computation for genotype ./., ./0 and ./1
9 end
10 if key ∩ zeros = ∅ then
11 M ′.addEntry(key ∩ zeros, (value[0]⊕Gp.cipher gt2, value[1] + 1)
// Computation for genotype 0/0, 0/1 and 1/1
// cipher gt1 instead of cipher gt2 for heterozygous
12 end
13 end
14 M ←M ′
15 end
16 return M // value[0]/value[1] will be computed at the client side
5.6 Security Analysis
In this section, we discuss about the security of our system with respect to the protection
of genomic data. The protection of clinical data is not the focus of this paper. How-
ever, differently from genomic data, various anonymization techniques can be applied
to protect clinical data and satisfy formal notions of privacy such as k-anonymity [189],
l-diversity [134] or t-closeness [129]. Because using anonymization techniques could mod-
ify the original clinical data and reduce the overall utility of the system, our system can
also be adapted to clinical data in case full accuracy is required.
Our system consists of four different parties: the data-warehouse (DWH), the i2b2
server (IS), the proxy server (PS) and the i2b2 user (U). As DWH is trusted, we only
focus on IS, PS and U. As discussed in Section 5.3.2, we assume the honest-but-curious
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Algorithm 9: Secure homozygous-alternate/heterozygous count
Input : P , V , NP and GP for each patient in P .
Output: M
1 M ← an empty set of key-value pairs
2 M.addEntry(V,Enc(0))
3 for p ∈ P do
4 ones ← Set of variants in V whose Np = 1
5 M ′ ← an empty map
6 for (key, value) ∈M do
7 if key ∩ ones = ∅ then
8 M ′.addEntry(key ∩ ones, value) // Computation for genotype ./0 and ./1
9 end
10 if key \ ones = ∅ then
11 M ′.addEntry(key \ ones, value⊕Gp.cipher gt2)
// cipher gt1 instead of cipher gt2 for heterozygous
// Computation for genotype ./., 0/0, 0/1 and 1/1
12 end
13 end
14 M ←M ′
15 end
16 return M
Algorithm 10: Secure homozygous-reference count or frequency
Input : P , V , NP and GP for each patient in P .
Output: M
1 M ← an empty set of key-value pairs
2 M.addEntry(V, (Enc(0), 0))
3 for p ∈ P do
4 zeros ← Set of variants in V whose Np = 0
5 M ′ ← an empty map
6 for (key, value) ∈M do
7 if key \ zeros = ∅ then
8 M ′.addEntry(key \ zeros, value) // Computation for genotypes ./., ./0 and ./1
9 end
10 if key ∩ zeros = ∅ then
11 M ′.addEntry(key ∩ zeros, (value[0]⊕Gp.cipher gt1⊕Gp.cipher gt2, value[1] + 1))
// Computation for genotype 0/0, 0/1 and 1/1
12 end
13 end
14 M ←M ′
15 end
16 for (key, value) ∈M do
17 value[0]← Enc(value[1] + value[1]x+ value[1]x2 + · · ·+ value[1]xℓ−1)⊕−value[0]
18 end
19 return M // value[0]/value[1] will be computed at the client side for the homozygous
reference frequency
adversarial model for both IS and PS and the malicious-but-covert model for U. More-
over, we recall that s1 represents the partial secret key stored at IS and s2 represents
the partial secret key stored at PS for a specific user. Similarly, S1 and S2 represent the
sets of partial keys for all users in the system at IS and PS, respectively.
- i2b2 Server: If the i2b2 server is compromised, the adversary can access the
encrypted genomic data, the set of partial secret keys S1, the role and access level of
each user, the amount of noise used for perturbing query results, accessible chromosomal
ranges, and the history of queries. Moreover, from the history of queries and the accessible
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chromosomal ranges, the attacker can infer users’ access patterns, their potential interests
and medical specialties. Yet, we note that our goal is to preserve the privacy of patients,
not of i2b2 users. Techniques such as private information retrieval (PIR) can be used on
top of ours for this purpose.
As such, although the adversary has encrypted genomic data and the set of partial
secret keys S1, he cannot obtain any sensitive genomic information about the patients
as he still needs at least one key from the other set of partial keys S2 in order to
decrypt. However, because IS and PS cannot be simultaneously compromised by
assumption, the attacker cannot obtain any partial key in S2 from PS. In addition, the
recovery of a partial secret key s2 ∈ S2 at PS is still hard even if numerous partial
keys s1 ∈ S1 are known. The adversary has to perform approximately O(2
l) operations
where l is the polynomial degree. Hence, the sensitive genomic data remain secure if
PS discards its set of partial keys S2 as soon as it detects that IS is compromised.
In this case, there is no need to re-encrypt genomic data with a new secret key
as the full secret key is never revealed. Only new partial keys need to be regener-
ated for all users in order to avoid the decryption of leaked data with a later attack on PS.
- Proxy Server: If the proxy server is compromised, only the set of partial secret
keys S2 is leaked. As before, because PS and IS cannot collude, the attacker cannot
obtain any sensitive genomic information. Also in this case, new partial keys need to
be generated for all users in order to avoid the decryption of leaked data with a later
attack on IS.
- User: If a user is compromised, his credentials can be stolen and used by a
malicious-but-covert adversary. Then, the adversary can get any aggregated query result
that is originally accessible by the user. Since the adversary can also deduce the identifier
of the user’s partial keys s1 and s2, he can get s2 from PS by sending a polynomial 1
along with the partial key identifier. This problem could be easily addressed by adding
some noise after the multiplication at PS. Yet, this additional protection mechanism is
not necessary as PS simply stores s2 of a user on his behalf and the adversary has no
mean to reconstruct the full secret key. Hence, there is no leakage of sensitive genomic
information even if a user can obtain s2.
Yet, if the compromised user’s role allows the adversary to obtain unperturbed query
results, patients re-identification is still possible. An additional system independent from
the user’s privacy budget ǫtot should be put in place at IS to detect suspicious requests.
We leave this investigation for future work.
5.7 Implementation and Performance Evaluation
In this section, we describe how we implemented and deployed our solution in the real
operational setting of the Lausanne University Hospital (CHUV). We evaluate its perfor-
mance on real genomic and clinical data for different database sizes and types of query.
5.7.1 Plugin Implementation
We implemented our privacy-preserving solution as a plugin of the i2b2 framework. The
i2b2 architecture consists of two major components: The first is the back-end infras-
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Figure 5.4: i2b2 native Web-client.
tructure (the “HIVe”) that is responsible for the security aspects, the access rights and
for managing the underlying data repository. The second component is the user Web-
client: a front-end application suite of query and mining tools that enables users to ask
questions about patients’ data on the i2b2 server. The native version of i2b2 does not
include any support neither for privacy-preserving data processing nor for managing ge-
nomic data but it is designed to enable cohort identification based mostly on clinical and
demographic data. As shown in Figure 5.4, after logging in, a user can drag-and-drop
search terms from the clinical ontology (1) into the Venn diagram-like interface (2) to
construct his cohort of patients. The main advantage of i2b2 with respect to other ex-
isting platforms for clinical research resides in its modular design that enables adopters
to easily extend the core architecture with independent plugins. As a consequence, we
implemented our privacy-preserving plugin as a totally independent module that can be
easily loaded during the setup of the standard i2b2. Our plugin is composed of four
main parts: (i) a data importation tool, (ii) a back-end module for the i2b2 server, (iii)
a back-end module for the proxy server, and (iv) a front-end module for the i2b2 native
Web-client.
In the followings, we briefly describe each of these components.
- Data Importation Tool: The importation tool is written in C++ and is
responsible for the system initialization and the new user assignment. For the system
initialization, it takes as input the VCF file, the access rights policies and the FV public
and secret keys. The tool parses the VCF file, encodes and packs the genotypes into
polynomials and encrypts them by using the FV public key. The final output is a SQL
script that can be used to import data in the i2b2 SQL database. For the new user
assignment, the importation tool takes as input the new user’s identifier, his access level
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and the FV secret key. As output, it generates a SQL script to import into the i2b2
server the new user’s access level along with the first part of the secret key and into the
proxy server the second part of the secret key.
- i2b2 Server Module: The i2b2 server back-end module consists of two parts: the
“main cell” and the “crypto engine”. The main cell is written in Java and is part of the
i2b2 server application. It is responsible for managing the data repository, handling the
queries, computing homomorphic addition of ciphertexts, and, according to the user’s
access rights, adding noise on the computation result to satisfy the notion of differential
privacy. The crypto engine is written in C++ and it is used for the partial decryption
at server side. The Java Native Interface (JNI) is used to call function in the C++
crypto engine from the main cell.
- Proxy Server Module: The proxy server back-end module has a similar structure
to the i2b2 server module. The main cell, written in Java, is responsible for managing
users’ partial keys stored in the data repository, whereas the crypto engine is responsi-
ble for helping the user with the full decryption by performing polynomial multiplication.
- Web-client Module: The Web-client front-end module is written in JavaScript
and can be loaded from the native i2b2 Web-client. It consists of a query builder (Fig-
ure 5.5A), where the user can drag-and-drop a patient set (previously constructed through
the native interface) and type into a search bar a set of genetic variants of interest, and
a result visualizer (Figure 5.5B), where the user can visualize the results of his current
and previous queries. The user is allowed to enter genetic variants by gene name, dbSNP
identifier or chromosomal position and to select the summary statistic he is interested
in.
5.7.2 Performance Evaluation
To evaluate the performance of our proposed solution in the real operational setting of
the Lausanne University Hospital, we have performed several tests on real cohorts of
patients with clinical and genomic data.
- Experimental Setup: To show the practicality of our solution, we used only
commodity hardware for our experiments. The i2b2 server module and the proxy server
module run on two servers in the CHUV’s research network. Their configurations are
described in Table 5.4. For both servers, we limited the number of threads to 8. At
the user side, we used an off-the-shelf laptop equipped with Windows 10, intel i7-3517U
processor and 10 GB of memory. We ran the i2b2 Web-client on Firefox 47.0.1.
Data warehouse
i2b2 Server
Proxy server
Operating System Ubuntu 14.04 Ubuntu 14.04
Processor Intel Xeon E3-1270 Intel Core i7-620M
Memory 16 GB 4 GB
Max Memory for JVM 8 GB 512 MB
Database PostgreSQL 9.4 MySQL 5.6
Table 5.4: Server Setting
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(A) Query Builder.
(B) Result Visualizer.
Figure 5.5: i2b2 front-end plugin.
We used the implementation of the FV cryptosystem provided within the NFLlib
library [22]. The NFLlib is an optimized open-source C++ library dedicated to ideal
lattice cryptography in the polynomial ring Zq[x]/(x
l + 1) for l a power of 2. We chose
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this library because, to the best of our knowledge, it is the most efficient one for com-
putations over polynomials. Indeed, NFLlib uses a mixed NTT-CRT representation to
reduce computational costs: Number-Theoretic Transform (NTT) for polynomials [95]
and Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) for their coefficients.
We used the FV encryption parameters, as reported in Table 5.5, in order to have
128 bits of security level.
Parameter Value
Polynomial Degree 2048
Ciphertext Modulus 4,611,686,018,326,724,609 (62 bits)
Plaintext Modulus 1,000,000 (20 bits)
Table 5.5: Encryption Parameters
We used real genomic data coming from the exome sequencing of 392 samples giving
a genotyping for 472,845 variants each. The resulting VCF file contained a total of
185,355,240 unphased genotypes. For clinical data, we used 90,454 clinical records from
134 patients available from the i2b2 demo version [5]. Patients from the i2b2 demo were
duplicated in order to match the number of patients with genomic records. As a result,
we had an initial cohort of 392 individuals with both clinical and genomic data. To test
the scalability of our solution, this initial cohort was further extended by replicating
individuals in order to obtain a cohort of 5,000 patients.
- Performance Analysis: We assessed the performance of our proposed solution in
terms of storage and computational overheads.
To measure the storage overhead, we compared the initial size of genotypes within
the original VCF file with the size of the encrypted genotypes stored on the i2b2 server.
We did not consider the meta-data in the VCF file as this information is never modified
before being stored on the i2b2 server. In general, in a VCF file, a genotype is represented
by 4 bytes: 2 bytes for 2 alleles, 1 byte for ‘/’ or ‘|’, and 1 byte for a delimiter. As there
were a total of 185,355,240 genotypes in our VCF file, their corresponding size was 707.07
MB. After encoding, packing and encrypting all genotypes in the VCF file, we obtained a
set of 181,104 ciphertexts whose size is 5.82 GB. This corresponds to a storage overhead
of 8x compared to the unencrypted VCF.
To measure the computational overhead, we ran experiments on all the privacy-
preserving algorithms for summary statistics for different sets of variants and different
cohort sizes. Experiments were run 100 times for each scenario and we report the average
execution time in the following. We evaluated the different steps of the query execution
phase, described in detail in Section 5.5.
Figure 5.6A and Figure 5.6B show the total execution time at the i2b2 server needed
to compute the different summary statistics for increasing cohort sizes and a fixed query
including 3,000 genetic variants with and without no-calls. It is easy to observe how
the execution time increases linearly with the number of patients in the cohort and how
the presence of no-calls in the VCF file has a significant impact on performance. Differ-
ences between the execution time for computing homozygous alternate/heterozygous
counts/frequencies (yellow and purple curves) and the other summary statistics are
mainly due to the different number of ciphertexts involved in the computation.
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(A) With no-calls.
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
Number of Patients
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
E
x
e
c
u
ti
o
n
 t
im
e
 (
s
e
c
o
n
d
s
)
Any Mutation Count
Allele Frequency
Homozygous Alternate/Heterozygous Count
Homozygous Alternate/Heterozygous Frequency
Homozygous Reference Count/Frequency
(B) Without no-calls.
Figure 5.6: Total query execution time at i2b2 server per number of patients in the cohort for
a query involving 3000 genetic variants.
The execution time at the i2b2 does not depend only on the number of patients in
the cohort but also on the number of consecutive genetic variants specified in the query,
as shown in Figure 5.7. The differences in execution time between the different summary
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Figure 5.7: Total execution time at i2b2 server per number of consecutive genetic variants.
statistics depend on genotypes with no-call values. In particular, the computations of the
number of mutations (blue curve) and the number of homozygous alternate/heterozygous
(yellow curve) are significantly influenced only by the existence of genotypes with 1 no-
call, whereas the other computations are also influenced by genotypes with 2 no-calls.
Note that in our data we do not have genotypes with 1 no-call. From Fig.5.8A and
Fig.5.8B we can observe that most of the computational time at the i2b2 server is due
to data retrieval from the database and homomorphic computations.
Finally, Figure 5.9A and Figure 5.9B show the execution time for a full decryption
of the query results for an increasing number of consecutive genetic variants for the
contribution of the proxy server and the client, respectively. It is easy to observe that
the execution time at the proxy server is similar to the execution time at the i2b2 server
for partial decryption as the number of processed ciphertexts is the same. At the client
side, we can observe a different behavior for the execution time as decryption is done
variant-by-variant instead of ciphertext-by-ciphertext. Note that, because of genotypes
with no-call values, the number of ciphertexts including the query results can be different
from the number of ciphertexts including genetic variants.
5.8 Discussion
We have thoroughly evaluated the performance of our solution on real data. Results
show that generally privacy-preserving solutions, such as the one proposed in this work,
can already be used in medical settings as new efficient enablers. Yet, some important
points need to be further discussed.
- Performance: As it can be observed from the results of Figure 5.6A and Fig-
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(A) Partial decryption.
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(B) Data retrieval and homomorphic computations.
Figure 5.8: Breakdown of total execution time at i2b2 server per number of consecutive genetic
variants.
ure 5.6B, the main bottleneck for the execution time of queries involving specific types
of summary statistics (e.g., allele or genotype frequencies) is due to the presence of geno-
types with no-call values. Indeed, the number of key-value pairs (i.e., set of variants that
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Figure 5.9: Execution time for full decryption for queries with increasing number of consecutive
genetic variants.
can be processed in parallel) generated by Algorithms 6, 8 and 10 at the i2b2 server can
significantly grow if the distribution of no-calls is very different among patients. Yet,
some quick alternative approaches can be used to easily address this issue. A first poten-
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tial approach consists in using a different encoding for genotype values, as the one shown
in Table 5.6, which maximizes performance at the expense of increasing the storage over-
head from a factor of 8 to a factor of 20. Note that a storage overhead of 20x can be
prohibitive for most institutions in case of large studies such as whole genome sequenc-
ing. It is definitely acceptable for studies on the exome. Another potential approach
would be to perform genotype imputation before the genotype encoding in order to re-
place no-calls with imputed values at the expense of a slight decrease in accuracy. This
said, it is easy to observe how the first alternative approach prioritizes high performance
and high accuracy instead of low storage overhead, whereas the second approach ensures
high performance and low storage overhead rather than full accuracy. Note that, by
slightly sacrificing performance, our current solution assigns the highest priority to low
storage cost and high accuracy as specified by CHUV’s requirements (see Section 5.4).
We leave for future work further investigations on how to improve our secure algorithms
in Section 5.5.5 in order to optimize both performance and storage without sacrificing
accuracy.
Genotype value Genotype encoding
gt1 gt2 gt3 gt4 gt5
./. 0 0 0 0 0
./0 0 0 0 1 0
./1 0 0 0 1 1
0/0 1 0 0 2 0
0/1 0 1 0 2 1
1/1 0 0 1 2 2
Table 5.6: Genotype encoding optimizing performance.
As it is well-known in the security field, the perfect solution does not exist. It is
always a matter of finding the best trade-offs between protection overhead, efficiency,
and accuracy of the result. Our proposed solution is general enough to be fine-tuned
according to the requirements.
- Query result perturbation: As explained in Section 5.5, our solution applies
the standard and well-established Laplace mechanism [75] to independently perturb
query results in order to satisfy the notion of differential privacy and prevent patient
re-identification. Yet, the amount of noise that the i2b2 server needs to add to new
queries of a given user grows linearly with the number of queries already answered for
that user. This can substantially degrade the utility of the system as the results of later
queries would be useless or, in other words, the number of useful queries would be lim-
ited. For this reason more sophisticated mechanisms could be used to obtain sublinear
noise. For example, the median mechanism [174], the exponential mechanism [142] or the
multiplicative weights mechanism [101] can answer exponentially more predicate queries
than the Laplace mechanism. Indeed, the algorithm proposed by Vinterbo et al. [206]
provides the option to incorporate user preferences with regard to individual query re-
sponses, thereby increasing utility to users without compromising privacy. The authors
propose as well an evaluation of the privacy/utility trade-off with i2b2 which shows the
efficacy of their method. This can be easily implemented in our system.
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5.9 Summary
In this chapter, we have described how we designed, implemented and deployed, for the
first time, a secure and efficient privacy-preserving solution for exploring genomic cohorts
in a real operational scenario at the Lausanne University Hospital. So far, without proper
security and privacy guarantees, the exploration of genetic cohorts has been extremely
difficult and time-consuming. Thanks to its efficiency and strong security, we believe that
our solution represents a powerful enabler in this context, especially when there is a need
for sharing sensitive information in less protected environments. The adoption of privacy-
preserving systems such as ours will undoubtedly foster data sharing and translational
research on a larger scale.
To conclude, we acknowledge that the proposed solution addresses a simple use case
by providing genomic summary statistics that can be securely computed through homo-
morphic additions. Yet, thanks to the flexibility of the FV scheme, more complex use
cases such as privacy-preserving phenome-wide association studies (PheWAS) or GWAS
can be envisioned and developed on top of our solution. We plan to extend the func-
tional capabilities of the current system by addressing more complex use cases in future
work. Finally, we want to emphasize that the goal of this chapter was not to discuss the
parameters’ values that determine the best privacy and accuracy trade-off when using
differential privacy, but to provide the tools that enable privacy-preserving exploration
of genetic cohorts. We believe that such a discussion should be a prerogative of database
administrators, end-users and hospitals’ institutional review boards.

Chapter 6
Addressing Beacon Re-Identification
Attacks: Quantification and Mitigation
of Privacy Risks
In the previous chapter, we have addressed the problem of re-using, in a privacy-
preserving way, clinical and genomic data for medical research. We have focused on
the particular use case of a medical institution willing to outsource the storage of its data
to an untrusted centralized repository so that multiple researchers can access it. Yet, the
amount of data required for significantly advancing medical research usually goes beyond
the capability of a single institution. The need to share clinical and genomic data among
multiple and mutually-distrustful stakeholders is constantly increasing but privacy and
security concerns often represent roadblocks difficult to overcome. In this chapter, we
consider the first existing federated system for genomic variant discovery, the Beacon
Project of the Global Alliance for Genomics and Health. We analyze one of the most
daunting privacy risks affecting this kind of systems, i.e., the re-identification risk, and
propose a set of practical mitigation strategies.
6.1 Introduction
The Global Alliance for Genomics and Health (GA4GH) [92] conceived the Beacon
Project as a means of testing the willingness of international sites to share genomic
data in the simplest of all technical contexts: a public web service that any data holder
could implement to enable users to submit queries of the form “Do you have any genomes
with nucleotide A at position 100,735 on chromosome 3?,” to which the service would
respond with “Yes” or “No”. A site offering this service is called a beacon and is respon-
sible for assuring that genomic data are exposed through the Beacon service only with
the permission of the individual to whom the data pertain, and in accordance with the
GA4GH ethical framework [125] and privacy and security policy [93]. Thus the Beacon
service is designed to be technically simple, easy to implement, and privacy protective.
The availability of vast quantities of high-quality genomic and health data is es-
sential to the advancement of biomedical knowledge. Yet privacy concerns often limit
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researchers’ ability to access potentially identifiable health data. Indeed, in some cases,
privacy laws and regulations may actually impede individuals’ ability to make their own
data available to researchers [193]. This problem is particularly acute in the field of
genomics, where the vast majority of variants predicted to be functionally important are
extremely rare, occurring in <0.5% of the population [192]. As a result, it is unlikely
that any single institution will hold enough data to achieve sufficient statistical power
in studying any particular condition. Recognizing the urgent need for federation across
organizations, the GA4GH was formed in 2013 to enable responsible sharing of genomic
and health-related data by establishing consistent policy, and interoperable standards
and protocols.
From its inception, the GA4GH has been committed to achieving a responsible and
effective balance between data sharing and individual privacy, a challenge that has been
extensively explored in the literature [107, 176, 77, 99]. In 2008, Homer et al. [107]
showed that statistical techniques can reveal the presence or absence of an individual
in a genomic data set, even when the targeted individual’s genome accounts for <0.1%
of the total data. The publication of this paper had a significant impact, prompting
several major institutions, including the Wellcome Trust and the US National Institutes
of Health, to limit public access to data formerly adjudged to be safely anonymous [96].
As this scenario demonstrates, privacy concerns can undermine the ability of researchers
to publish and access genomic data.
Initially, the GA4GH recognized that the Beacon approach could reveal information
about individuals in a data set. However, in performing the risk assessment, the GA4GH
recognized several aspects that served to mitigate the risk that any individual would
be identified based on Beacon search. First, the Beacon user interface is extremely
restrictive, enabling query only for the presence or absence of the four nucleotides (A,
C, T, G) that comprise every individual’s genome. Second, the number of individual
genomes aggregated in each beacon is very large. Third, for a data seeker to be able to
identify an individual through Beacon queries would require as a pre-condition that the
data seeker possess a significant amount of genomic data associated with the targeted
individual, such as a variant call format (VCF) file of the individual’s whole genome
sequence. In such case, a potential adversary would know all variants in the individual’s
genome, and would have much more efficient means of discovering a disease association
than persistent beacon queries. Thus GA4GH concluded that the risk of a data seeker
identifying an individual through Beacon queries was acceptably low, even for the case
of a data seeker willing to violate GA4GH’s ethical standards.
However, Shringarpure and Bustamante [181] describe an attack in which an anony-
mous adversary, even with knowledge of only a small portion of a target’s genome can
successfully launch a re-identification attack: In a beacon comprising 1,000 individuals
for instance, 5,000 queries suffice. Such an attack relies on a likelihood ratio test whose
power is a function of the responses returned by the beacon, the size of the data set,
the allele-frequency spectrum, and the sequencing error rate. Their paper demonstrates
that under certain conditions, the anonymous-access model implemented by the Beacon
Project does not prevent identification of individuals whose genomes could be exposed
through a Beacon interface.
The goal of this chapter is to examine potential vulnerabilities and risks associ-
ated with the Beacon model, and to explore ways of mitigating re-identification risks
– thus enhancing Beacon privacy protections. Re-identification is the process by which
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Notation Description
N Total number of genomes in the beacon.
Q = {q1, ..., qn} Set of n queries.
R = {x1, ..., xn} Set of n responses returned by the beacon.
H0 Null hypothesis: query genome is not in beacon.
H1 Alternative hypothesis: query genome is in beacon.
fi Alternate allele frequency at the SNP corresponding to query qi.
pi Reference allele frequency at the SNP corresponding to query qi,
(pi = 1− fi).
L(R) Log-likelihood of a response set R = {x1, ..., xn}.
LH0(R), LH1(R) Log-likelihood under the null/alternative hypothesis.
beta(a, b) Alternate allele frequency distribution assumed
in the original by Shringarpure and Bustamante.
DiN−1 Probability that none of the N − 1 genomes
in the beacon has an alternate allele for query qi.
DiN Probability that none of the N genomes
in the beacon has an alternate allele for query qi.
δ Probability of mismatch between the query genome and its
copy in the beacon due to sequencing errors.
j ∈ 1, ..., N Index of individuals in the beacon.
i ∈ 1, ..., n Index of queries.
α Type I error: P (reject H0|H0 is true).
β Type II error: P (accept H0|H1 is true).
power P (reject H0|H1 is true) = 1− β.
ri Risk of query i.
bj Budget of patient j.
LRDH1 , LRDH0 Likelihood ratio distribution under the alternative/null hypothesis.
Λ LRT statistic.
t Cut-off for the LRT statistic Λ (the null hypothesis is rejected if Λ < t).
Qj Set of queries answered by individual j.
k Threshold on the number of individuals carrying an alternate allele at
the queried SNP (used in defense S1).
ǫ Probability of adding noise on unique alleles (used in defense S2).
Bj Budget for individual j. Initially Bj = −log(p) for every j (used in defense S3).
ri Risk for query i (i.e., how much budget for every individual j is deducted
from Bj if the beacon answers query i).
LRT Likelihood Ratio Test.
SNP Single Nucleotide Polymorphism.
VCF Variant Call Format.
Table 6.1: Notation used throughout the chapter.
anonymized personal data is matched with its true owner [14]. We first analyze the
re-identification threat described by Shringarpure and Bustamante and the vulnerability
the attack exploited. We then propose an optimized version of the attack that consid-
ers an adversary with some background knowledge about the allele frequencies (AFs)
in the targeted beacon. We describe three potential strategies for mitigating the risk
of re-identification, and assess their effectiveness through several experiments with data
obtained from the 1000 Genomes Project [194]. We conclude the chapter by discussing
strengths and weaknesses of the proposed strategies and by providing some recommen-
dation for strengthening Beacon privacy protection. We summarize the notation used in
this Chapter in Table 6.1.
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6.2 Original Re-Identification Attack
We begin by describing the re-identification attack proposed by Shringarpure and Bus-
tamante [181]. In the following we refer to it as the “SB attack”.
We assume a beacon of N unrelated individuals. Queries to the beacon are of the
form q = {C,P,A}. The beacon responds “Yes” (encoded as 1) if A is an alternate allele
at position P on chromosome C, and if it appears at least once in the beacon population.
Otherwise it responds “No” (encoded as 0). For a set of n queries Q = {q1, . . . , qn}, the
beacon returns responses R = {x1, . . . , xn}.
As noted earlier, the setting of the SB attack is similar to that of previous works such
as that of Homer et al. [107]. The attacker is assumed to have access to the VCF file of
a target victim’s genome and queries the beacon at heterozygous positions to determine
whether the victim is in the beacon or not. The SB attack relies on a likelihood-ratio
test (LRT) that evaluates the likelihood of the beacon’s responses under two possible
hypotheses:
• The null hypothesis H0: The queried victim’s genome is not in the beacon.
• The alternative hypothesis H1: The queried victim’s genome is in the beacon.
The re-identification risk is measured by the power of such a test, i.e.,
Pr(rejectH0|H1 true). To make their test as general as possible, Shringarpure and Bus-
tamante assume only that the attacker knows the beacon size N , as well as the site
frequency spectrum of the beacon population. Formally, the alternate allele frequency
fi of a heterozygous SNP observed in the population is assumed to be distributed as
fi ∼ beta(a, b) for population parameters a, b. Their LRT test further allows for a prob-
ability δ of sequencing errors, resulting in a mismatch between the attacker’s copy of a
genome and the copy in the beacon. Given a set of beacon responses R = {x1, . . . , xn},
the log-likelihood of the sequence is
L(R) =
n∑
i=1
xi log Pr(xi = 1) + (1− xi) log Pr(xi = 0) . (6.1)
Under H1, let D
i
N−1 denote the probability that none of the N − 1 other genomes in
the beacon have an alternate allele at position i. Similarly, under H0 we denote by D
i
N
the probability that none of the N genomes in the beacon have an alternate allele at i.
Then, under the two hypotheses, we have
LH1(R) =
n∑
i=1
xi log(1− δD
i
N−1) + (1− xi) log(δD
i
N−1) , (6.2)
LH0(R) =
n∑
i=1
xi log(1−D
i
N ) + (1− xi) log(D
i
N ) . (6.3)
Shringarpure and Bustamante show that under their assumptions, for any position
i we have DiN−1 = E[p
2N−2
i ] and D
i
N = E[p
2N
i ], where pi ∼ beta(b, a). The log of the
likelihood-ratio test is given by
Λ = LH0(R)− LH1(R) = nB + C
n∑
i=1
xi , (6.4)
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where B and C are constant for N, δ, a, b fixed. Thus,
∑n
i=1 xi (the number of “yes”
responses from the beacon) is a sufficient statistic for the LRT.
6.3 “Optimal” Attack With Real Allele Frequencies
The SB attack removes direct dependency on allele frequencies and sets conservative
bounds for the number of queries required for successful re-identification. We consider
here a more capable and determined attacker who has access to some background knowl-
edge on allele frequencies and optimizes his attack by querying the rarest alleles in the
victim’s genome first. In other words, similarly to best practices in forensics, the attacker
makes use of alleles with maximum re-identification power instead of performing random
requests. This assumption appears reasonable in practice, as allele frequency informa-
tion for different ancestry groups is already publicly available on the Web (e.g., 1000
Genomes Project [64], HapMap project [65], etc.) and easily accessible even by inexpert
attackers. We show through several experiments (see Section 6.5) that this new attack
is significantly more powerful than the original SB attack, even when the attacker has
incomplete knowledge of AFs in the beacon.
Formally, the attacker assumes allele frequencies f1, f2, . . . , fM for the M SNPs in
the victim’s genome. Without loss of generality, we assume the frequencies are already
ordered (i.e, f1 ≤ f2 ≤ · · · ≤ fM ). Then, the attacker will maximize its re-identification
power by first querying those SNPs which are least likely to appear in the beacon un-
der H0, namely those with lowest frequency. In this setting, Equations (6.2) and (6.3)
still hold, but the computation of DiN−1 and D
i
N is different. Under the alternative
hypothesis, we have
DiN−1 = Pr(none of the other N − 1 genomes have an alternate allele at position i)
=
(
(1− fi)
2
)N−1
= (1− fi)
2N−2 .
Similarly, under H0 we have D
i
N = (1− fi)
2N .
As the probabilities DiN−1 and D
i
N now directly depend on the position i, we have
the following LRT
Λ = LH0(R)− LH1(R)
=
n∑
i=1
log
(
DiN
δDiN−1
)
+ log
(
δDiN−1(1−D
i
N )
DiN (1− δD
i
N−1)
)
xi
=
n∑
i=1
log
(
δ−1(1− fi)
2
)
+ log
(
δ
(1− fi)2
·
1− (1− fi)
2N
1− δ(1− fi)2N−2
)
xi . (6.5)
We will evaluate the power of this test empirically, through experiments in a variety
of settings with real data and different levels of adversarial background knowledge. We
will estimate the null distribution of the LRT by computing Equation (6.5) for a number
of control individuals known not to be in the beacon. The null hypothesis is rejected if
Λ < t for some threshold t. We then let tα be such that Pr[Λ < tα | H0] = α. The power
of the test is computed as 1− β = Pr[Λ < tα | H1], where the distribution of Λ given H1
is estimated by querying individuals in the experimental beacon.
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6.4 Risk Mitigation Strategies
Based on the “optimal” version of the re-identification attack, we propose three different
practical strategies to mitigate the risk. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
any defense mechanism that effectively mitigates the “optimal” re-identification attack
also effectively mitigates the original SB attack. Our experimental results in Section 6.5
show the validity of this assumption.
6.4.1 Beacon Alteration Strategy
The first strategy (S1) relies on the observation that most of the statistical power in
the re-identification attack comes from queries targeting unique alleles in the beacon
database. In particular, S1 alters the beacon by answering a query with “Yes” only if
there are at least k > 1 individuals sharing the queried allele. In other words, k is the
minimum number of queried alleles present in beacon when returning “Yes”. Note that
for the case where k = 2, this is different from responding “Yes” when at least 2 out
of the 2N alleles in the beacon are alternate (N represents the number of individuals
in the beacon), as a single individual may have 2 copies of the alternate allele. Current
beacons set k = 1; i.e., when there are one or more individuals in the population with
the queried allele, the answer will be “Yes”. We assume the value of k is made public,
hence the attacker will modify the attack to accommodate this change. Yet, already for
k = 2 we found that in practice what the attacker can infer is limited (see Section 6.5.3
for details).
Formally, the attacker knows the allele frequencies for the SNPs in the victim’s
genome, and these frequencies can be ordered randomly or sequentially. In this set-
ting, Equation (6.1) still holds, but Equations (6.2) and (6.3) needs to be modified as
they now depend on k.
Under the alternative hypothesis, the beacon responds “No” if either of the following
two conditions is met.
• A sequencing error δ occurred and less than k other individuals have a copy of the
allele
• No sequencing error occurred but less than k − 1 other individuals have a copy of
the allele
Hence, we have
LH1(R, k) =
n∑
i=1
xi log(Pr(xi = 1|H1, k)) + (1− xi) log(Pr(xi = 0|H1, k))
=
n∑
i=1
xi log(δ(1−D
i
N−1(k)) + (1− δ)(1−D
i
N−1(k − 1)))
+ (1− xi) log(δD
i
N−1(k) + (1− δ)D
i
N−1(k − 1)) (6.6)
where DiN−1(k) denotes the probability that fewer than k out of N − 1 individuals
have an alternate allele (for query qi). Let XN−1,si be a random variable following a
binomial distribution with N − 1 trials and success probability si = 1− (1− fi)
2, where
si represents the probability that a given individual (other than the victim) has at least
one copy of an alternate allele (for query qi) with frequency fi. Then,
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DiN−1(k) = Pr(less than k out of N − 1 genomes have an alternate allele at position i)
= Pr(XN−1,si < k) =
k−1∑
j=0
(
N − 1
j
)
(1− (1− fi)
2)j((1− fi)
2)N−1−j . (6.7)
Similarly, under the null hypothesis, the probability that the beacon responds “No” to
a query qi for an allele with frequency fi is the probability that at most k−1 individuals
have a copy of the query allele. Hence, we have
LH0(R, k) =
n∑
i=1
xi log(Pr(xi = 1|H0, k)) + (1− xi) log(Pr(xi = 0|H0, k))
=
n∑
i=1
xi log(1−D
i
N (k)) + (1− xi) log(D
i
N (k)) (6.8)
Therefore, the likelihood ratio test statistic Λ(k) when k ≥ 2 can be computed by
Λ(k) = LH0(R, k)− LH1(R, k)
=
n∑
i=1
log
(
DiN (k)
δDiN−1(k) + (1− δ)D
i
N−1(k − 1)
)
+ log
(
(1−DiN (k))(δD
i
N−1(k) + (1− δ)D
i
N−1(k − 1))
DiN (k)(δ(1−D
i
N−1(k)) + (1− δ)(1−D
i
N−1(k − 1)))
)
xi . (6.9)
Note that if k = 1, from Equations (6.6) and (6.8) we can obtain Equations (6.2)
and (6.3), respectively.
An alternative approach is to hide the precise number of individuals within a beacon
database and instead provide an approximate database size (e.g., the reported database
size is 100 although the actual database size is 1000). In this case, let the approximate
size of a beacon database that the attacker knows be Na; thus, the LRT statistic Λ can
be calculated according to Equation (6.5), where N = Na.
Λ =
n∑
i=1
log
(
δ−1(1− fi)
2
)
+ log
(
δ
(1− fi)2
·
1− (1− fi)
2Na
1− δ(1− fi)2Na−2
)
xi . (6.10)
6.4.2 Random Flipping Strategy
The second strategy (S2) relies on the same observation but instead of altering the beacon
response, it introduces noise into the original data. The disadvantage of S1 is that only
a subset of variations (e.g., the non-unique SNPs when k = 2) in the beacon population
can be queried. In practice, unique alleles that are likely to be the most useful in human
genetics research, are completely hidden. S2 improves the usability of the beacon over
S1 as it hides only a portion ǫ of unique alleles, but not all. In other words, a beacon
with S2 will add noise with probability ǫ only to unique alleles in the database and
provide false answers (e.g., “No” instead of “Yes”) to queries targeting these unique
alleles. The main goal of S2 is to share as many unique alleles as possible while reducing
the likelihood that the information released will be sufficient to re-identify an individual
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in the database. Without loss of generality, we assume the value of ǫ is public. As for
S1, the attacker will adapt the LRT statistic to take it into account.
Formerly, and also in this case, the attacker knows the allele frequencies for the SNPs
in the victim’s genome and performs queries by following the rare-allele-first model.
Similarly to S1, Equation (6.1) still holds, but Equations (6.2) and (6.3) needs to be
modified again as they now depend on ǫ.
Under the alternative hypothesis, the beacon responds “No” if either of the following
two conditions is met.
• A sequencing error δ occurred and none of the other N − 1 participants has a copy
of the allele.
• An artificial error ǫ occurred and the allele is unique. Note that an allele is unique
if a sequencing error occurred and another participant has a copy of the allele or if
no sequencing error occurred and none of the other N − 1 participants has a copy
of the allele.
Hence, we have
LH1(R, ǫ) =
n∑
i=1
xi log(Pr(xi = 1|H1, ǫ)) + (1− xi) log(Pr(xi = 0|H1, ǫ)), (6.11)
where the probability of a “No” answer is
Pr(xi = 0|H1, ǫ) = Pr(none of N − 1 genomes have an alternate allele at position i)
+ ǫPr(allele at position i is unique)
= δDiN−1 + ǫ(δ Pr(XN−1,si = 1) + (1− δ)D
i
N−1)
= ǫδ Pr(XN−1,si = 1) + (δ + ǫ− ǫδ)D
i
N−1. (6.12)
Note that Pr(XN−1,si = 1) denotes the probability that another participant has a
copy of the allele at position i. As in Sec. 6.4.1, we can derive such a probability as
Pr(XN−1,si = 1) =
(
N − 1
1
)
(1− (1− fi)
2)((1− fi)
2)N−1
= (N − 1)(1− (1− fi)
2)((1− fi)
2)N−1. (6.13)
Similarly, under the null hypothesis we have
LH0(R, ǫ) =
n∑
i=1
xi log(Pr(xi = 1|H0, ǫ)) + (1− xi) log(Pr(xi = 0|H0, ǫ)), (6.14)
where the probability of receiving a “No” answer from the beacon is
Pr(xi = 0|H0, ǫ) = Pr(none of N genomes have an alternate allele at position i)
+ ǫPr(allele at position i is unique)
= DiN + ǫPr(XN,si = 1) (6.15)
Finally, the likelihood ratio test statistic Λ(ǫ) can be easily derived from Equa-
tions (6.11) and (6.14) as in previous sections.
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6.4.3 Query Budget Per Individual Strategy
The third strategy (S3) mitigates the re-identification risk by assigning a budget to
every individual in the database; this budget is applied to each authenticated Beacon
user. With respect to strategies S1 and S2, S3 leverages two additional assumptions:
• Each Beacon user has been identity proofed, holds a single account, is authenti-
cated, and does not collude. If users are allowed to collude, then to be effective, S3
will have a dramatic impact on the utility of the system. This assumption appears
reasonable in practice as, in order to collude, a user needs by definition to involve
someone else. We assume that each user holds a single Beacon account to elimi-
nate the possibility of a single user simulating multiple profiles in collusion, which
carries higher risk than either collusion among multiple users or a re-identification
attack that can be undertaken at an individual scale. This is because an attack
involving multiple accounts, all working on behalf of a single attacker, does not
require exchanging files with other users, and could be conducted more quickly
than a single-threaded attack.
• The attacker has accurate genomic information, which means δ = 0. This is a worst-
case assumption because if we can prevent re-identification under this condition,
we can prevent the proposed “optimal” attack, too. Note that in practice, because
there are some sequencing errors (i.e., δ > 0), the attacker will actually have less
power. Hence, this approach is conservative from a re-identification point of view.
Moreover, by assuming δ = 0, we can significantly simplify the analytical treatment
of the problem.
The basic idea is that each time an individual’s genome contributes to a “Yes” answer
for a given query (i.e., the individual has the allele specified by the query), her corre-
sponding budget for that user is reduced by an amount that depends on the frequency
of the queried allele. If her budget is less than this amount, her information will not be
used to answer that query and the individual will be removed from the dataset, as shown
in Algorithm 11. In this way, the privacy of the individual will be always preserved at a
cost of a slight decrease of utility.
Let R be the set of responses of the beacon; the goal of S3 is to keep track of the power
of the attack, which is based on the LRT Λ = LH0(R)−LH1(R), to prevent any individual
genome from contributing to a query response that can leak identity information with
high confidence.
More formally, we define a cut-off threshold tα on the value of Λ to determine which
hypothesis to accept (i.e., the null hypothesis is rejected if Λ < tα). Then the false-
positive rate is α = Pr[Λ < tα | H0] and the power of the test is 1−β = Pr[Λ < tα | H1].
So to validate that the original attack is mitigated by S3, we first need to know the
distribution of Λ under H0 and H1. In the analysis by Shringarpure and Bustamante,
it is shown that Λ is asymptotically Gaussian under both hypotheses (with different
parameters). In our case, this result does not hold because we set δ = 0 and assume
fixed allele frequencies fi for each allele.
The crucial observation here is that since δ = 0, if the queried individual is in the
beacon it must be that the beacon responds “Yes” to all queries qi ∈ Q made by the
adversary for a query individual. Let Ryes denote the sequence of all “Yes” responses.
We consider two cases:
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Algorithm 11: Algorithm describing mitigation strategy S3
Require: Upper bound on test errors, p.
1: Set all bj = − log(p).
2: Receive i-th query and check whether it has been asked before. If yes, go to Step 3. If no,
go to Step 4.
3: Return the previous answer, then go to Step 2.
4: Compute the risk ri = − log(1−D
N
i ).
5: Check whether there are any records with the asked variant and bj > ri. If no, return no
and go to step 2.
6: For all the individuals with such variant and bj > ri, reduce their budgets by ri. Then
return yes.
7: Go back to step 2 and wait for the next query.
• R = Ryes. One then easily obtains:
LH1(R) = 0, LH0(R) =
n∑
i=1
log(1−DiN ), Λ =
n∑
i=1
log(1−DiN ) . (6.16)
• R = Ryes. Then, we have:
LH1(R) = −∞, LH0(R) ∈ R, Λ =∞ . (6.17)
So we see that in any case, the random variable Λ can only take on two values, either∑n
i=1 log(1−D
i
N ) or ∞.
Now, if H1 is true, R must be Ryes. Thus, we have that the distribution of Λ under
H1 reduces to the constant
∑n
i=1 log(1−D
i
N ).
If H0 is true, the beacon responds “Yes” to query qi with probability 1−D
i
N . Thus,
Pr[R = Ryes | H0] =
∏n
i=1(1 − D
i
N ). Then, under H0, Λ is a random variable that
takes value
∑n
i=1 log(1 −D
i
N ) with probability
∏n
i=1(1 −D
i
N ), and value ∞ otherwise.
In summary:
Λ | H1 =
n∑
i=1
log(1−DiN ) with probability 1 ,
Λ | H0 =


n∑
i=1
log(1−DiN ) with probability
n∏
i=1
(1−DiN ) ,
∞ otherwise.
So the cut-off threshold t must be chosen somewhere in
]∑n
i=1 log(1−D
i
N ),+∞
[
.
According to the above, the power of the adversary will always be 1 (the adversary will
never conclude that the victim is not in the beacon when she actually is). So our only
control is over the false-positive rate α =
∏n
i=1(1−D
i
N ). The goal of our strategy here
is to dismiss an individual from consideration for any further query responses as soon as
including her data would enable the adversary to construct a powerful re-identification
test for that individual. By this, we mean a test with power 1 and false positive rate
α ≤ p, for some chosen p. Our budget method sets bj = − log(p) at first and then each
time a query is made for an allele that a individual possesses, we first check whether
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the budget of the individual is larger than − log(1 − DiN ), then reduce his budget by
− log(1 − DiN ). In this way we ensure that for each individual j,
∏
i∈Qj (1 − D
i
N ) > p,
where Qj represents the subset of queries made for alleles that individual j possesses,
and for which individual j was considered when constructing the response.
For simplicity, we consider here that an adversary that wishes to re-identify individual
j will only query SNPs for which j possesses the alternate allele (assuming δ = 0). Indeed,
for a query for a variant that j does not possess, we have Pr[xi = 1 | H1] = 1 −D
i
N−1
and Pr[xi = 1 | H0] = 1−D
i
N , which are negligibly close for large N . Thus, such queries
can simply be considered as useless for distinguishing H0 from H1.
6.5 Experiments With Real Data
To evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed strategies in reducing risk under the “opti-
mal” attack with real AFs, we designed and ran several experiments on real data with
the following setup. We created a beacon composed of 1, 235 samples of chromosome 10
randomly chosen from the 2, 504 individuals in phase 3 of the 1000 Genomes Project [64].
A total of 31 relatives were removed. The resulting data set consists of individuals with
either European, African, admixed American, East Asian or South Asian ancestries.
Among these samples, 100 were selected as the control set. Similarly, from the remaining
individuals not in the beacon, 100 were selected as the test set.
The null distribution of the LRT statistic was obtained through the exact-test com-
putation on the 100 individuals in the test set (i.e., not in the beacon). With a false
positive rate of α = 5% we computed the power (1−β) as the proportion of test rejected
(i.e., when Λ < tα) for the control set (i.e., how many individuals in the control set,
hence in the beacon, were successfully re-identified).
6.5.1 “Optimal” Re-Identification Attack in Single-Population Beacon
We evaluated the re-identification power of our attack on a beacon composed by individ-
uals coming from the same ancestry group. From phase 3 of the 1000 Genomes Project,
we selected 502 samples of European (EUR) ancestry and we randomly picked half of
them to set up the beacon. The remaining half was used to compute the EUR population
allele frequencies. We considered several scenarios where the attacker has different types
of background information.
As expected, results in Figure 6.1 show that the worst-case scenario is represented
by an attacker knowing the exact ancestry of the population in the beacon. With only
three SNPs, beacon membership could be re-identified with 100% power and 5% false-
positive rate. Yet, because the beacon ancestry information is not always public, a more
realistic scenario is to consider an attacker that only knows the allele frequencies of a
random population possibly from a different ancestry than the one of the beacon. Even
with the least precise background information (in this case the AFs from East Asian
(EAS) ancestry), 36 SNPs are sufficient to re-identify an individual. Figure 6.2 shows
the Kendall rank correlation coefficient between the actual allele frequencies in the beacon
and the allele frequencies from different ancestry groups. By combining the information
in Figure 6.1 and 6.2, it is easy to observe that the higher the ordinal association between
the beacon AFs and the AFs known by the attacker, the fewer queries are needed to re-
identify with 100% power and 5% false-positive rate.
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Figure 6.1: “Optimal” Re-Identification Attack in Single-Population Beacon. Different power
rates per number of SNPs queried from an unprotected beacon with a single population (EUR)
by an adversary with different types of background knowledge: (Green) The attacker knows
the allele frequencies of a population from the same ancestry (EUR) as the one in the beacon
and performs queries following the rare-allele-first logic; (Red, Cyan, Blue and Purple) The
attacker knows the allele frequencies of a population from an ancestry different from the one
in the beacon and performs queries following the rare-allele-first logic (African (AFR), admixed
American (AMR), East Asian (EAS) or South Asian (SAS), respectively); (Yellow) The attacker
knows the allele frequencies of a distinct population with the same ancestry (EUR) other than the
one in the beacon but performs queries in random order; (Black) The attacker does not have any
information on allele frequencies (i.e., the original attack by Shringarpure and Bustamante [181]).
6.5.2 “Optimal” Re-Identification Attack in Multi-Population Beacon
Beacons often contain individuals coming from different ancestry groups. As a con-
sequence, we further evaluated the attack based on real allele frequencies on a multi-
population beacon and considered the case where an attacker might have only partial
information about the different ancestries in the beacon. We set up a different beacon
by removing individuals with EUR ancestry from phase 3 data set of the 1000 Genomes
Project, and by selecting 1, 235 random individuals from the remain ones. The resulting
population is composed by individuals with African (AFR), Ad Mixed American (AMR),
East Asian (EAS) or South Asian (SAS) ancestries. We picked 100 random samples from
the beacon and 100 random samples not in the beacon a not of EUR ancestry to compose
the query set.
As expected, results in Figure 6.3 show that also in the multi-population beacon the
new re-identification attack based on allele frequencies is more effective than the one of
Shringarpure and Bustamante. Especially, when the attacker knows the allele frequencies
for a population with the same mix of ancestries of the individuals in the beacon (blue
curve), 5 queries on average1 are enough to obtain 100% of statistical power with 5% false-
positive rate. As expected, with the same background knowledge but by querying alleles
in random order, the attacker needs 750 more queries (azure curve) to obtain the same
statistical power. A more realistic scenario is represented by the attacker knowing partial
1The attack is repeated on 100 different individuals.
6.5. EXPERIMENTS WITH REAL DATA 99
Figure 6.2: Kendall Rank Correlation Coefficient with respect to true beacon allele frequencies.
Kendall rank correlation coefficient between the actual allele frequencies of the single-population
beacon of Fig.1 and the allele frequencies of populations with different ancestries. Values closer
to represent higher correlation. Colors mapping as in Figure 6.1.
(e.g., allele frequencies from a population with AFR ancestry) or unrelated information
(e.g. allele frequencies from a population with EUR ancestry) about the ancestries in
the beacon. In these cases, 100% of statistical power with 5% false-positive rate can be
obtained with 20 (green curve) or 37 (red curve) queries, respectively.
6.5.3 “Optimal” Re-Identification Attack in Beacon with S1
We evaluated the proposed solution S1 by considering an attacker who knows the AFs
of the 1000 Genomes Project and the value of threshold parameter k. As such, we set up
a beacon as described at the beginning of Section 6.5 and computed the LRT statistic
as in Equation (6.9). Figure 6.4 shows that, under such an attack, no individual in the
beacon can be re-identified if a “Yes” answer is provided only when the queried allele
appears at least k = 2 times in the database. Yet, the downside of this method is that
only a fraction of the alleles that are in the beacon can be shared. For example, in the
experimental beacon, only 60.30% of the alleles are shared by two or more individuals
and thus can be shared; the queries to the remaining rare alleles (≈ 40%) will receive a
“No” answer even though they are actually present in the Beacon database.
6.5.4 “Optimal” Re-Identification Attack in Beacon with S2
To evaluate the effectiveness of S2 against an attack with background knowledge on
AFs, we consider an attacker who knows the AFs of the 1000 Genomes Project and the
value of the parameter ǫ. Figure 6.5 shows how the statistical power of the attacker
decreases when different portions (ǫ) of unique alleles are hidden. When ǫ is set to be
0.001, the attacker has to query around 104 unique alleles to obtain a strong power
of re-identification, compared to 200 queries for 100% re-identification when no random
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Figure 6.3: “Optimal” Re-Identification Attack in Multi-Population Beacon. Different power
rates per number of SNPs queried from an unprotected multi-population beacon (the beacon
contains individuals from all ancestry in the 1000 Genomes Project but the European ancestry)
by an adversary with background knowledge on allele frequencies. Different colors represent
different types of background knowledge.
masking on unique alleles (of S2 strategy) is applied. When ǫ ≥ 0.15, the re-identification
power will not increase above ≈ 35%, which will keep the power at an acceptable risk
level (i.e., relatively low confidence of re-identification).
6.5.5 Budget Evaluation in Beacon with S3
We evaluated strategy S3 with the same experimental setting as for S1 and S2. By
default, we set p = 0.05, which means the statistical power of attack cannot exceed
0.95. Differently from experiments performed on solutions S1 and S2, which show an
increase in re-identification risk given certain levels of utility of the beacon, we evaluate
the efficacy of S3 by computing the decrease of utility across queries for a certain level
of privacy loss.
To this purpose, we emulate the query behavior of a typical honest beacon user
by generating queries based on the distribution of query frequency per allele frequency
extracted from ExAC browser logs over a period of 12 weeks (data on beacon query
frequencies were not available at the time of this work). During this time frame, a total
of 1, 345, 291 queries were asked on 934, 680 variants present in ExAC. Table 6.2 shows
the proportion of queries and allele per range of allele frequencies (AF).
Fig.6.6 shows how the number of individuals with enough budget decreases with
respect to the number of queries answered by the beacon. Note that the beacon’s utility
is completely preserved for the first 2, 000 queries.
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Figure 6.4: “Optimal” Re-Identification Attack in Beacon with S1. Different power rates per
number of SNPs randomly queried from a beacon with mitigation S1 by an adversary with
knowledge on and on allele frequencies from the 1000 genomes project: (Blue) k = 1; (Green)
k = 2.
Allele Frequency <0.001 0.001∼0.01 0.01∼0.05 0.05∼0.5 >0.5
Queries in ExAC 0.853 0.0.076 0.023 0.033 0.014
Table 6.2: Proportions of alleles and queries (over a period of 12 weeks) for each range of allele
frequency.
6.6 Computational Complexity Evaluation
The first and second strategies induce very little overhead. The allele frequencies can
be pre-calculated, which takes only linear time to the size of the database, and kept
as a table in the database. Once k or ǫ is pre-determined, the beacon will just need
to check if the query allele’s frequency is smaller than k (for strategies S1 and S2)
and to generate a random number (for S2) before composing a response of “Yes” or
“No”. For mitigation strategy S3, we can easily compute the complexity of the proposed
Algorithm 11. Suppose there are N individuals in the dataset, then for given a query,
we need to:
1. Compute the risk of query, which can be done in constant time O(1),
2. Check whether there are individuals that have the queried allele and a budget
greater than the risk, O(0),
3. If there is no such person, answer “No”, which can be done in constant time O(1),
4. If there is at least one, answer “Yes”, then reduce those people’s budget by the
risk. This can be done in linear time O(N).
So in total, the computational time required for each query on a beacon with mitiga-
tion strategy S3 is linear with respect to the number of individuals in the be
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Figure 6.5: “Optimal” Re-Identification Attack in Beacon with S2. Different power rates per
number of SNPs queried (with rare-first logic) from a beacon with mitigation S2 by an adversary
with knowledge on ǫ and on allele frequencies from the 1000 genomes project. Different colors
for different values of ǫ.
note that the required time for S3 is the same as if no privacy-preserving mechanisms
were imposed.
6.7 Discussion
In this chapter, we have analyzed in detail the beacon re-identification attack originally
proposed by Shringarpure and Bustamante and a new and “optimal” version of it by
considering a smarter adversary who makes use of public information on AFs. We evalu-
ated the power of our new attack through several experiments on real data by considering
different conditions of adversarial background knowledge. Our results show that our at-
tack always outperforms the original SB attack. As one might expect, we have observed
that the power of an adversary’s re-identification attack is directly related to the com-
pleteness and accuracy of the adversary’s knowledge of the AF of the targeted Beacon.
As already analyzed by Shringarpure and Bustamante, the underlying LRT test can be
extremely harmful when a beacon is linked to sensitive phenotypes. Yet it is important to
emphasize that, although our attack further reinforces SB’s concern, the re-identification
risk is relative to each beacon. These attacks fundamentally rely on the assumption that
the attacker already has access to the genome of the victim.
Despite such a strong assumption, several research efforts in genomic privacy have
studied the problem of re-identification of membership in genetic databases and have
shown that it is extremely hard to prevent and sometimes even impossible [79].
Based on the “optimal” re-identification attack, we have proposed three different
strategies aimed at effectively thwarting beacon membership re-identification. Be-
cause the accuracy of the beacon re-identification attack depends on the power and
false positive rate of the LRT test, the probability that a test behaves correctly (re-
jecting the null hypothesis when it is false and failing to reject when it is true) is
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Figure 6.6: Budget Evaluation in Beacon with S3. Behaviors of individual budgets per number
of SNPs queried according to the typical user’s query profile obtained from ExAC log data. The
cyan curve represents the number of individuals with enough budget to answer “Yes” to queries
targeting alleles with AF=0.001. Red, Green and Blue curves correspond to 0.002, 0.005, 0.01,
respectively.
Strategy Disadvantages Advantages
S1: Beacon Alteration Eliminates possibility of query-
ing for unique alleles highly
likely to be most useful in ge-
netic research
Protects privacy of individuals
possessing variants most likely
to be targeted by attackers
S2: Random Flipping Decreases rate of true answers
returned from querying unique
alleles likely to be useful in ge-
netic research
Permits some unique alleles to
be discoverable and to fine-
tune the privacy-utility trade-
off
S3: Query Budget per
Individual
Requires the assumption
of Beacon user being non-
anonymous and holding no
more than one Beacon account;
may require complicated ac-
counting scheme
Enables all alleles to be discov-
erable until budget is exceeded
Table 6.3: Summary of advantages and disadvantages of the three proposed mitigation strategies.
given by: Power ∗ (Probability of alternative hypothesis) + (1 − False positive rate) ∗
(Probability of null hypothesis). From the perspective of a beacon administrator, the
attacker’s test should be incorrect most of the time; i.e., power should be low and/or
the false positive rate should be high. The three proposed strategies all address the
mitigation problem by controlling the power or the false positive rate. The first (S1) and
second (S2) strategies reduce the power to nearly zero when the LRT must have a small
false positive rate, whereas in the third solution (S3), the test always has 100% power
but a high false positive rate. In particular, S1 and S2 directly alter the beacon to reduce
the inference power of the attacker, whereas S3 introduces a new idea of personal budget
that decreases when the genome of the individual is used to positively answer a query.
Results of our experiments have shown that all proposed mitigation strategies have
advantages and disadvantages, as summarized in Table 6.3. S1 effectively mitigates the
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attack by keeping the power of the LRT to 0.2 if all unique alleles are flipped. Yet, it
generates a significant loss in utility of the beacon because the majority of the queries of
a typical user of beacon usually target rare alleles. We define the utility of a beacon as
the proportion of true answers it can provide. S2 can be considered a more sophisticated
version of S1 because it flips only a portion of unique alleles, affording a more fine-grained
control over the utility vs. privacy trade-off. The attack inference power can be confined
to a secure level by masking only 15% of unique alleles (which means a drop in utility of
6% against 40% of S1). Note that the utility of a beacon adopting S1 or S2 is fixed a
priori and does not change along with the power of the attack.
Finally, results of experiments on S3 show that, given a certain assurance level (p =
0.05), the beacon utility is completely preserved for the first 2, 000 queries. Yet, S3 relies
on the assumption that the beacon system is not anonymous and has a controlled level
of access with user authentication and identity proofing. Based on data collected from
the ExAC browser logs, a budget of 2, 000 query per beacon user seems a reasonable
compromise between privacy and utility.
Preventing inference attacks on large databases is widely known to be one of the
most daunting of database security challenges [20]. This fact has been a major consid-
eration in the development of GA4GH’s framework for responsible sharing of genomic
and health-related data, privacy and security policy, and security infrastructure. Effec-
tive risk management must leverage policy, technology, and community governance to
address re-identification risks. Effective risk management is fundamental to facilitating
and promoting data sharing across the GA4GH global community. We emphasize that
security and privacy are components of risk management. Technical risk-management
strategies such as those proposed in this chapter are practical and can be adapted ac-
cording to the context of each beacon. Therefore, they represent a valuable set of options
for assessing and mitigating risk within the GA4GH community.
6.8 Summary
The risk of re-identification based on the binary yes/no allele-presence query responses
was initially adjudged as acceptable in the GA4GH Beacon Project. However, recent
work demonstrated that, given a beacon with specific characteristics (including rela-
tively small sample size, and an adversary who possesses an individual’s partial genome
sequence), the individual’s membership in a beacon can be inferred through repeated
queries for variants present in the individual’s genome. In this chapter, we have im-
proved upon the initial attack by considering a smarter attacker exploiting background
information on allele frequencies and we proposed three practical strategies for reduc-
ing re-identification risks in beacons. The first two strategies manipulate the beacon
such that the presence of rare alleles is obscured; the third strategy budgets the number
of accesses per user for each individual genome. Using a beacon containing data from
the 1000 Genomes Project, we demonstrated that the proposed strategies can effectively
reduce re-identification risk in beacon-like datasets.
Chapter 7
MedCo: Enabling Privacy-Conscious
Exploration of Distributed Clinical and
Genomic Data
In the previous chapter, we have shown how to thwart the re-identification risk in beacons-
like systems for genomic variant discovery. Yet, variants discovery represents only the
first step in the process of identifying data sets of interest for particular research stud-
ies. In this chapter, we move one step forward by proposing a new solution enabling
the privacy-conscious exploration of distributed clinical and genomic data necessary to
identify cohorts of well-characterized individuals to be included in clinical or population
health studies.
7.1 Introduction
With the increasing digitalization of clinical and genomic information, data sharing is
becoming the keystone for realizing the promise of personalized medicine to its full po-
tential. Several initiatives, such as the Patient-Centered Clinical Research Network
(PCORNet) [180] in USA, eTRIKS/TranSMART [27] in EU, the Swiss Personalized
Health Network (SPHN) [190] in Switzerland, and the Global Alliance for Genomics and
Health (GA4GH) [195], are laying down the foundations for new biomedical research in-
frastructures aimed at interconnecting (so far) siloed repositories of clinical and genomic
data.
In this global ecosystem, the ability to provide strong privacy and security guarantees
in order to comply with strict regulations (e.g., HIPAA [?] in USA or the new GDPR [80]
in EU) is crucial, yet extremely challenging to achieve, for biomedical research to be able
to scale up. The number of health-data breaches constantly increases [203] and there
is significant public pressure to ensure that the privacy and security of the data can be
properly protected. Yet, because of the current cultural gap between the medical and
the privacy/security communities, currently deployed technical solutions enabling the
sharing of medical and genomic data still provide very limited guarantees in this sense.
This constrains researchers to access very limited medical information, often of relatively
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low interest for research. For example, the Beacon Network of the GA4GH [67] can
provide only presence/absence information of a given variant in a distributed database,
and the SHRINE system [213] enables a researcher to access only aggregate information
(e.g., the number of patients satisfying specific research criteria) from HIPAA-compliant
“limited data sets” that exclude any sort of genetic or identifying clinical information. As
a result, the development of new technologies that (i) are compliant with regulations, (ii)
allow sharing data also beyond the “limited data set”, and (iii) can be easily integrated
on top of existing systems, is now more urgent than ever for medical research.
We address this challenge by introducing MedCo, the first operational system that en-
ables the privacy-preserving exploration of distributed sensitive (and identifying) medical
data by using strong collective encryption. Its purpose is to foster data sharing by dis-
tributing trust among different medical institutions that want to expose their data to ex-
ternal queries, in a way that is compliant with regulations. To achieve this, MedCo takes
the best of both worlds (medical informatics and IT privacy/security) by building on top
of existing and well-established open-source technologies (i) for clinical data exploration,
i2b2 [146] and SHRINE [213], and (ii) for distributed and secure data processing, UnL-
ynx [89]. In particular, MedCo enables medical institutions to federate and collectively
encrypt their sensitive clinical and genetic data with homomorphic encryption in order
to protect them against undesired and illegitimate access (e.g., hackers or insiders), and
to enable their exploration through a set of secure distributed protocols.
In light of its low overhead, MedCo can dramatically accelerate and partially replace
IRB review processes for sharing sensitive (and identifying) medical data with external
researchers. These review processes can take several weeks, if not months, to permit
researchers to access the data, and they are often denied because the necessary privacy
and security guarantees cannot be provided. As such, MedCo paves the way to new and
unexplored use-cases where, for example, (i) researchers will be able to securely query
massive amounts of distributed clinical and genetic data that go beyond the “limited
data set” category and to obtain descriptive statistics indispensable for generating new
hypotheses in clinical research studies, or (ii) clinicians will be able to find patients with
similar (possibly identifying) characteristics to those of the patient under examination
in order to take more informed decisions in terms of diagnosis and treatment.
In summary, in this chapter, we make the following contributions:
• We introduce MedCo, the first operational system enabling the sharing of sensitive
clinical and genomic information based on state-of-the-art open-source technologies.
• We extensively tested MedCo in a simulated federation of three sites, focusing on a
clinical-oncology case with public somatic DNA and lung cancer data.
• We propose a new generic method to add dummies in order to mitigate frequency
attacks that can incur when probabilistically encrypted data are transformed to de-
terministically encrypted data for the sake of enabling Boolean queries.
We summarize the notations used in this Chapter in Table 7.1.
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Notation Description
HBC Honest-but-curious
MBC Malicious-but-covert
DDT Distributed Deterministic Tag
DVS Distributed Verifiable Shuﬄing
DKS Distributed Key Switching
K Public key for the ElGamal encryption scheme
k Secret key for the ElGamal encryption scheme
EK(m) ElGamal encryption of message m with public key K
EK(m) = (C1, C2) ElGamal ciphertext tuple
X Set of privacy-sensitive ontology concepts
(ku,Ku) ElGamal key pair (secret and public keys) for user u
si Symmetric secret key for site i
DTs(m) Deterministic tag of message m under symmetric secret s
ǫu Initial differential privacy budget for user u
ǫq Differential privacy budget allocated for a given query q
f ji Flag for patient j at site i indicating if the patient is “real” (f
j
i = 1)
x or “dummy” (f ji = 0)
Ri Patient count at site i satisfying the query
φ Set of patients satisfying the query
Rˆi Obfuscated patient count at site i satisfying the query
Table 7.1: Notation used throughout the chapter.
7.2 MedCo Ecosystem
In this section, we introduce the ecosystem in which MedCo operates. We start by
describing the system and threat models. We then define the functionality and pri-
vacy/security requirements that MedCo must satisfy.
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Figure 7.1: MedCo Ecosystem. System model, including several clinical sites and an in-
vestigator; threat model, including honest-but-curious adversaries at the clinical sites and a
malicious-but-covert adversary at the investigator.
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7.2.1 System Model
We consider the system model depicted in Figure 7.1, where medical institutions (or
sites) are organized in a decentralized federation (or network) and collaborate to share
clinical and genomic data without relying on any central third party or authority. This is
the typical model of existing clinical networks such as the GA4GH Beacon Network [67]
and Matchmaker Exchange [154], or most of the PCORNet Clinical Data Research Net-
works [180]. As opposed to the centralized model, our model ensures several advantages
such as, for example, the absence of a single point of failure, increased transparency and
local control. Each site’s data are maintained separately and data access can be mon-
itored by each different institution. In particular, the proposed system consists of the
following entities:
- Clinical sites (Si) such as research institutions, universities or hospitals that own clinical
and genomic data and are willing to share them with internal (i.e., affiliated with one of
the clinical sites in the federation) and external investigators. The sites are responsible
for securely storing the data and for collectively processing incoming queries in a privacy-
preserving way. We assume that each clinical site is internally organized into two main
departments: (i) a clinical care department where clinical and genomic data are generated
by patient encounters and stored in a private electronic health record (EHR) system and
(ii) a clinical research department where a subset of data are imported from the EHR
system into a research data warehouse that can be exposed to external researchers or
investigators for the purpose of data sharing.
- A medical investigator (I) who is interested in exploring the distributed data stored at
the different sites. Her main goal is to use MedCo for generating and validating research
hypotheses or identifying cohorts of interest to then ask each site for the authorization
for obtaining the patients’ raw individual data for further analyses.
7.2.2 Threat Model
We consider two main types of threats: a honest-but-curious (HBC) adversary at the
clinical sites and a malicious-but-covert (MBC) adversary impersonating the investigator:
- Clinical sites: We assume the clinical care department at each site Si to be trusted
as, in general, it is not directly exposed to external agents and their EHR systems can
only be accessed by a limited number of authorized employees (e.g., physicians, nurses).
However, we consider each site’s research department to be HBC, as data stored in
the research data warehouse must be exposed to queries from external parties for the
sake of data sharing. These sites are trusted to store correct information in their data
warehouses and to honestly follow the MedCo core protocol. Yet, they do not necessarily
trust each other because they might be compromised by external or internal attackers
willing to infer sensitive information about the individuals whose data are stored in their
databases. For example, a hacker can enter into a research department’s information
system, by exploiting a vulnerability in the software or by a social-engineering attack,
and illegitimately access the data stored in the clinical research data warehouse or infer
other sites’ sensitive information that is being processed during the MedCo protocol.
Similarly, an insider with legitimate access to the clinical research data warehouse can
try to steal sensitive information from its own site or from the others and then sell it to
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the best offer on the black market, or put it on the Web in order to ruin the reputation
of renowned medical institutions.
- Investigator: We assume the investigator to be MBC. An authorized investigator
might infer sensitive information stored at the different clinical sites by performing con-
secutive queries in order to exploit the information leaked by the end-results. For ex-
ample, a malicious investigator can re-infer the presence of a known individual into
a sensitive cohort (e.g., patients who are HIV-positive) or reconstruct a subset of the
database itself.
We assume, however, that (i) all sites but one can collude or be compromised simul-
taneously, (ii) investigators have been identity proofed, hold a single account and do not
collude with each other nor with any clinical site1; This last assumption appears reason-
able in practice as, in order to collude, a user needs by definition to involve someone else.
Finally we assume also that queries are logged into a distributed immutable ledger.
7.2.3 Requirements
To meet end-users expectations and be compliant with regulations, MedCo must satisfy
the following requirements in terms of functionality and privacy/security features.
- Functionality. MedCo must provide at least the same functionalities as state-of-the-
art systems for cohort exploration on distributed data (e.g., the SHRINE [213]) in order
to enable the same use cases (e.g., feasibility studies or cohorts identification). In par-
ticular, an investigator must be able to run queries in MedCo by logically combining
clinical and genomic concepts encoded by a medical ontology and obtain the number
of patients per site satisfying the research criteria. Also, MedCo must enable differ-
ent query breakdowns such as distribution of patient counts per age, gender, ethnicity.
More formally, an investigator must be able to perform aggregate SQL queries such
as “COUNT(patients) FROM dataset WHERE * AND/OR * GROUP BY *;” and selection
SQL query such as “SELECT(patients) FROM dataset WHERE * AND/OR * GROUP BY
*;” where ‘*’ represents any possible concepts/codes in the ontology.
- Security/Privacy. MedCo must enable sites to protect the confidentiality of their
sensitive data, such as identifying health information or genomic data at rest, in transit
and during computation while avoiding a single point of failure in the system. Also, only
the investigator issuing the query is allowed to obtain the query end-result. MedCo can
also ensure unlinkability by providing a mechanism that prevents the investigator from
tracing a query response back to its original site. Optionally, MedCo could enable the
prevention of inferences from end-results of subsequent queries about the presence or
absence of an individual in one of the databases, in order to guarantee, for instance,
differential privacy.
Depending on the trustworthiness of the investigator querying the system,
MedCo should enable for a modular enforcement of the above-mentioned privacy/security
guarantees. For example, MedCo could release either obfuscated and unlinkable query
results, exact query results, or individual patients’ records.
1We note that this assumption permits an investigator to be an employee of one of the federated
clinical sites but prevents her from having direct access to the clinical-research data warehouse.
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7.3 MedCo Building Blocks
MedCo is the first operational system that combines established open-source technologies
from both the biomedical informatics community (i2b2 [146] and SHRINE [213]) and the
privacy and security community (UnLynx [89]) in order to enable privacy-preserving
sharing of clinical and genomic distributed data. In this section, we provide a high-level
description of these technologies and their main features that we use as MedCo building
blocks.
7.3.1 Data Model from i2b2
Informatics for Integrating Biology and the Bedside (i2b2) [146] is the state-of-the-art
clinical platform for enabling secondary use of electronic health records (EHR) [146]. It
is designed to enable investigators to perform queries on an enterprise data-repository in
order to find sets of patients that would be of interest for further clinical research studies.
We chose this platform for storing data and building queries in MedCo because of
(i) its flexible data model, (ii) its popularity,2 (iii) its extendability through the design
of new plug-ins, and (iv) its intuitive end-user interface enabling the easy generation
of clinical queries. Indeed, i2b2 consists of a simple and flexible relational data-model
based on a “star schema” (see Fig. 7.2) and a set of server-side software modules, called
“cells,” which are responsible for the business logic of the platform and are organized in a
“HIVe.” The data model stores, in a narrow table called observation fact table, clinical
observations (or “facts”) about patients such as diagnoses, medications, procedures, and
demographics, along with a date, a patient identifier and an encounter identifier. Each
observation is encoded by an ontology concept from a medical terminology, such as the
International Classification of Disease (ICD) or the US National Drug Code (NDC). The
use of extendable ontologies makes i2b2’s model highly adaptable to site-specific coding
and easily deployable on top of existing EHR systems. Besides the observation fact
table, there are four other “dimensions” tables that further describe patients’ data and
meta-data. Queries are built in a Web-based query system by combining ontology codes,
organized in a hierarchical tree-based structure, with logical ORs and ANDs operators.
Queries are executed as SQL statements by the data repository (or CRC) cell that returns
the aggregate number of patients meeting the research criteria.
7.3.2 Interoperability Layer from SHRINE
The Shared Health Research Information Network (SHRINE) [213] is the state-of-the-art
framework that enables investigators to search patients’ data from the ‘limited data set
(LDS)’ across multiple independent clinical sites. SHRINE is currently deployed in at
least six networks in the United States. It is built on top of i2b2 and its purpose is to
connect distributed i2b2 instances from various clinical sites through an interoperability
layer based on a common ontology. Such a common ontology is translated into each local
site’s ontology at query time, thus hiding the complexity of the local databases from the
rest of the network. SHRINE comprises three main components:
- The Adapter : It is a Web-service designed as an i2b2 cell in order to be fully inte-
grated within the i2b2 HIVe. It translates the investigator’s query made through the
2i2b2 is used by more than 200 institutions worldwide covering more than 250 millions patients data.
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Figure 7.2: i2b2 data model [146]. It consists of a central observation fact table and four
dimension tables. Each row of the observation fact table stores one clinical observation for a
given patient. ‘PK’ stands for ‘primary key’ while ‘CD’ stands for ‘code’.
common SHRINE ontology into a format that matches the site’s local databases. In a
fully decentralized network, an adapter must be deployed at each clinical site that uses
SHRINE.
- The Query Aggregator : It is responsible for (i) broadcasting the investigator’s query to
each of the adapters in the network and (ii) receiving from each clinical site the count
of patients satisfying the query to be sent back to the investigator. At least one clinical
site in the network must deploy a query aggregator that will serve as query entry-point
in the system.
- The Web Client : It provides a Web-based user interface through which the investiga-
tor can access the system and build i2b2-type queries by using the common SHRINE
ontology. The Web client must be deployed together with the Query Aggregator.
In our system model, we consider that each clinical site in the network is provided
with all three SHRINE components so that MedCo is fully decentralized and each site
can serve as a query entry point. We note that SHRINE does not provide any form of
confidentiality protection for the data stored at the different sites as it only relies on
basic access control and query-result obfuscation to mitigate the risk of re-identification.
7.3.3 Privacy-Preserving Distributed Protocols from UnLynx
UnLynx is the latest and most advanced general framework for privacy-conscious shar-
ing of distributed sensitive data [89]. Its purpose is to enable a set of data providers
to collectively protect the confidentiality of their sensitive data in the anytrust threat
model [214], by encrypting them with a collective public key generated by a group of
independent servers forming a collective authority (or “cothority”). Due to the use of
additively homomorphic encryption (ElGamal on elliptic curves), users can still perform
simple statistical queries directly on the encrypted data by relying on a set of secure dis-
tributed protocols run within the cothority. When a query comes to UnLynx, each data
provider uploads the requested ciphertexts to the cothority, that securely processes them
in order to obtain an encrypted query result. Such a result can eventually be decrypted
only by the user who issued the initial query. UnLynx is designed to be modular, allow-
ing the addition and removal of security/privacy features depending on the performance
and security requirements. MedCo relies on three of the UnLynx main protocols. In the
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following, we assume elliptic curve notation where E denotes an elliptic curve over the
prime field GF(p) and G designates its base point. We denote as EK(m) the ElGamal
probabilistic encryption of a message m under a public key K = kG, where k is the secret
key.
- Distributed Deterministic Tag (DDT) Protocol. The DDT protocol enables
a set of n cothority servers to tag (with deterministically encrypted values) data
probabilistically encrypted under the cothority collective key, without ever decrypt-
ing them. The purpose of this protocol is to enable equality-matching queries on
probabilistically encrypted data that otherwise would not be possible. Let EK(m) =
(C1, C2) = (rG,m+ rK) be the encryption of a message m with the collective public key
K. The DDT protocol consists of two cothority-rounds. In the first round, each server
sequentially generates a fresh secret si and adds a value derived from its secret siG to C2.
After this first round, the resulting ciphertext is (C˜1,0, C˜2,0) = (rG,m+rK+
∑n
i=1 siG).
In the second round, each server partially and sequentially modifies this ciphertext. More
specifically, when server Si receives the modified ciphertext (C˜1,i−1, C˜2,i−1) from server
Si−1, it computes (C˜1,i, C˜2,i), where C˜1,i = siC˜1,i−1 and C˜2,i = si
(
C˜2,i−1 − C˜1,i−1ki
)
.
At the end of the second round, the deterministically encrypted tag is obtained by keeping
only the second component of the resulting ciphertext DTs(m) = C2,n = sx+
∑n
i=1 sisB,
where s =
∏n
i=1 si is a short-term collective secret corresponding to the product of each
server’s fresh secret.
- Distributed Verifiable Shuﬄing (DVS) Protocol. The DVS protocol enables a
set of cothority servers to sequentially shuﬄe probabilistically encrypted data so that the
outputs cannot be linked back to the original ciphertexts. More specifically, the DVS
protocol uses the Neff shuﬄe [150]. It takes in input multiple sequences of ElGamal pairs
(C1,i,j , C2,i,j) forming a a×b matrix and outputs a shuﬄed matrix of (C¯1,i,j , C¯2,i,j) pairs
such that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ a and 1 ≤ j ≤ b, (C¯1,i,j , C¯2,i,j) = (C1,π(i),j + r
′′
π(i),jB,C2,π(i),j +
r′′π(i),jP ), where r
′′
i,j is a re-randomization factor, π is a permutation and P is a public
key.
- Distributed Key Switching (DKS) Protocol. The DKS protocol enables a set
of cothority servers to convert a ciphertext generated with the collective public key of
the cothority into a ciphertext of the same data generated under any known public
key, without ever decrypting them. The DKS protocol never makes use of decryption.
Let EK(m) = EK(m) = (C1, C2) = (rG,m + rK) be the encryption of a message m
with the collective public key K. The DKS protocol starts with a modified ciphertext
tuple (C˜1,0, C˜2,0) = (0, C2). Then, each server partially and sequentially modifies this
element by generating a fresh random nonce vi and computing (C˜1,i, C˜2,i) where C˜1,i =
C˜1,i−1 + viB and C˜2,i = C˜2,i−1 − rKi + viU . The resulting ciphertext corresponds to
the message m encrypted under the public key U , (C˜1,n, C˜2,n) = (vB,m+ vU) from the
original ciphertext (C1, C2), where v = v1 + . . .+ vn.
7.4 MedCo Core Architecture & Protocol
In this section, we provide a detailed description of MedCo (Figure 7.3). We begin by
explaining the system initialization and the data ingestion phases in which clinical sites
collectively encrypt their sensitive data and store them in the i2b2 data model. We then
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describe the secure query workflow that enables an investigator to efficiently query the
encrypted data stored in independent i2b2 databases.
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Figure 7.3: MedCo Core. High-level representation of MedCo core phases with 4 clinical sites
including system initialization, ETL phase (steps A and B) and secure query workflow (steps
1-8).
7.4.1 System Initialization
Clinical sites store unencrypted patient-level clinical and genomic data in their private
EHR systems and are willing to share these data by securely exposing them to inter-
nal/external investigators through an i2b2 research data warehouse. Therefore, we as-
sume that each site has already deployed an instance of the i2b2 HIVe on top of its own
data warehouse and that SHRINE is also installed in order to provide the interoperability
layer necessary for connecting data encoded with local ontologies at the different sites.
During this initial phase, each clinical site (Si) generates a pair of ElGamal cryptographic
key (ki,Ki), where Ki = Gki, along with a symmetric secret si. Then, all sites combine
their ElGamal public keys in order to generate a single collective public key K =
∑
iKi
that will be used to encrypt the data.
7.4.2 Data Extraction Transformation and Loading
During the data-ingestion phase, a.k.a. extraction transformation and loading (ETL),
each site extracts patient-level data from its private EHR system and transforms them
by following the i2b2 data model representation in Figure 7.2. In the i2b2 data model,
the private information that must be protected from an untrusted third party consists of
the set of clinical observations that are considered to be sensitive or identifying for a given
patient. Those are usually represented by a subset, X, of ontology concepts encoded with
ontology codes (Concept CD) in the observation fact table. Hence, before loading the
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data into the i2b2 data warehouse, each site starts an encryption phase consisting of two
steps:
A. Generation of dummy patients: Each site generates a set of dummy patients with
plausible clinical observations specifically chosen so that the distribution of ontology
codes across patients, in the observation fact table, is as close as possible to the
uniform distribution. We explain the rationale behind such a step in detail in Section 7.5.
To distinguish the real patients from the dummies, each site also generates a binary flag
to be appended to the demographic information in the patient dimension table. Such
flag is set to 1 for real patients and to 0 for dummy patients.
B. Data encryption: In order to protect patients’ sensitive observations that are stored
in the observation fact table, each site deterministically encrypts the ontology codes
in X, by running on each of them a two-round UnLynx DDT protocol in which each
site in the network uses its secret si. As a result of this protocol, the sites obtain the
corresponding deterministic tag, DTs(x) for each code x ∈ X, where s =
∑
i si. Along
with the deterministic encryption of the sensitive ontology codes, each site also encrypts
the patients’ flags to be stored in the patient dimension table, by using the probabilistic
ElGamal encryption algorithm with the collective key K.
After this ETL phase, the i2b2 databases at the different sites contain “non-sensitive”
ontology codes in cleartext, and “sensitive” ontology codes protected with determinis-
tic encryption for both real and dummy patients. Probabilistically encrypted flags are
stored to keep track of dummy patients and to make them indistinguishable from real
patients. Clinical sites make use of dummies in order to thwart frequency attacks from
honest-but-curious adversaries who aim at breaking the deterministic encryption when
the distribution of ontology codes is not uniform.
7.4.3 Secure Query Workflow
We assume each investigator that uses MedCo has a pair of ElGamal cryptographic keys
(ku,Ku) and, optionally, an initial differential privacy budget ǫu. The purpose of such a
budget is to limit the number of queries an investigator can run on the system so that
ǫu-differential privacy can be guaranteed. The proposed query workflow is illustrated in
Figure 7.3 and comprises the following steps:
1. Query Generation: The query generation takes place in the SHRINE Web client
with an authenticated investigator who selects “sensitive” and “non-sensitive” concepts
from the common SHRINE ontology and combines them with AND/OR logical operators
in order to build a Boolean query. Once the query is built, the “sensitive” concepts are
probabilistically encrypted by the Web client with the collective key K, whereas the
“non-sensitive” ones are left in cleartext. The resulting query is sent along with Ku to
the SHRINE query aggregator of the preferred clinical site.
2. Query Analysis: From the SHRINE query aggregator of the first clinical site,
the query is broadcasted to all the SHRINE adapters installed at the other sites in the
network. At each site, the query is translated into the local ontology by the SHRINE
adapter and subsequently analyzed by a new MedCo cell that extracts the encrypted
(hence “sensitive”) codes from the query.
3. Query Processing: Once the encrypted ontology codes are extracted, the
MedCo cell at each site runs an UnLynx DDT protocol on them in order to obtain
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the corresponding deterministic encrypted tags (as in the ETL phase). These tags, along
with the unencrypted codes in the initial query, are then forwarded to the standard i2b2
Data Repository (CRC) Cell. The CRC cell uses them to fetch, from the i2b2 database,
the set of patient numbers and probabilistically encrypted flags corresponding to the pa-
tients (real and dummy) that match the Boolean predicate in the initial query. Equality
matching between the encrypted codes in the query and those in the observation fact
table is enabled by the deterministic nature of the encrypted tags that preserves the
equality property in the ciphertext domain.
4. Result Aggregation (optional): Once the patient numbers and the encrypted flags
are fetched from the local i2b2 database, the MedCo cell homomorphically aggregates the
flags in order to obtain the encrypted local patient count EK(Ri) at each site. Because of
the null contribution of their encrypted flags (i.e., EK(0)), dummy patients are cancelled
out from the local patient-count during the aggregation. Let EK(f
j
i ) be the encrypted
flag of the j-th patient in site Si, then EK(Ri) = EK(
∑
j∈φ f
j
i ) =
∑
j∈φEK(f
j
i ), where
φ is the set of patients satisfying the query.
5. Result Obfuscation (optional): In order to guarantee differential privacy, the
MedCo cell obfuscates the encrypted local patient-count by homomorphically adding
noise sampled from a Laplacian distribution. More specifically, let ǫq be the privacy
budget allocated for a given query q and µ be the noise value drawn from a Laplacian
distribution with mean 0 and scale ∆fǫq , where the sensitivity ∆f is equal to 1 due to
Ri being a count. The encrypted obfuscated query result is obtained as EK(Rˆi) =
EK(Ri + µ) = EK(Ri) + EK(µ). We note that the query result is released to the
investigator only if the investigator’s differential privacy budget is enough for such a
query, i.e., if ǫu − ǫq > 0.
6. Result Shuﬄing (optional): In order to break the link between the encrypted
obfuscated query results generated and the sites having generated them, the MedCo cell
of the site that initially broadcasted the query starts an UnLynx DVS protocol on all
the local encrypted and obfuscated patient counts. As a result of the protocol, each site
receives back an encrypted obfuscated patient count, possibly generated by one of the
other sites.
7. Result Re-Encryption: The local encrypted (shuﬄed and obfuscated) query results
EK(Rˆi) are computed at each site under the collective key K, so they must be re-
encrypted under the investigator’s public key Ku so that she can decrypt them. To this
purpose, each site runs an UnLynx DKS protocol in order to obtain EKu(Rˆi). Then
the SHRINE adapter at each site sends EKu(Rˆi) back to the initial SHRINE query
aggregator.
8. Result Decryption: Once the SHRINE query aggregator receives the encrypted
query results from the different sites in the network, it sends them back to the Web client
for decryption with the investigator’s secret key ku.
We note that, depending on the trustworthiness level of the investigator, steps 4, 5
and 6 can be skipped and patient numbers and encrypted flags can be directly released
to the Web client. As such, the investigator will be able to rule out dummy patients
from each site by checking the corresponding flags and use the real patient numbers for
directly contacting sites and obtaining individual patient records.
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7.5 Dummy-Addition Strategies
For cohort-exploration queries, the deterministic encryption of the ontology codes applied
during the ETL phase (see Section 7.4.2) avoids dictionary attacks by any subset of
colluding HBC sites due to the distribution of the secrets si used in the DDT protocol.
Nevertheless, a Dummy-Patients Generation step is required prior to encryption in order
to avoid the unintended leakage of (i) the ontology code distribution and (ii) the query
result. In this section, we analyze the optimal dummy-generation strategy to achieve
this goal.
We assume, without loss of generality, that each patient has a different set of obser-
vations; if there were equal patients in the database, fake ontology codes could be added
to make them different. The leakage to HBC sites can be estimated by calculating (i)
the adversary’s equivocation (a.k.a. conditional entropy) on the ontology codes of the
observation fact table given their tagged versions, as an average measure, and (ii) the
smallest anonymity set of the ontology codes, as a worst case measure. The higher the
equivocation and the larger the anonymity set is, the lower the leakage is. For this ex-
position, we will focus only on the relation between patients and occurrences of ontology
codes, leaving aside the temporal dimension, and we will follow the toy example shown
in Figure 7.4. This figure represents the (horizontally) folded version of the (vertical)
observation fact table, therefore coding each patient as a row, each ontology code as
a column, and each observed (resp. unobserved) code in a patient as a “1” (resp. “0”)
in the corresponding cell.
Ontology code a b c d e →σo(.)→ Tagged x y z r s dummy flag
real patients
pid1 1 1 1 1 0 σp(.) pa 1 1 1 0 1 E(1)
pid2 0 1 1 1 1 pb 1 1 1 1 0 E(0)
pid3 1 0 1 1 1 pc 1 0 1 1 1 E(1)
dummy patients
pid4 1 1 0 1 1 pd 0 1 1 1 1 E(0)
pid5 1 1 1 0 1 pe 1 1 0 1 1 E(1)
←−M −→ ←−M ′ −→
Figure 7.4: Toy example. Ontology code mapping to real and added dummy patients with
pseudo-identifiers pidi, and ontology codes a, b, c, d, e. pa, pb, pc, pd, pe are the randomly sorted
version of the patient pseudo-identifiers, and x, y, z, r, s are the shuﬄed and deterministically
encrypted (tagged) version of the ontology codes. The dummy flag is a probabilistic encryption
of 1 for real patients and 0 for dummies.
More formally, let us define the matrix that associates ontology codes with patients
as the tuple of a random binary matrix M where each row can be either a real or a
dummy patient and each column represents one ontology code and two functions, σp
and σo, that respectively map the patient pseudo-identifiers (pidj in Fig. 7.4) to the rows
(pa, pb, pc, pd, pe in Fig. 7.4) and the observed ontology codes (a, b, c, d, e in Fig. 7.4) to the
columns (x, y, z, r, s in Fig. 7.4). These maps represent the shuﬄing applied to patients
before they are assigned their pseudo-identifiers, and the shuﬄing and deterministic
encrypted tag applied to ontology codes before they are loaded into the i2b2 database.
In order to focus on the practical leakage of the deterministically encrypted database,
let us assume that the tagging and the probabilistic encryption of the dummy flags do
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not leak anything about their inputs (their trapdoors cannot be broken), even if they
are based on computational guarantees. Therefore, the adversary (each of the sites)
observes the realization of the row- and column-permuted matrix: A ≡ [M′ =M ′], and
her equivocation, with respect to the original information given A, can be expressed as
H(M, σo, σp|A) = H(M|σo, σp,A) +H(σo|σp,A) +H(σp|A) (7.1)
(a)
= H(σo|σp,A) +H(σp|A)
(b)
≤ H(σo|A) +H(σp)
(c)
≤ H(σo) +H(σp).
(7.2)
Expression (7.1) can be divided in three terms: the first one represents the entropy of
M conditioned to the two permutations and the observed contents of the cells, which is
fully deterministic, hence zero-entropy (step (a) in (7.2)); the second term is the entropy
of the ontology codes permutation conditioned to the observation of the matrix cells and
the patient permutation, and the third term is the entropy of the patient permutation
conditioned on the observed matrix contents. We aim at maximizing these two terms.
The last term of the equivocation can be maximized by making the dummy rows
indistinguishable from the real patients; i.e., drawn from the same distribution. Empiri-
cally, this means that all the patients, real or dummy, have the same type of distribution,
and the contents of the rows are independent of the position of the dummy patients in
the list. This also makes the two permutations independent of each other even when
conditioned on the contents of M ′ (step (b) in (7.2)). In our toy example in Fig. 7.4,
all the real patients’ rows belong to the same type (weight 4); by generating two new
dummy patients with the same weight, they become indistinguishable from real patients
in our simplified example.
In order to maximize the entropy of the ontology codes mapping σo conditioned on A
(step (c) in (7.2)), all the permutations have to be equiprobable for the given M ′. This
is achieved by flattening the joint distribution of the observed ontology codes through
the added dummies; the geometric interpretation of this flattening is that any column
permutation can be cancelled out by a row permutation, such that it is not possible to
univocally map any ontology code to any column in M ′. In our toy example, it can
be seen that due to the two added dummies, any fixed query yields the same number
of patients independently of the permutation applied to the query terms, which gives
a complete indistinguishability between all the tagged ontology codes even in light of
the matrix M ′. It must be noted that the unobserved codes do not have to be added
to the table, as the adversary does not have a priori knowledge of which is the subset
of observed codes, only its cardinality. Also, this strategy fully breaks the correlation
between ontology codes; for example, if the site added only one dummy with codes a, b, e
to the real patients in Fig. 7.4 the individual appearance rate of the codes would be
flattened, but it would leak that there is a correlation between the codes c and d, that
could be identified in the encrypted matrix through an lp-optimization attack [149].
The last bound in (7.2) is the best that clinical sites can do with the dummy-patient
addition strategy, knowing the matrix of real patients; it maximizes the uncertainty of
the attacker about the original ontology concepts, for any real distribution of patients and
ontology codes. The corresponding practical dummy-addition strategy can be described
as follows: Real rows are grouped according to their weight (number of observations);
if the whole set of observed ontology codes has n elements, for each group of rows of
weight k < n, dummy rows are added to complete all the k-combinations of n elements,
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producing
(
n
k
)
rows (counting both real and dummies) per group. In our toy example,
(considering independent codes) the equivocation goes from 3.58 bits with no dummies
to 10.23 bits with the two dummies, while the minimum anonymity set raises from 2 to
5.
This strategy guarantees the maximum uncertainty for the adversary for an arbitrary
real distribution of codes across patients, but it generates a combinatorial number of
dummies, which is not feasible in general (unless the number of observed codes is very
low); but if some assumptions can be made about the code joint distribution, we can
simplify the strategy. If dependencies are only found within small groups of codes, being
the groups mutually independent (that is the case for genomic information and depen-
dencies found inside subsets of localized variants), it is possible to constrain the needed
number of dummies by applying the same dummy-addition strategy in a restricted block-
wise fashion. In order to flatten only the histogram of group weights, we group codes in
independent blocks of size n′ ≪ n and apply the dummy-generation permutation to the
blocks (inter-block), but not to the contents of each block, until the block distribution
is flat, therefore reducing the needed number of dummy rows. This trade-off strategy
creates an “anonymity set” of ontology codes of size n/n′ in such a way that the adver-
sary cannot distinguish between the set of codes inside different blocks. The drawback
is that the equivocation is reduced, as the resulting joint distribution of the ontology
code observations is only flat across blocks, but not inside each block. In the worst case
in terms of leakage (fully correlated codes within each block) the achievable adversary’s
equivocation becomes H(M, σo, σp|A) = H(σo|σp,A) +H(σp|A) ≤ H(σo,n/n′) +H(σp),
where σo,n/n′ are the permutations of the n/n
′ blocks of n′ codes each. This bound is
achieved when the blocks are mutually independent, so the best partitioning strategy
consists in keeping correlated codes inside the same block. If fully independence between
codes can be assumed (n′ = 1), it can be seen that flattening the observations histogram
leads to the same maximum attacker equivocation as the complete permutation strategy
(Eq. (7.2)), but with a much lower number of added dummies. In order to further re-
duce this number, it is possible to set a minimum anonymity set size m for the codes and
add dummies to water fill the observation histogram (block-wise flat, instead of fully flat)
until each code has at least other m−1 codes featuring the same number of observations.
Finally, it must be noted that whenever a site’s i2b2 database is updated, dummies
can be regenerated (and encryptions and tags re-randomized) when the ETL process
(see Section 7.4.2) is run again for the whole updated database. The DDT protocol uses
a different fresh randomness, so that the codes from the updated database cannot be
linked back to the codes of the old one.
7.6 Privacy & Security Analysis and Extensions (MedCo+)
The main privacy and security requirements for MedCo are summarized in Section 7.2.3.
In this section, we briefly discuss and analyze the fulfillment of these targets for MedCo,
and we revisit possible extensions for more stringent requirements.
Security in MedCo is based on the cryptographic guarantees provided by the un-
derlying decentralized data-sharing protocols (from UnLynx) and the adoption of well-
established security practices when coding the interfaces with the i2b2 backend and the
SHRINE interoperability layer. All input sensitive data are either deterministically (on-
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tology codes) or probabilistically (dummy flags) encrypted with a collectively maintained
key, such that they cannot be decrypted without the cooperation of all sites, thus guar-
anteeing confidentiality and avoiding single points of failure. For the full step-by-step
security analysis of UnLynx, we refer the reader to [89]. Following this analysis, paired
with the dummy strategy described in Section 7.5, it can be seen that MedCo covers
the unlinkability requirement for the query results, thanks to the UnLynx DVS protocol;
and it protects their confidentiality, as only the authorized investigator can decrypt the
query results thanks to the UnLynx DKS protocol. Conversely, MedCo also enables the
application of differentially private noise to the results to avoid membership inference
attacks, and, thanks to the proposed dummy strategy, it guarantees confidentiality of
the data also against all the clinical sites that participate in the system.
There are two extensions that can be applied to MedCo in order to satisfy additional
confidentiality and integrity requirements: guaranteeing unlinkability among investiga-
tors’ queries, and obtaining protection against malicious sites.
- Query confidentiality: In the basic MedCo system presented in Section 7.4, HBC
sites can link the ontology codes used through different queries, as the applied deter-
ministic tag is the same for all the queries. In the case that query confidentiality is
also a requirement (e.g., investigators from pharmaceutical companies), it is possible to
address it by probabilistically encrypting ontology codes during the ETL phase and by
deterministically tagging the obtained ciphertexts with a fresh secret for each new query.
The effective encryption key is different for each fresh run of the DDT protocol, so it is
not possible to link the query terms between different runs of the shuﬄing-DDT. When
this modified system (which we denote MedCo+) is paired with the proposed dummy-
addition strategy, the terms between queries are indistinguishable and unlinkable, at the
cost of transferring and tagging the subset of the encrypted database involved in the
query.
- Malicious sites: MedCo’s threat model assumes HBC sites to be credible and plausible
assumption, based on the damage to reputation that a clinical site would suffer if it
misbehaves in a collective data-sharing protocol. Nevertheless, it is possible to cope with
malicious clinical sites by using UnLynx’s proof generation protocols [89], which produce
and publish zero-knowledge proofs for all the computations performed at the clinical
sites, so that the proofs can be verified by any entity in order to assess that no site
deviated from the correct behavior. UnLynx features zero-knowledge proofs for the DVS,
DDT and DKS protocols, and the addition of differential privacy noise. Although this
solution yields a hardened and resilient query protocol, the cost of producing all proofs
causes a typically unacceptable burden in regular data sharing applications, for which
the basic proposed MedCo covers all fundamental privacy requirements while yielding a
very competitive performance, as shown in the next Section.
7.7 Deployment and Evaluation
We have deployed and tested MedCo in a real network of three sites in Switzerland:
the E´cole Polytechnique Fe´de´rale de Lausanne (EPFL), the University of Lausanne
(UNIL), and the Centre Hospitalier Universitaire Vaudois (CHUV). This section de-
scribes MedCo’s performance for a clinical oncology use-case and shows its computational
and storage overhead with respect to unprotected i2b2/SHRINE deployment.
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7.7.1 Oncology Use-Case
Profiling somatic mutations is becoming increasingly common in oncology. Beside its role
in diagnosis and prognosis, mutation profile is a system to guide treatment decision. It
helps define the disease sub-types, quantify the level of intra-tumor heterogeneity, iden-
tify mutations driving tumor progression, and support clinical decision through targeted
therapies. For a few genetic alterations that occur in a large number of patients, there
are thousands of rare ones. In that context, being able to compare mutation profiles
between patients across different clinics and identify those with a similar molecular pro-
file is of critical importance for guiding treatment decision in oncology. For example,
in case of a rare disease subtype or a bad prognosis after drug resistance, clinical de-
cision recommendation can be inferred from patients sharing phenotypical and somatic
mutations characteristics. Similarly, in clinical research, the ability to compare multi-
ple patients with the same mutation profiles enables robust hypothesis generation and
testing. The power of such an approach increases with the number of mutation profiles
that can be queried. Therefore, being able to share somatic mutation information among
hospitals and institutions is an absolute requirement. Yet, privacy and security concerns
make such sharing extremely difficult, if not impossible. For these reasons, we tested
MedCo on cancer genomic and clinical data from cBioPortal [57] by performing typical
queries for oncogenomics, of which we report here two representative examples:
- Query A: Number of patients with skin cutaneous melanoma AND a mutation in
BRAF gene affecting the protein at position 600. About half of melanoma patients
harbor a mutation in the BRAF gene at position V600E or V600K and can be treated
by the BRAF inhibitor vemurafenib [25]. The proportion of mutated BRAF melanoma
is therefore an important benchmark for a clinic or hospital.
- Query B: Number of patients skin cutaneous melanoma AND a mutation in BRAF
gene AND a mutation in (PTEN OR CDKN2A OR MAP2K1 OR MAP2K2 genes).
This query is based on the fact that patients treated with vemurafenib develop resis-
tance through mutations activating the MAP kinase pathways [217]. When facing drug
resistance, finding another patient with a similar mutation profile could bring invaluable
information for clinical decisions.
We used genomic and clinical datasets obtained from a skin cutaneous melanoma
study [51, 106] of 121 patients with 9 clinical attributes and an average of 1,978 genetic
mutations (239,286 observations in total).
7.7.2 Implementation
We developed MedCo as three components that fully integrate i2b2 [146], SHRINE [213]
and UnLynx [89]: specifically (i) a new i2b2 server cell, developed in Java code, responsi-
ble for the MedCo business logic described in Section 7.4 and for interacting with UnLynx
for the execution of secure distributed protocols, (ii) a new i2b2 Web-client plugin, de-
veloped in Javascript, enabling a user to generate queries involving somatic mutations
through an annotation-based search engine, and to encrypt sensitive codes in the query
directly in the browser, and (iii) an ETL system, developed in Go 1.8, responsible for
extracting genomic and clinical data from a raw tab-separated file, encrypting them with
the ElGamal collective key and loading them into the i2b2 data model.
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Encrypted data were stored in the i2b2 data model with PostgreSQL [157]. In par-
ticular, somatic mutations were stored as deterministically encrypted observations in the
observation fact table encoded by the combination of their chromosomal position, ref-
erence allele and mutated allele. Genetic annotations (e.g., gene names) were stored in
the concept dimension table.
7.7.3 Experimental Setup
To avoid inconsistencies in the results, potentially caused by the heterogeneous setting of
the EPFL-CHUV-UNIL network (i.e., different firewalls, servers, and access control mech-
anisms), and to obtain a fair comparison with the standard unprotected i2b2/SHRINE
deployment, we ran our evaluation within an isolated environment. Such an environ-
ment comprises 3 servers interconnected by 10Gbps links and featuring two Intel Xeon
E5-2680 v3 CPUs with a 2.5GHz frequency that support 24 threads on 12 cores, and
256GB RAM. We note, however, that bioinformaticians in the EPFL-CHUV-UNIL sites
had similar user experiences. Each server hosted the SHRINE Web client, the i2b2
HIVe including the SHRINE adapter, query aggregator and the new MedCo cell, the
i2b2 database, and the UnLynx server back-end. To set up our system and facilitate
its deployment, we used Docker [143]. The default database contains the public dataset
described in Section 7.7.1. We used UnLynx ElGamal encryption on the Ed25519 elliptic
curve with 128 bit security.
To evaluate MedCo’s performance, we considered four different experimental setups,
with each measurement averaged over 10 independent runs:
1. Runtime for varying database size: For this setup, we ran query A (see Section
7.7.1) for different database sizes and measured the total runtime of MedCo, comparing it
with: (i) The insecure i2b2/SHRINE implementation where all data are stored in clear,
and (ii) the more secure version of MedCo, MedCo+, where we enhanced MedCo in order
to protect also query confidentiality, as described in Section 7.6.
2. Runtime for varying number of sites: We studied MedCo’s runtime for query A
with varying number of sites in the network. We assumed that for each new site a new
server is added to the system. We considered 3, 6, 9 and 10 sites with each site having
a third of the original database (approximately 82.000 mutations or rows).
3. Network traffic for varying query size: In this setup, we assessed the amount of
traffic incurred during a query in MedCo and MedCo+ by varying the number of queried
ontology codes/mutations.
4. ETL runtime for varying database size: We studied the amount of time needed
to extract, transform and load the data (pre-processing), which includes the formatting,
initial deterministic encrypted tagging of codes, encryption of patients’ flags and loading
of the data in the i2b2 database.
7.7.4 Performance Results
Here we evaluate the raw overhead without dummies of the protocols featured in
MedCo and MedCo+ with respect to the insecure i2b2; we analyze the impact of dum-
mies in Section 7.7.5. Figure 7.5 provides query-workflow breakdowns for both query
A and query B. Because they are negligible, we do not account for the query parsing
and encryption/decryption times in the Web client, for the time to broadcast the query
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(A) Query A.
(B) Query B.
Figure 7.5: Query-workflow breakdown. Each site is represented as S1, S2, S3. The vertical
black line signals the point where each node has to wait for the others before it can proceed.
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from the SHRINE query aggregator to the different sites, and for the result obfuscation.
Unexpectedly, results show that the i2b2 query to the observation fact table is the
most expensive operation in MedCo as it depends on the total number of observations.
This time is also linear in the number of ontology codes in the query and it is inherent
to the standard i2b2 database management for SQL-queries to the observation fact
table. Fetching the encrypted patients flags from the patient dimension table, before
homomorphic aggregation, can be also expensive as it depends on the number of patients
satisfying the search criteria. The deterministic tagging of query encrypted codes is also
linear in the number of ontology codes in the query, as each encrypted code has to be se-
quentially modified twice by each site in the network. Such a process takes more time for
query B than for query A, as they consist of 79 (77 mutations and 2 clinical attributes)
and 6 (4 mutations and 2 clinical attributes) query attributes, respectively. Differently,
the homomorphic aggregation depends on the number of patients satisfying the query
and it can be extremely fast for rare combinations of somatic mutations and clinical at-
tributes. For queries A and B it takes around 0.68 and 0.40 milliseconds as only around
16 and 9 patients per site satisfy the research criteria. The remaining secure distributed
operations introduced by MedCo depend on the number of sites in the network but they
are negligible as they involve only one ciphertext, i.e., the encrypted query result.
Figure 7.6 shows the performance results for the four above-mentioned setups (1-4).
The measurements are averaged out between servers. Subfigure 7.6A refers to the first
setup and reports the time required to execute query A with different database sizes
under different scenarios. Besides the normal database (‘1x’), we chose two others with
twice (‘2x’) and four times (‘4x’) more observations. These two additional databases were
obtained by replicating the original one. In each case, the data were evenly distributed
among the three sites, thus obtaining, for the three cases ‘1x’, ‘2x’ and ‘4x’, around 80k,
160k and 320k observations over 40, 80 and 160 patients per site, respectively. Results
show that MedCo is extremely efficient and comparable in terms of performance to the
insecure version of the i2b2/SHRINE implementation. MedCo’s overhead with respect
to the insecure i2b2/SHRINE is almost constant when the database size increases as
the privacy-preserving protocols introduced by MedCo depend mostly on the number of
queried codes and the size of the resulting patient set. We can also observe that MedCo+
has a relatively higher runtime cost as a counterpart for achieving query unlinkability,
because all the observations in the observation fact table have to be deterministically
tagged at runtime for each new query. However, we note that such a privacy enhancement
might be necessary only under specific circumstances (e.g., when an investigator from a
pharmaceutical company is using the system).
Subfigure 7.6B displays the results for the second setup, where we increase the number
of sites in the network, to study the runtime scalability of MedCo. Results show that
its overhead increases almost linearly with the number of participating sites. In other
words, increasing the number of sites from 3 to 6 changes the MedCo’s contribution, with
respect to i2b2 from 0.4 to 0.7 seconds.
Subfigure 7.6C shows the network traffic incurred when increasing the number of
queried ontology codes. The traffic was split between two main components: i2b2
database traffic, and traffic introduced by MedCo’s secure protocols. As expected,
network traffic increases linearly with the number of queried ontology codes for both
MedCo and the insecure i2b2/SHRINE, whereas it is almost constant for MedCo+. Also,
the database operations dominate the traffic in MedCo. Yet, the traffic caused by the
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(A) Query runtime vs database size. (B) Query runtime vs number of sites.
(C) Network traffic vs query size. (D) ETL time vs database size.
Figure 7.6: MedCo’s performance results for setups 1-4.
secure protocols is not negligible, as encrypted codes in the query are broadcasted to each
site in the network. In MedCo+, the traffic of secure protocols becomes predominant
with respect to the database traffic, as all observations in the database are broadcasted
across the whole network in order to be deterministically tagged, regardless of the number
of codes in the query.
Subfigure 7.6D shows the results for the pre-processing or ETL phase, including the
encryption of the data (deterministic tagging for ontology codes and ElGamal encryption
of patients’ binary flags) and the data loading into the database. Results show that the
ETL phase is costly and its time increases linearly with the amount of data in the
database. However, it is important to mention that this phase is only executed once at
each site, oﬄine.
Finally, Figure 7.7 shows MedCo’s ability to scale with respect to the insecure
i2b2/SHRINE for database sizes of 100 and 1,000 times larger than the original database.
Again, in both cases, patients were evenly distributed across sites thus obtaining for the
two cases (‘100x’ and ‘1000x’) around 8M and 80M observations over 4,000 and 40,000
patients, respectively. Results are impressive, as the total query runtime (for query A)
for the ‘1000x’ case, which can represent the standard size of a clinical site’s database,
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Figure 7.7: MedCo’s scalability test: Query runtime vs database size (for a database up to 1,000
times larger the original database).
is still within 10 seconds. As expected, MedCo’s overhead with respect to the insecure
i2b2/SHRINE becomes more significant in the 1,000x case, as around 16,000 patients’
encrypted flags need to be fetched from the patient dimension table. This is due the
artificial carbon-copy replication of the data and it is unlikely to happen for a typical
oncology database with an equivalent size but without replicated patients. Similarly, also
the time required for the homomorphic aggregation increases as the number of patients
satisfying the query has increased by 1,000 times. However, we note that the most expen-
sive operation still remains the i2b2 querying time that is independent of any additional
privacy-preserving feature added by our solution.
7.7.5 Storage Overhead
In the unprotected i2b2 data model, ontology concepts are generally represented by 64-bit
integers, whereas MedCo’s deterministic encryption converts each code into a 32-bytes
tag. Hence, the storage overhead introduced by MedCo’s encryption is in the order of 4
times. Depending on the specific distribution of ontology codes across patients, a varying
number of dummy patients must also be considered. In the tested oncology use-case, we
assume independent codes and follow the dummy addition strategy described in Sec-
tion 7.5. Because our original dataset is very sparse, with 238,363 ontology codes most
of which (around 98%) are observed only once, the adversary’s equivocation is already
very high without the need of dummies (around 3.76 Mbits). We focus, therefore, on the
minimum anonymity set for the observed codes. The extremely low number of common
mutations and their small anonymity set (some of them having a unique rate) make com-
mon mutations easily identifiable by an adversary. Consequently, for maximizing both
the equivocation and the minimum anonymity set (238,363 for all codes), the number of
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necessary dummy patients should be increased to 7,400, with 14 million new observations
in total (approx. 62x increase factor in the number of rows of the observation fact and
the patient dimension tables). Yet, by trading off the size of the smallest anonymity
set, it is possible to reduce the number of needed dummy patients to 350 with roughly
614,000 observations, yielding a table increase factor of around 3.6x, which is practical.
This guarantees a minimum anonymity set of 10,000 codes, and an adversary’s equivo-
cation close to the achievable upper bound. Due to space constraints, we do not show
here the performance results of MedCo with dummies, but they can be assimilated to
the ‘4x’ case in Figure 7.6A.
7.8 Related Work
Among the operational systems for sharing of clinical or genomic information,
SHRINE [213] and the GA4GH Beacon Network [87] are certainly the most advanced
and widespread. However, as opposed to MedCo, they provide limited privacy guarantees
(only ad-hoc result obfuscation) and no protection of data confidentiality besides stan-
dard access control, thus significantly restraining the amount of sharable information.
Besides that, and to the best of our knowledge, there are mainly two recent works
dealing with privacy-preserving queries in distributed medical databases. The first one,
PRINCESS [58], is based on trusted hardware: the sites encrypt all their data under
AES-GCM (Advanced Encryption Standard - Galois Counter Mode) and send them to an
enclave running in a central server, featuring an Intel SGX processor; this server decrypts
and processes them, enabling the computation of statistical models. Compared to our
work, PRINCESS can be more versatile in terms of allowed computations, but it presents
a single point of failure (the central server), and centralizes all trust in the enclave and
in the attestation protocol provided by Intel. Moreover, the memory restrictions of the
enclave limit the scalability of the scheme, requiring compression and batching techniques
to enable processing of large genomic data, for which MedCo scales much better.
The other recent approach, SMCQL [40], is based on secure two-party computation;
it introduces a framework for private data network queries on a federated database of
mutually distrustful parties. SMCQL features a secure query executor that implements
different types of queries (e.g., merge, join, distinct) on the distributed database by
relying on garbled circuits and Oblivious RAM (ORAM) techniques. Whereas this work
features truly decentralized trust, it does not scale well to scenarios with more than two
sites, which are likely to happen in medical contexts with a high number of collaborating
hospitals.
7.9 Summary
In this chapter, we have presented MedCo, the first operational system that enables
collective protection and privacy-preserving sharing of medical data across independent
clinical sites. MedCo is based on widespread technologies from the biomedical informatics
community, i2b2 and SHRINE, in order to be easily deployable on top of existing health
information systems. Additionally, it relies on secure distributed protocols from UnLynx
that enable different privacy/security vs. efficiency trade-offs, thus paving the way to
the sharing of sensitive clinical and genomic information, which so far is not possible
with existing operational systems. Finally, MedCo introduces a new general method for
7.9. SUMMARY 127
adding dummy patients (or records) in a database in order to conceal the distribution
of deterministically encrypted ontology (or attributes) and to thwart frequency attacks.
We have tested MedCo in a real operational environment by deploying it in a network
of three institutions. Results on a clinical oncology use-case show small query-response
times and good scalability with respect to the number of sites and amount of data.
Therefore, we firmly believe that MedCo represents a concrete solution for enabling
medical data sharing in a privacy-conscious and regulation-compliant way.

Chapter 8
GenoShare: Supporting
Privacy-Informed Decisions for Sharing
Exact Genomic Data
In the previous chapter, we have seen how cohorts of well-characterized patients can
be identified across several clinical sites in a privacy-conscious way. The last step of
the data-sharing process consists in sharing the individual records of these patients with
investigators willing to perform more in-depth analyses. Yet, when individual genomic
data need to be released, clinical sites are still hesitant as it is extremely difficult to
fully understand the privacy risks that such a data-release entails. In this last chapter,
we propose a new framework that supports privacy-informed decision for sharing exact
genomic data by providing means to systematically reason about the risk of disclosing
privacy-sensitive attributes (e.g., health status, kinship, physical traits).
8.1 Introduction
The privacy risks stemming from disclosing medical genomic data [79, 96, 148] are be-
ing increasingly amplified by the growing number of breaches occurring in healthcare
organizations [197, 158, 105, 203]. This situation creates a complicated environment for
health care practitioners and researchers trying to engage with citizens regarding the
sharing of data for clinical research, as gaining their trust is becoming a major challenge.
Currently, medical institutions and research centers address this problem by relying on
a review board that decides whether disclosure is suitable. However, these decisions
usually follow all-or-nothing policies, which provide little control on the inferences that
can be made upon the shared data. Thus, they are of little help at conveying trust
to users. The computer security community has made a remarkable effort to improve
this situation, mainly focusing on solutions that perturb the data such that releases are
differentially private [86, 116, 218], since anonymization approaches [189, 134, 129, 215]
have been shown futile for privacy-preserving sharing of genomic data [99, 107].
Despite the demanding privacy needs of genomic data management, these solutions
have not been adopted by practitioners so far. A main reason for this reluctance is
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that genomics applications usually require genomic data to be as exact as possible [79,
88, 151]. High accuracy is especially important in association studies aiming to identify
significant correlations between particular genotypes and rare diseases, which are often
weak signals. Moreover, differentially private solutions focus on safeguarding only the
release of aggregates, and thus are not suitable for protecting individual’s data, whose
sharing is a common practice in research studies. In summary, the need to release the
exact data values precludes the use of state-of-the-art solutions that provide formal
privacy guarantees in the presence of arbitrary external information.
Yet, genomic data sharing is crucial to advance the state of the art in medicine. Thus,
there is a high demand in the biomedical community for solutions that enable practition-
ers to reason about what exact data can be released while protecting individuals’ privacy
in clinical and research settings. Even though they cannot prevent inferences enabled
by unforeseeable attack developments or data releases, such solutions would represent a
great improvement over the current situation since they can effectively reduce the privacy
risks based on the information available to the decision maker.
In this paper, we introduce GenoShare, whose goal is to assist practitioners in decision
making by quantifying the risk of sensitive information leakage when sharing genomic
data. Let us assume that an institution (e.g., hospital, research center) wishes to share
genomic data, but is concerned about the privacy of the individuals who contributed
their data. Upon reception of a request for genomic data sharing, such institution can
use GenoShare to quantify the risk of sensitive attribute disclosure associated to revealing
those data. To this end, GenoShare considers inference attacks relevant to the privacy
concerns of the data contributors, and the information available to the adversary: i)
the genomic statistics across populations [194], ii) the genomic association to sensitive
information [104, 187], and iii) the correlations between genomic variants inside an indi-
vidual’s genome, and across related individuals’ genomes. As opposed to prior works that
consider only one type of inference attack at a time [107, 110, 175], GenoShare quantifies
the risk of a privacy breach considering the joint effect of inference attacks, i.e., exploiting
their interrelations, and can also consider partial adversarial knowledge – thus providing
a more realistic risk estimation than the state-of-the-art approaches.
If the risk of sensitive attribute disclosure is deemed low, the institution can release
the requested data in exact form, and otherwise it denies access to the data. GenoShare
measures risk using novel intuitive metrics that, as opposed to current approaches based
on inferences of raw genomic values [208], are directly related to the inference of tangible
information, such as kinship or predisposition to a disease. Thus, they are well suited for
modeling informed consent [123]. Furthermore, since denying access based on informa-
tion secret to the adversary is known to leak information [121], GenoShare implements
mechanisms to avoid this leakage.
To summarize, we make the following contributions:
• We present GenoShare, a framework that supports informed decision making re-
garding the sharing of exact genomic data by considering relevant inference attacks,
and their joint effect on privacy.
• We introduce novel metrics that capture the risk of sensitive attributes disclosure,
better suited to model informed consent than the state of the art. These metrics
can be used to build privacy policies that model decision-making for genomic data
sharing.
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Notation Description
aafi Alternate allele frequency at position i
y Disease susceptibility to be protected
Ψ(y) Set of variants associated with disease y
ωy = (ωy1 , . . . , ω
y
n) Set of effect-size coefficients for variants in Ψ(y)
φA,B Kinship coefficient for individual A and B
g = (g1, . . . , gn) Set of genotypes for a real genome
go,gu Set of observed, unobserved genotypes used by genotype inference
R Panel of reference individuals used by genotype inference
gˆ = (gˆ1, . . . , gˆn) Set of inferred genotypes
g˜ = (g˜1, . . . , g˜n) Set of genotypes for an avatar genome
g˙ = (g˙1, . . . , g˙n) Set of most common genotypes in the population
f = (f1, . . . , fn) Set of aggregated statistics for a real database
f˜ = (f˜1, . . . , f˜n) Set of aggregated statistics for an aggregated avatar
qg(gs) Query for the genotypes of a subset s of variants
qm(fs) Query for the aggregated statistics on a subset s of variants
Ag Genotypes revealed in previous queries
Am Aggregated statistics revealed in previous queries
Ry Risk of disclosing predisposition to disease y through phenotype inference attack
Rm Risk of disclosing database membership through membership inference attack
Rkd Risk of disclosing familial relationship of degree d through kinship inference attack
αm, βm Type I and II errors for database membership inference
αd, βd Type I and II errors for kinship inference of degree d
ρ Set of thresholds on inference risks
ρy Threshold on the risk of disclosing predisposition to disease y
ρm Threshold on the risk of disclosing membership m to the database
ρk Threshold on the risk of disclosing kinship
B Auxiliary information available to the adversary
Privg˜ Genome avatar’s privacy
Priv
f˜
Aggregated avatar’s privacy
Table 8.1: Notation used throughout the chapter. For all variables, bold indicates a set.
• We develop a novel method for preventing inferences based on genomic query
denials. The idea is to internally use avatars (modified versions of individual’s
genomes) to decide upon data release, still releasing the original data when privacy
is not at risk.
• We instantiate GenoShare with the three most relevant attacks on genomic privacy,
advancing the state of the art by adapting them to consider partial information
and considering their interrelations to amplify their inference power. We show
GenoShare’s effectiveness at detecting potential private information leaks using
real data from the 1,000 Genomes Project [194].
8.2 The Genomic Sharing Scenario
We consider a scenario in which an institution holds a database D with genomic data of
lots of individuals. We model an individual’s genome in D as a vector g = (g1, . . . , gn)
formed by n variants on autosomal chromosomes (i.e., not sex chromosomes), where gi
denotes the value of variant i. We encode the value (or genotype) of a variant gi at
position i as gi ∈ {0, 1, 2}, based on the number of alternate alleles it contains. We use a
vector f = (f1, . . . , fn) to model aggregated statistics on these variants. We summarize
the notation in Table 8.1.
Institutions wish to share these data in one of two ways: i) as a subset of genotypes
gs, in response to a genotype request for variants of a given individual, qg(gs); and ii)
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as a subset of aggregated statistics fs for a specific group of individuals, in response to
an aggregated request for variants, qm(fs). Because genomic-related applications are not
tolerant to noisy data, institutions want to share them in their original, exact, form.
On the other hand, individuals whose genomes are in D could be concerned about
the potential disclosure of their sensitive information. They express such concerns estab-
lishing a threshold, ρ, that captures their tolerance to disclosure of sensitive information
with respect to the risk of inference.
We assume an adversary who wants to learn some (sensitive) information about indi-
viduals in the database protected by GenoShare. Genome-based inference attacks can be
categorized as follows: (i) Phenotype inference attacks, that aim at inferring an individ-
ual’s predisposition to diseases (e.g., Alzheimer’s disease, cancer, schizophrenia) [79], or
her physical traits, from her genotype and known genotype-phenotype correlations [104];
(ii) Membership inference attacks, whose goal is to infer the presence of an individual
of whom genomic information is available in a group for which aggregate statistics are
known [107, 181], which can be very sensitive if such a group is associated with a sensitive
attribute (e.g., HIV-positive patients, patients in a psychiatric institute, etc.); (iii) Kin-
ship inference attacks, that aim at inferring familial relationships between know individu-
als’ genomes; (iv) Re-identification attacks, that aim at inferring the identity (e.g., family
name) [99] behind a known genome, or physical traits (e.g., height, eye color, etc.) that
can lead to re-identification [61]; or (v) Linking attacks, that aim at linking anonymized
sensitive phenotype data available to the adversary to a set of individuals for which their
genotypes are known by exploiting genotype-phenotype correlations [112, 102].
To perform inferences, the adversary could have access to the following information :
–Background information (B) such as public information about average individuals’
genomes [194], and about genomic association to sensitive information [187, 104]; or
information made public by individuals, e.g., on OpenSNP [152] that provides access
to further genomic data, or on Facebook [81] that provides information about familial
relationships [110],
–Revealed variants of the targeted individual and of her relatives (Ag), and aggregated
statistics (Am),
–Potentially revealed variants : information that would be revealed if a new request is
granted (gs or fs), or that could be inferred in case of GenoShare denying a high-risk
query.
8.3 GenoShare
We design GenoShare to help institutions owning a database of genomic sequences to
share exact genotypes (gs) or aggregated statistics (fs) in a privacy-conscious way. When
GenoShare receives a data request (either qg(gs) or qm(fs)), it quantifies the privacy risks
regarding inferences stemming from the release of the data. If the risks are deemed too
high with respect to given thresholds ρ, GenoShare prevents any automatic release of
data. It can further provide the institution with information that can be used to make
a privacy-conscious decision regarding whether to share the requested data.
We note that when queries are granted, GenoShare cannot protect the information
that has already been released from inferences that could be made possible by advances in
the state of the art in genomics research. This limitation is inherent to the practitioners’
need for clean and exact data.
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Figure 8.1: The four main blocks in GenoShare: i) an Avatar Engine that generates and stores
avatar genomes which are used internally to avoid inferences based on query denials; ii) an Attack
Engine that simulates the adversary’s behavior in order to predict what information could be
learned if the requested data are released; iii) a Risk Measurement Engine that quantifies the risk
of disclosing sensitive information when releasing data; and iv) a Decision Engine that verifies
whether the privacy risks are under the thresholds ρ, and either outputs the exact requested
data (gs or fs) or nothing. The figure shows instantiations of the blocks for three inference
attacks, and the bottom row illustrates how other attacks could be accommodated.
8.3.1 Architecture
GenoShare is conceptually divided in four main blocks, illustrated in Figure 8.1:
Attack Engine. This engine simulates the inference attacks that the adversary can
perform given both the information already available to him (Ag, Am, and B), and
what would be disclosed if the query was granted (gs or fs).
Risk Measurement Engine. This engine computes the risk of sensitive attribute
disclosure materializing if the data requested in the query is revealed.
Decision Engine. This engine checks if the risk computed by the Risk Measurement
Engine exceeds the established thresholds for any individual in the database.
Avatar Engine. The Avatar Engine creates and stores avatars: modified versions of
the stored genomic data. Avatars are used, internally, in the Attack Engine to simulate
the inference attacks, and in the Risk Measurement Engine to quantify the inference risk.
Their goal is to mitigate potential inferences on the true genome based on query denials.
Note that, whenever the decision is to grant the queried data, the true data is released.
8.3.2 Using GenoShare
Initialization. GenoShare requires an initialization phase in which the attacks to be
considered are instantiated in the Attack Engine (Sect. 8.4); the privacy metrics are set
up in the Risk Measurement Engine (Sect. 8.5); the corresponding risk thresholds ρ are
set up in the Decision Engine; and the Avatar Engine generates one avatar per individual
per attack considered in the Attack Engine (Sect. 8.6).
Operation. Upon reception of a data request (qg(gs), or qm(fs)), two steps are needed
to run GenoShare:
1. Configuration. GenoShare needs to be configured to decide: (i) what background
information B is assumed to be available to the adversary (e.g., only data released by
tool, familial relationships, genome data obtained from other sources,. . . ); and (ii) which
attacks are of a concern for the given request.
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2. Execution. To evaluate the query, GenoShare substitutes the requested data (gs or fs)
by the corresponding avatar genotypes (g˜s or f˜s). Then, it runs all the attacks configured
in the Attack Engine, whose output is then input to the Risk Measurement Engine. This
engine computes the risk of a privacy breach, and the Decision Engine verifies whether
it complies with all individuals’ thresholds. If any of the risks exceeds the corresponding
thresholds, GenoShare prevents the release of the data. If not, it releases the exact data
requested in the query (gs or fs).
8.4 GenoShare’s Attack Engine
The Attack Engine runs all the inference attacks configured in GenoShare , to mimic the
actions that an adversary would perform to learn sensitive information about individuals.
As opposed to prior works that consider inference attacks independently, GenoShare con-
siders them jointly, thus maximizing their effect. We now introduce the three most well-
known attacks, namely phenotype, membership, and kinship inference, that we instantiate
with state-of-the-art inference techniques. We note that GenoShare can accommodate
other attacks, such as the re-identification attack, the linking attack or others, and it can
be updated with better techniques each time there is a new proposal.
8.4.1 Phenotype inference attack
Phenotype inference attacks are aimed at learning genotype-related sensitive phenotypes
about a target individual (and her relatives), such as predisposition to diseases or physical
traits. For simplicity, in this paper we only consider predisposition to diseases inference.
Phenotype inference attacks run in two steps: (i) genotype completion, in which the
adversary uses the target’s known variants, i.e., those that he has already observed,
to infer correlated unobserved variants both from the target and her relatives, and
(ii) genotype-phenotype mapping, in which, given the recovered variants, the adversary
computes the target’s disease predisposition using publicly available information about
genotype-phenotype correlations. We now provide details about these two phases that
are relevant to understand the avatar generation algorithms in Sect. 8.6.
Genotype completion. Genotype completion enables the inference of unobserved vari-
ants gu from the variants available to the adversary (i.e., previously revealed and to be
revealed, go := Ag ∪ gs, and background information B), and the genotype data in a
public panel of reference individuals R. It outputs a posterior probability distribution
for each unobserved variant, gˆ = Pr(gu|go,B,R). We instantiate this inference using
a well-established statistical technique called genotype imputation [138] that makes use
of a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) to model the target’s genome. Simpler techniques
could be used but, to the best of our knowledge, genotype imputation provides the most
accurate genotype inference [175].
At a high level, genotype imputation works by using patterns of blocks of highly
correlated variants, so-called haplotypes, in the reference panel to predict unobserved
variants when only a subset go of g has been observed. By definition, a haplotype is
a set of variants on a chromosome that tend to always occur together, i.e., that are
statistically correlated. This process is illustrated in Figure 8.2.
Then, the adversary can infer the variants of the target’s relatives from the com-
pleted genotype, i.e., the exact observed genotypes go and the probabilistically inferred
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Figure 8.2: High-level representation of the genotype imputation technique.
ones gˆ, and the knowledge on target’s family tree. We model the target’s family as a
Bayesian network and the well-established junction tree algorithm [127] can be used to
compute, for each family member, the set of marginal probability distributions over the
unobserved variants conditioned on the target’s information previously inferred (go ∪ gˆ)
(see Figure 8.3 for a high-level representation of the junction tree algorithm).
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Figure 8.3: High-level representation of the junction tree algorithm: From a family tree (0),
a Bayesian network is constructed (1) and then moralized through triangulation in order to
obtain a moralized graph (2). Finally, The moralized graph is transformed into a clique tree
(or junction tree) (3) by guaranteeing that for each pair of cliques U, V with intersection S, all
cliques on path between U and V contain S.
Genotype-phenotype mapping. An individual’s genetic predisposition to a disease
can be inferred from her genotype at variants associated with the disease, and the strength
of this genotype-phenotype association. As explained in Section 2.1, this strength is
characterized by the effect size ωy = log(OR), where OR is the odds ratio. More formally,
let Ψ(y) be the set of variants associated with disease y. Then, the adversary computes
the target’s predisposition to disease y, denoted as P y, as the linear combination of
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the target’s inferred genotypes gˆi of variants i in Ψ(y) weighted by the strength of the
genotype-phenotype association ωi
P y = P y0 +
∑
i∈Ψ(y)
ωi
∑
k∈1,2,3
kPr(gˆi = k) , (8.1)
where P y0 is the baseline predisposition to y. Note that for monogenetic diseases (e.g.,
breast cancer), Ψ(y) consists of only one variant.
8.4.2 Membership inference attack
The membership inference attack enables the adversary to infer whether a target in-
dividual, for which variants are known, is present in a group of individuals for which
genetic aggregated statistics are available [107, 210, 176, 207, 113, 220, 181]. We instan-
tiate this attack using the technique proposed by Homer et al. [107] because it relies on
less restrictive assumptions than other approaches, but any other membership inference
technique could be used instead. We note that this technique is different from the one by
Shringarpure and Bustamante described in Chapter 6 as it uses allele frequencies instead
of allele presence/absence information. Homer’s technique compares, for every target’s
observed variants go, (i) the distance between the alternate allele frequency
gi
2 in the
target’s genotype and aafi (the alternate allele frequency in the population) with (ii) the
distance between gi2 and fi, the frequency of the same allele in the group of interest.
Formally, using the L1 distance:
D
(gi
2
)
=
∥∥∥aafi − gi
2
∥∥∥−
∥∥∥fi − gi
2
∥∥∥ . (8.2)
When the target is in the group, E
[
D( gi2 )
]
is greater than zero because gi2 shifts fi
away from aafi. On the contrary, under the null hypothesis (the target is not present in
the group of interest) E
[
D( gi2 )
]
should approach zero. If gi2 is further away from the
group than from the reference population, i.e., even less likely to be part of the group,
E
[
D( gi2 )
]
is negative.
If the number of released frequencies is sufficiently high, E
[
D( gi2 )
]
converges to the
normal distribution due to the central limit theorem. This enables the adversary to make
use of a one-sample t-test to determine whether the target is part of the group or not.
As we explain in Section 8.4.4, the adversary can make use of the output of the genotype
completion (gˆ) to further improve the membership attack. As the output of genotype
completion is a probability distribution over the possible values of a variant, we adapt
(8.2) such that it incorporates this knowledge. For k ∈ {0, 1, 2}:
D
(
gˆi
2
)
=
∥∥∥∥∥aafi −
∑
k
k
2
Pr(gˆi = k)
∥∥∥∥∥−
∥∥∥∥∥fi −
∑
k
k
2
Pr(gˆi = k)
∥∥∥∥∥ . (8.3)
8.4.3 Kinship inference attack
The kinship inference attack enables the adversary to infer the degree of kinship of a
pair of target individuals, given a common set of their variants. We instantiate this
attack, for the first time, with a technique that estimates the identical-by-descent (IBD)
statistics representing the proportion of genomic variants co-inherited from a common
ancestor [137, 199]. Similarly to the previous attacks, other techniques could be used. In
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particular, we use the kinship coefficient φA,B proposed in [137], defined as the probability
that two alleles sampled at random from two individuals A and B are identical by descent.
We compute φA,B as the average over all variants’ coefficients φˆi,A,B computed as:
φˆi,A,B =
2aafi(1− aafi)− (gi,A − gi,B)
2
8
∑
i∈MA,B
aafi(1− aafi)
, (8.4)
whereMA,B is the set of observed variants for both individuals. If the number of observed
variants is sufficiently high, the sum of φˆi,A,B over all variants converges to the normal
distribution due to the central limit theorem. Similarly to the previous attack, the
adversary can infer the degree of kinship of the target individuals by using the inference
criteria in [137] (see Table 8.2). As there are different kinship levels, in our experiments
we use a closed testing procedure [139] of consecutive one-sample t-tests and choose the
closest relationship that can be inferred.
Relationship φA,B Inference criteria
Monozygotic twin 12 >
1
23/2
Parent-offspring 14
[
1
25/2
, 1
23/2
]
Full siblings 14
[
1
25/2
, 1
23/2
]
2nd degree 18
[
1
27/2
, 1
25/2
]
3rd degree 116
[
1
29/2
, 1
27/2
]
Unrelated 0 < 1
29/2
Table 8.2: Kinship inference criteria based on the estimated kinship coefficient φA,B .
Note that the estimation of the kinship coefficient relies on the assumption that vari-
ants are independent hence contrary to membership inference, kinship inference cannot
benefit from genomic imputation that relies on correlation.
8.4.4 Attacks interrelations
In order to best estimate the adversary’s inference capabilities, the Attack Engine takes
into account interrelations between the different attacks which can benefit from each
other as shown in Figure 8.4. The genotype completion carried out within the pheno-
type inference attack can be used to improve the efficacy of the membership inference
attack, because it increases the knowledge of the adversary about the target’s genotype
information: A larger number of the target’s variants is made available to establish her
membership to the database. On the contrary, the kinship inference attack cannot bene-
fit from genotype completion. This is because genotype completion relies on correlations
between variants, but the accuracy of the estimated kinship coefficient relies on indepen-
dent variants. However, the kinship inference attack can improve the phenotype inference
attack by informing about the familial ties which enable us to build the Bayesian net-
work model. As a consequence, the kinship inference attack indirectly and positively
influences the membership inference attack. Finally, the membership inference attack
can also enhance the genotype completion of the phenotype inference attack if it reveals
that the target is present in a database associated with a phenotype that is correlated
to a particular genotype. We do not evaluate the latter in Section 8.7, as understanding
the information gained by the adversary is straightforward.
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Figure 8.4: Interrelation among inference techniques
8.5 GenoShare’s Risk Measurement Engine
GenoShare needs to have means to measure the risk of sensitive attribute disclosure
when granting a request qg(gs) or qm(fs). Such risk needs to be understood by a large
variety of users with extremely diverse knowledge related to genomics and/or medicine
(e.g., patients, doctors, researchers). As such, we propose metrics to represent sensi-
tive attributes that could be understood by the public at large [123]. It must be noted,
however, that the Risk Measurement Engine could be instantiated with any other met-
rics deemed suitable for measuring the information leaked to the adversary in order to
characterize other more-or-less-specialized concerns. For instance, metrics oriented to
avoid bulk disclosure of data, e.g., by including a large percentage of variants in the risk
computation, or metrics of interest for experts, such as genomic researchers, in which
only specific variants are considered to be risky.
8.5.1 Phenotype inference risk
The phenotype inference risk aims at capturing how well the adversary can infer a tar-
get’s phenotype, e.g., a physical trait or a predisposition P y to a disease, regardless of
the actual phenotype value, i.e., her inference error. For simplicity we focus our expla-
nation on disease predisposition, but note that the metric can be easily adapted to other
phenotype inferences.
Disease predisposition can be inferred through the phenotype inference attack, see
Section 8.4.1. If the adversary had access to all the target’s actual genotypes, he could
perfectly compute her predisposition. However, when GenoShare is in place, the adver-
sary only has access to the previously disclosed genotypes (Ag), and to those that he
can infer using the genotype completion (gˆ). Recall from Section 8.4.1 that, for each
gˆi, the adversary obtains a probability distribution over the three possible variant values
{0, 1, 2}. Given the known and inferred variants, the predisposition P y can be estimated
using the genotype-phenotype mapping.
Wagner defined the per-variant success rate of the adversary as the probability that
the adversary correctly infers the true variant value given the genotype inference out-
put [208]. Inspired by this metric, we quantify the risk of inferring a given disease predis-
position, denoted as Ry, by weighing the per-variant privacy metric by the per-variant
strength of association ωi between genotype and disease predisposition:
Ry =
1∑
i ωi
∑
i
ωi Pr(gˆi = gi), i ∈ Ψ(y), (8.5)
where Ψ(y) is the set of variants associated with disease y and gi the individual’s true
genotype of variants i in Ψ(y). The metric Ry is an absolute measure of the adversary’s
success given the known and inferred genotypes. We note that, even if no information has
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been released, the adversary can use her prior information (i.e., the variants’ alternate
allele frequency in the population aaf). Thus, the mimimum risk faced by the individual
is
Ry,min =
1∑
i ωi
∑
i
ωi Pr(gˆi,aaf = gi), i ∈ Ψ(y) (8.6)
where gˆi,aaf denotes the adversary’s estimation of gi given his prior knowledge.
8.5.2 Membership and kinship inference risks
We consider membership and kinship inferences to be binary classification problems.
These are based on a one-sample t-test used to test the null hypothesis of the individual
not being in the dataset, in the case of membership (see Sect. 8.4.2), or not being related
to anyone else in the database in the case of kinship (see Sect. 8.4.3). Thus, to quantify
these inference risks, we use α, the significance level of the classification (i.e., the false
positive rate), and 1 − β, the test statistical power, where β denotes the false negative
rate. Intuitively, the higher the power and the lower the significance level are, the more
certain the adversary is about his classification. Therefore, an individual’s privacy grows
with α and β (i.e., when the number of false positives, resp. false negatives, grows).
We define the risk of membership inference as
Rm = (1− βm, αm) , (8.7)
and the risk of inferring kinship of degree d as
Rkd = (1− βd, αd), d ∈ N
∗ . (8.8)
where the subscripts of α and β refer to the membership (m), respectively the d-degree
kinship (d), inference attacks.
8.6 GenoShare’s Avatar Engine
Denying access to private data can leak information about these data, because decisions
are based on information not available to the attacker [121]. Simulatable auditing [122]
prevents such leakage by anticipating incoming queries, and only replying to those that do
not enable unauthorized inferences. Unfortunately, existing solutions in this direction are
limited to statistical queries different from aggregated requests in the genomic scenario,
and not applicable to the case of individual genotype requests.
The key intuition in simulatable auditing is that, to prevent leakage, a decision to deny
a query must be based exclusively on the information released by the system (including
the potential answer to the current query), but not on the query itself nor other value in
the database. Building on this idea, one may be tempted to use existing techniques to
produce synthetic data [46], or perturb the data to make it differentially private [34], in
order to obtain alternative data with similar statistical properties to those of the original
data. These alternative data can be used as input for the decision process so that the
query denial does not depend on the original sensitive data. However, by following this
approach, GenoShare can take incautious decisions in particular instances, i.e., granting
a query deemed safe for the alternative input, while for the original genomic data it would
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have raised an alarm. Such a risky behavior is not acceptable for medical institutions
notably because of patients’ privacy.
To mitigate this problem, we propose to use avatars, new modified versions of an
individual’s genome or a database’s aggregates used internally by GenoShare. Avatars,
as opposed to perturbed or synthetic data, always guarantee conservative decisions when
used in GenoShare’s decision process. They are used as input to the Attack and Risk
Measurement Engines instead of the original genomes, thus ensuring that, given a denial,
the adversary can, at most, recover the avatar. We note that when a query is granted,
i.e., deemed safe, always the original data is released, not the avatars.
We define two types of avatars: genome avatars (g˜), and aggregates avatars (f˜) to
substitute genotypes (gs) and aggregates (fs) real inputs, and construct them to ensure
that decisions are never incautious. In terms of the risk metrics defined in Section 8.5,
this implies that phenotype inference attacks on the avatar should result in a success rate,
Ry, larger than on the real genome; and membership (resp. kinship) inference attacks
should result in higher power, 1 − βm (resp. 1 − βd) for a given significance level αm
(resp. αd).
Avatar-based privacy. Guaranteeing safety of the decisions with respect to the real
genomes inevitably leads us to generating avatars that are not fully independent from
the real genomic data they represent. Thus, we cannot provide the provable protection
guaranteed by simulatable auditing. Instead, we quantify the level of privacy provided
by GenoShare’s avatars. Let us consider genotype requests as an example. Given a query
denial, the probability of the adversary inferring one true genotype is:
Pr[gi|g˜i] · Pr[g˜i|denial] , (8.9)
where g˜i denotes the value of gi’s avatar, Pr[gi|g˜i] denotes the probability that the adver-
sary succeeds at recovering true genotypes from the avatar, and Pr[g˜i|denial] denotes the
probability of learning the avatar from the denial. The latter strongly depends on the
concrete sequence of queries and their replies, hence cannot be computed analytically.
Thus, we choose to assume the worst-case scenario in which the adversary does recover
the avatar and concentrates on computing the first probability, Pr[gi|g˜i]. This worst-case
scenario provides a lower bound on the privacy provided by avatars. If the adversary
cannot correctly recover the avatar from the denial (i.e., Pr[g˜i|denial] < 1), the overall
privacy increases.
Then, for a given individual, we compute her avatar’s privacy as the average error of
the adversary over all variants:
Privg˜ =
1
n
∑
i
(1− Pr[gi|g˜i]) , Privf˜ =
1
n
∑
i
(1− Pr[fi|f˜i]) . (8.10)
We note that, depending on the use case, it could make sense to only consider variants
that are deemed most sensitive for the individual.
In the following, we propose avatar-generation algorithms for the three families of
techniques we instantiate in the Attack Engine. We note that the proposed avatar
generation methods are not tied to any particular implementation of the attacks, but
based on their fundamental operation principle. Thus, they are valid for any attack
inside a family.
8.6. GENOSHARE’S AVATAR ENGINE 141
8.6.1 Genome avatar
Genome avatars g˜ are used as input to the Attack Engine when GenoShare receives a
genomic request qg(gs). Since the inference techniques are based on different principles,
avatars must be technique-dependent to guarantee that, for all cases, GenoShare outputs
a conservative decision.
Phenotype inference. GenoShare quantifies the phenotype inference risk stemming
from a phenotype inference attack using Ry (as in (8.5)), dependent on the adversary’s
error. Hence, to trigger conservative decisions avatars need to reduce this error with
respect to the case where the real genome would be used for the attacks. Phenotype
inference attacks rely on genome completion to infer unknown variants before using
a phenotype-genotype mapping to perform the inference (see Sect. 8.4.1). The working
principle of genotype completion techniques is to infer unobserved variants using common
patterns in a reference panel R. This implies that inferred variants are likely to be equal
to the most common variants in R. Thus, setting the avatar to such common variants
increases the probability that the inferred variants are equal to the avatar (Pr(gˆi = g˜i)),
reducing the error in Ry.
Let us denote as g˙i the most common value in the reference panel for variant i.
Depending on the variant’s aaf, we have that g˙i = 0, if aaf ≤ 0.5, and g˙i = 2 otherwise
(variant’s values encoded as 1 are never the most common, since they are split in two
depending on which of the two chromosomes holds which allele). We compute the genome
avatar for phenotype inference, denoted as g˜g, using a privacy configuration parameter
pg ∈ [0, 1]:
g˜gi =


g˙i, if gi = g˙i,
g˙i, if gi = g˙i, with probability pg,
gi, if gi = g˙i, with probability 1− pg.
(8.11)
Given this creation mechanism, we compute the probability that the adversary suc-
ceeds at recovering true genotypes from the avatar considering the two possible avatar
values. When g˜gi = g˙i, the adversary is certain that the value observed is the real geno-
type gi (third case in (8.11)), thus succeeds with probability one. On the other hand,
when g˜gi = g˙i, the choice that maximizes the adversary’s success is to guess that gi = g˙i.
Her success probability is 1− pg(1− Pr[g˙i]), where the second term captures the proba-
bility of failure, i.e., g˜gi = g˙i was a consequence of the second case in (8.11). Therefore,
the privacy level computed as in (8.10) is:
Privg˜g = 1−
∑
i 1g˜
g
i =g˙i
+ 1g˜gi =g˙i(1− pg(1− Pr[g˙i]))
n
, (8.12)
Effectively, the parameter pg balances the privacy and decision precision provided by the
avatar. The larger pg is, the larger the difference between avatar and real genome is
(more privacy), but the more different are the decisions with respect to the real genome.
We note that, when related individuals are in the same system, their avatars must be
consistent with the Mendelian inheritance laws to avoid inconsistencies when the junction
tree algorithm is used for genotype inference of relatives. Given the two parents’ avatars
generated using the method in (8.11), we construct offspring avatars by “virtually mat-
ing” the parents’ avatars. To ensure conservativeness, we choose the most conservative
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combination that is consistent with the parents for the offspring, instead of choosing at
random as happens in reality. Given this creation mechanism, the offspring’s avatar is
independent from the real offspring genome, and thus does not leak information. It is
only related to the parents’ avatars which provide the privacy stated in (8.12).
Membership inference. The membership inference risk is measured in GenoShare as
the power of a test establishing whether a statistical summary (e.g., allele frequencies) of
a target individual’s genome is more similar to the dataset of interest or to the reference
population (see Sect. 8.4.2). Therefore, in order to trigger conservative decisions, an
avatar should be more similar to the dataset than the real individual’s genotypes.
To build the avatar, we first check which allele contributes more to the dataset aggre-
gate for each variant. Then, with probability pm, we replace the target’s real value with
such allele. Formally, we compute the genome avatar for membership inference, denoted
as g˜m as follows. For each variant i that is in the dataset, given a privacy parameter
pm ∈ [0, 1]:
g˜mi =


max(0, gi − 1), with probability pm, if aafi ≥ fi
min(gi + 1, 2), with probability pm, if fi > aafi
gi, with probability 1− pm.
(8.13)
The parameter pm can be used to trade-off privacy and decision precision. Following
the same reasoning as for the genome avatar, the success probability of the adversary is
1 when aafi ≥ fi and g˜
m
i = 2, and when aafi < fi and g˜
m
i = 0. In the former case, she
knows that gi = 2, in the latter gi = 0 (third case in (8.13)). Otherwise, the success of
the adversary is max(pm, 1 − pm), depending on the probability of replacement. Then,
the term Pr[gi|g˜
m
i ] in (8.10) is:
Pr[gi|g˜
m
i ] =


1, if aafi ≥ fi ∧ g˜
m
i = 2
∨aafi < fi ∧ g˜
m
i = 0
max(pm, 1− pm), otherwise .
(8.14)
Kinship inference. Similar to membership inference, the risk of kinship inference
depends on the power of a test measuring how similar the genomes of two individuals are
(see Sect. 8.4.3). Essentially, the degree of relationship inferred by this test depends on
the amount of overlap weighted by the allele frequency of the sampled variants. Hence,
to ensure conservativeness, avatars should be more similar to the target’s relative genome
that the target itself.
For an individual A, we compute the genome avatar for kinship inference with respect
to individual B, denoted as g˜k, given a privacy parameter pk ∈ [0, 1] as:
g˜ki =


gi,B , if gi = gi,B ,
gi,B , if gi = gi,B , with probability pk,
gi, if gi = gi,B , with probability 1− pk,
(8.15)
where gi,B is B’s genotype at variant i.
Since this avatar generation process is analogous to the one for genotype inference,
privacy is computed in the same way:
Privg˜k = 1−
∑
i 1g˜i =gi,B + 1g˜i=gi,B (1− pk(1− Pr[gi,B ]))
n
, (8.16)
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where Pr[gi,B ] is genotype gi,B ’s prior probability in the population.
Each individual in the database needs to have one genome avatar for kinship inference
per relative in the database. When simulating the kinship inference attack, the Attack
Engine uses the avatar that corresponds to the closest relative known to the adversary
(e.g., because of previous releases).
8.6.2 Aggregates avatar
Aggregates avatars f˜ are used when GenoShare receives an aggregates’ request qm(fs).
As only the membership inference technique makes use of the dataset, one aggregated
avatar is sufficient.
Intuitively, conservative decisions for membership-inference attacks should be trig-
gered when the aggregates avatar is more similar to the genomic information to be
tested by the adversary than to the population, so individuals would be found to be in
the database and GenoShare would prevent the sharing. We construct the aggregates
avatar for membership inference, denoted as f˜ , as follows. Given privacy parameters
γ, pf ∈ [0, 1], for all i for which fi = gi/2, we sample δ
f˜i
i from U [0, γ|fi − gi/2|], and
generate f˜i as follows:
f˜i =


fi − δ
f˜i
i if fi > gi/2 with probability pf
fi + δ
f˜i
i if fi < gi/2 with probability pf
fi with probability(1− pf ) .
(8.17)
If fi = gi/2, there is no way to construct a conservative avatar, and the avatar value
will take the original value fi. Therefore, the adversary’s success probability is 1 in this
(very rare) case. In other cases, the adversary will infer the frequency that maximizes
his success between the original fi (third case in (8.17)) and the modified ones (first or
second cases in (8.17)) depending on the parameters. The resulting privacy of this avatar
is given as:
Priv
f˜
= (8.18)
1−
1
n
∑
i
1fi=gi/2 + 1fi =gi/2max
(
1− pf , pf
ǫ
γ|fi − gi/2|
)
,
where the second term in the maximum function is derived from the following. As we
rely on the uniform (continuous) distribution to generate f˜i, the probability of being
exactly at fi is, in general, not defined. Instead, we compute the probability of being in
a small interval (represented by ǫ) around fi, knowing f˜i:
Pr[|Fi − fi| ≤ ǫ|f˜i] =


1, if f˜i = fi,
ǫ
∆ , if (fi > gi/2 ∧ fi −∆ ≤ f˜i < fi)
∨(fi < gi/2 ∧ fi < f˜i ≤ fi +∆),
0, otherwise,
(8.19)
where ∆ = γ|fi− gi/2|. In this case, pf can be used to trade off privacy and accuracy in
a coarse manner, and the parameter γ serves to fine-tune this trade-off. Note that, for
the aggregate avatar, contrary to the genome avatar, the privacy value never depends on
the specific avatar value f˜i, mainly because we deal here with continuous values and not
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three possible discrete values that significantly constrain the space of possible avatars (in
conjunction with the requirement to output a conservative query answer).
8.6.3 Using avatars
The avatar generation mechanisms described above depend on configuration parameters
px, x ∈ {g,m, k, d}, that define the level of privacy provided by the avatars Privg˜, resp.
Priv
f˜
. As obtaining a closed expression that expresses the relation between the level of
privacy and px is extremely complex, deriving analytically configuration values is not
possible. However, computing avatars is extremely cheap. Thus, one can efficiently
search for adequate parameters (e.g., using the bisection method).
Every time GenoShare is launched, it uses as many avatars as attacks its needs to
consider. However, we note that an adversary cannot learn more than a single avatar
for a given position by making multiple requests. Indeed, either there is no denial and
the adversary learns nothing about any avatar, or there is a denial and this denial will
always be based on the same avatar (the most conservative one) for later requests. In
other words, there cannot be a denial based on more than one avatar.
8.7 Using GenoShare with Real Data
We now show how GenoShare can, in practice, support privacy-conscious decisions when
sharing genomic data. We consider three use cases in which the adversary makes different
requests and has different background knowledge. These use cases are chosen to illus-
trate how GenoShare reacts to the most likely combinations of requests and background
knowledge, and how the interrelations between the attacks influence GenoShare’s deci-
sion.
8.7.1 Experimental Setup
Real Data. We run our experiments on the genomes of 351 individuals with admixed
American ancestries (AMR) from the 1,000 Genomes Project [194]. For each individ-
ual, we sample 270k variants across all autosomal chromosomes, and take this to be a
representative sample of her genome. We use 250 individuals to build the public refer-
ence panel (R), and the remaining 101 to simulate the institution’s database (D). We
also build a “sensitive” dataset formed by 50 random individuals in D to simulate an
HIV-related cohort H (any other sensitive disease could be alternatively used here as an
example).
GenoShare’s Initialization. We set up GenoShare’s Attack Engine with the three in-
ference attacks introduced in Section 8.4. To instantiate the phenotype inference attack,
we implemented genotype completion using Brian L. Browning’s BEAGLE implemen-
tation v4 [53, 52], and the junction tree algorithm using the Netica Bayesian network
Software [66]. We take the disease-variant associations for the AMR population from
the GWAS Catalog [104] for genotype-phenotype mapping. To instantiate membership
and kinship inference attacks, we used our own implementations of the Homer [107] and
kinship coefficient [137] inference techniques.
GenoShare’s Avatar Engine is set up using the generation techniques in Section 8.6.
For all individuals in D, we generate (i) a genome avatar for phenotype inference, (ii) a
genome and an aggregates avatar for membership inference, if they are also part of H;
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and (iii) a genome avatar for kinship inference, if they have relatives. Finally, the Risk
Measurement Engine is initialized with the risk metrics in Section 8.5, and we instantiate
the Decision Engine with risk thresholds particular to each use case.
8.7.2 Use Cases
In the following, we assume that the adversary always requests data about a single target
individual, or summary statistics about a single disease-related cohort. To consider
multiple individuals/cohorts, it suffices to replicate the experiments for all targets.
UC1: Genotype request – no background knowledge on D.
In this scenario, the institution receives consecutive requests for releasing batches of 100
variants of individual A in D. We consider that A is part of the HIV-related cohort, H,
and one of her relatives, B, is also in D but not in H. A’s risk thresholds for phenotype
inference risk, membership to the HIV-related cohort inference risk, and kinship inference
risk are ρy = 0.9, ρm = 0.7, ρk = 0.9, respectively. We consider that the adversary’s
background knowledge (B) consists of the publicly available reference panel R.
Upon reception of a genotype request qg(gs), the institution configures
GenoShare with B and ρ above, and launches it. Then, all the attacks in the Attack
Engine are run on A’s genome avatars, considering all their interdependencies.
Let us first consider the phenotype inference attack. To illustrate the evolution of A’s
phenotype inference risk, we consider the adversary’s goal is to learn her predisposition to
Alzheimer’s disease and bipolar disorder. We stress, however, that GenoShare could be
configured to consider disclosure of any other genomic-related clinical trait or phenotype.
Figure 8.5 shows this risk’s evolution as consecutive batches of variants are released. The
solid line represents the risk for A’s real genotype, and dashed lines for A’s avatars offering
privacy Privg˜g = {0.05, 0.1, 0.2} (maximum privacy is Priv
max
g˜g = 0.29). The dotted red
line represents A’s threshold ρy = 0.9. The first point in each figure represents the risk
before any variant is released, i.e., the prior risk for A computed as in (8.5) where the
adversary’s estimation of the target variants’ is made according to the alternate allele
frequency in the population aafs.
We consider two data-request patterns. The first pattern consists of a series of re-
quests for arbitrary variants, that are not necessarily correlated with any sensitive disease.
This case represents the behavior of a researcher looking for new genomic associations
with a disease of interest at a genome-wide scale. The results of this experiment are
shown in Figures 8.5A1 and 8.5A2. First, we observe that released data become part of
the adversary’s knowledge as Ag, and thus the risk never decreases. Second, as expected,
releasing arbitrary (thus likely disease-unrelated) variants slightly affects A’s predisposi-
tion inference risk for both considered diseases, when computed on the real genotypes.
Yet, when avatars are used, as they contain more common variants, this growth is larger.
This is because, due to the genotype completion technique that favors the estimation of
common values in R, the estimation of the avatar is better.
The second pattern consists of a series of requests for variants correlated with a
specific disease, concretely schizophrenia. This represents a typical scenario in which a
researcher studies variants of known significance. Results in Figures 8.5B1 and 8.5B2
show that releasing these variants does not have a particular impact on the risk of
inferring A’s predisposition to Alzheimer’s disease as these two diseases are genetically
uncorrelated [55]. Yet, because of the high genetic correlation between bipolar disorder
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(A1) (A2)
(B1) (B2)
Figure 8.5: UC1 – Disease predisposition inference risk, Ry, when releasing A’s genotypes in
batches of 100: effect of releasing arbitrary variants on the risk of inferring predisposition to
Alzheimer’s disease (A1) and bipolar disorder (A2); effect of releasing schizophrenia-related
variants on the risk of inferring predisposition to Alzheimer’s disease (B1), and bipolar disorder
(B2).
and schizophrenia, the risk of inferring predisposition to bipolar disorder significantly
increases as more schizophrenia-related variants are released.
Regarding GenoShare’s decision, the larger is Privg˜g , the more conservative are the
decisions based on the corresponding genome avatars, i.e., for a given inference risk level
they allow to disclose less data than those based on the true genome. For instance,
let us consider the risk of inferring predisposition to bipolar disorder (Figure 8.5(B2)).
Given A’s threshold, ρy, if computations were done on the real genome, GenoShare would
allow to release up to 300 genotypes (intersection of the black line and the red dotted
line), risking an information leak when the decision is to deny a query. This risk can be
mitigated by using avatars, at the cost of releasing less data. The most protective avatar
(Privg˜g = 0.2, cyan) enables the release of around 200 variants, while the less protective
one (Privg˜g = 0.05, blue) permits the release of almost as many variants as with the real
genome (black).
Given space constraints, in the following, we only show results for the consecutive re-
leases of arbitrary variants. We obtained similar results for variants related to schizophre-
8.7. USING GENOSHARE WITH REAL DATA 147
Figure 8.6: UC1 – Power of membership inference for different levels of adversarial knowledge
(αm = 10
−4).
nia.
Releasing A’s variants not only affects her phenotype inference risk but also her
membership and kinship inference risks. We show the effect on the risk of inferring her
membership to the HIV-related cohort H for a false positive rate αm = 10
−4 in Fig-
ure 8.6. In the different rows of Figure 8.6, we consider that the adversary has obtained
an increasing number of aggregates from previous queries (Am) to be incorporated to his
background knowledge B. Unsurprisingly, the more genotypes are revealed, the stronger
is the inference power, up to the point where the number of genotypes and aggregate
statistics released are the same (vertical dotted line). Then the inference power remains
constant because there are no more aggregate statistics to gain information from (hor-
izontal dotted line). We observe that genotype completion helps membership inference
by increasing the inference power before the vertical dotted line. Indeed, thanks to geno-
type intra-correlations, a larger number of genotypes than those made available to the
adversary can be used in the attack (see Figure 8.7 for comparison with the membership
inference power without the contribution of genotype completion). The behavior of the
avatars (dashed lines) is similar to the previous case, privacy can be enhanced at the
cost of releasing less information. We note that, the more variants are released, the less
different is the avatar from the actual genotype. Hence, the inference power based on
the avatar and real genome converges.
Finally, Figure 8.8 shows the effect of genotype release on risk of inferring A and
B’s kinship for different degrees of relatedness d = {1, 2, 3} and a false-positive rate
αd = 10
−4. Similarly to the previous case, each row assumes that the adversary has an
increasing number of variants from B as part of his knowledge Ag. We consider two
cases where A and B are first and second degree relatives. In the first case (Fig. 8.8(A)),
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(A) Releasing genotypes gi when aggregates fi are known
(B) Releasing aggregates fi when genotypes gi are known
Figure 8.7: Power of membership inference for αm = 10
−4: interleaving genomic and aggregated
queries
we see that the kinship inference power is already maximized when 300 variants are
disclosed for both individuals. Because of the closed test procedure, the power for d > 1
is also maximized. However, the kinship inference power for d = 0 (monozygotic twins) is
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negligible regardless of the number of variants used in the attack, as there is no possibility
that this is the case. In the second case (Fig. 8.8(B)), few variants suffice to infer with
significant power that the individuals are at least third degree relatives (d = 3). Yet,
1,000 variants are not enough to determine their real kinship, d = 2, with high certainty.
In fact, up to 4,000 variants are necessary to maximize this inference power (see Fig. 8.9).
Again avatars perform as expected, enabling a trade-off between amount of released data
and privacy in case of query denials.
We recall that GenoShare denies a query as soon as any of the inference risks breaches
its corresponding threshold. For instance, if we consider an avatar with Privg˜g = 0.05,
and adversarial background knowledge of 500 aggregates fromH and 500 genotypes from
B (second degree relative), GenoShare prevents the release of data at the fourth request
because of the kinship inference risk being too high.
UC2: Genotype request – kinship background knowledge.
In this scenario, the institution holding D receives consecutive requests for releasing
genotypes of arbitrary pathogenic variants (i.e., related to a disease) of individual A.
A, and also her parents B and C, are part of the HIV-cohort H. Their degree of
kinship is already known by the adversary and it is part of his background knowledge
B. For example, he could have inferred this information through the kinship inference
attack when A’s, B’s and C’s genotypes were released by GenoShare , or if their kinship
information was publicly available on Facebook [110]. Moreover, we assume that A, B,
and C have different privacy concerns: A is not worried about any potential privacy
breach and sets very permissive thresholds ρA = {ρy = ρm = 0.95}, whereas B and C
have more restrictive preferences ρB = {ρy = ρm = 0.7} and ρC = {ρy = ρm = 0.8}
(Note that, as kinship is known, we disregard the kinship threshold.)
Upon reception of a genotype request qg(gs), the institution configures
GenoShare with B, ρA, ρB and ρC , and launches it. GenoShare runs both pheno-
type and membership inference considering their interrelation, and computes the risk of
a privacy breach for the three individuals. Figure 8.10(A) illustrates the evolution of
A’s, B’s, and C’s predisposition to type 2 diabetes inference risk. Because of the kinship
effect, releasing A’s genotypes has an effect on B’s and C’s risk computed with both the
real genotype (solid) and avatars (dashed). We note that, because the three individuals
are involved, it is enough that at least one of their risk thresholds is exceeded to deny the
request. For instance, if avatars are used, even though the first query would be deemed
safe for A (blue), it would be denied because it implies that the risk for B (yellow) goes
above her threshold.
Because it improves genotype completion, kinship information also significantly af-
fects membership inference. Figure 8.10(B) illustrates the evolution of the risk of mem-
bership to the HIV-related cohort H inference for A, B, and C for αm = 10
−4 when
1,000 aggregates are already known to the adversary. Similarly to the previous use case,
we observe how releasing A’s genotypes also increases the membership inference risk for
B and C. Also, observe that, as in the third row of Figure 8.6, genotype completion helps
the adversary by significantly increasing his inference power (even if only 100 genotypes
are available after the first query, the adversary can exploit the 1000 aggregates that are
available).
UC3: Aggregate request – no background knowledge on D.
In this last scenario, the institution holding D receives consecutive requests for releas-
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(A) First-degree relationship between A and B
(B) Second degree relationship between A and B
Figure 8.8: UC1 – Power of kinship inference for different degrees (αd = 10
−4).
ing aggregate statistics fs of the HIV-related cohort H. We consider the same privacy
preferences and background knowledge as in UC1. Upon reception of a request for aggre-
gate data, the institution configures GenoShare with public background knowledge and
launches it. In this particular case, GenoShare only runs the membership inference attack
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Figure 8.9: Power of kinship inference for different degrees and αd = 10
−4 in the case of second
degree relationship between A and B.
because it is the only attack for which obtaining new aggregates helps the adversary.
Figure 8.11 shows the effect of a series of aggregate data releases on the risk of inferring
A’s membership to the HIV-related cohort H, for a false-positive rate αm = 10
−4 and
different amount of A’s variants available to the adversary. Unsurprisingly, the more
aggregates are released, the higher the inference power. It is important to note that,
thanks to the genotype completion carried out in the phenotype inference, the adversary
can use every new released aggregated frequencies even if the corresponding genotypes
of A have not yet been revealed (i.e., after the black dotted lines cross). Thus, the
risk of membership inference keeps growing with every extra frequency observed by the
adversary. Without the contribution of the genotype completion, inference power stays
constant since additional aggregate statistics cannot be used by the membership attack
(see Figure 8.7(B)). As in previous cases, we observe how avatars enable to trade off
privacy for amount of data released.
Finally, this use case also shows GenoShare’s utility in the case where the adver-
sarial background knowledge consists of the full genome of some individuals in H. For
example, individuals that put their genome online (e.g., on OpenSNP), or have been
sequenced at a direct-to-customer genomic service (e.g., 23andMe) that keeps a copy of
their genome. In these circumstances, as the genome is already known, the only attack
that GenoShare can mitigate is the membership inference attack based on aggregate data
requests. We emphasize that, for GenoShare to not underestimate the membership infer-
ence risk in such a case, it is the responsibility of the individuals to communicate to the
institution holding their genomic data that other copies are available elsewhere. In this
case, GenoShare’s background knowledge should be set to account for the adversary’s
knowledge of the complete target’s genome before its execution.
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(A) Risk of phenotype inference for type 2 diabetes
(B) Risk of membership inference (αm = 10−4) when the adversary already knows 1,000 aggre-
gates from the HIV-related cohort
Figure 8.10: UC2 – Disease predisposition and membership inference risk for A, B, and C
8.7.3 GenoShare’s Performance
GenoShare is not intended to be a real time tool, but to be run oﬄine. We conduct per-
formance measurements on an 8-core Intel Xeon CPU E3-1270 V2 processor 3.50GHz,
and 32 GB of memory, running Debian Linux. We measure the time required for comput-
ing the inference risks for the three considered attacks by executing GenoShare 10 times
on 10 different requests of 100 arbitrary variants, and report the average over the 100
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Figure 8.11: UC3 – Effect of releasing batches of 100 aggregates on the risk of membership
inference (αm = 10
−4, γ = 0.25).
experiments. Although the considered inference techniques are naturally parallelizable,
our measurements are made on a single thread of execution and thus represent an upper
bound for computation time.
We find that, despite its apparent complexity, the use of GenoShare entails very
reasonable overhead. As expected, since they only require fast arithmetic operations,
the computation time of both the kinship and membership inference attacks is within
the second hence negligible, and grows linearly with the number of variants to be tested.
Similarly, the generation of avatars, which is performed only once during GenoShare’s ini-
tialization, is also negligible. On the other hand, the phenotype inference attack, that
uses BEAGLE’s Java implementation for genotype completion, takes on average around
8 minutes and 14 seconds at each new request. We note that this timing is strongly
influenced by our choice of running BEAGLE with default parameters and limiting the
amount of memory allocated for the Java virtual machine to 2GB, and could be reduced
by optimizing the configuration (e.g., with a typical 22-node cluster it requires less than
23 seconds). We also note that the genotype completion computation time depends
both on the number of variants to be considered across the genome (in our case 270k
variants), and on the number of individuals in the reference panel R (in our case 250
individuals). We refer the reader to the original publication for more details on how
BEAGLE scales [53, 52].
In terms of storage, for each individual in the database, GenoShare requires one avatar
per kind of attack instantiated. The size of an avatar is at most the size of the set of
human genetic variations, i.e., roughly 1% of a full genome. Thus, GenoShare’s storage
requirements are certainly practical.
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8.8 Related Work
We revise attacks and defense mechanisms for genomic privacy which are most relevant
to our work. We refer the reader to existing surveys [79, 148] for an exhaustive review
of the state of the art.
Attacks. A first group of relevant attacks, referred to as attribute disclosure, can be
subdivided into two categories. The first category, attribute disclosure via genomic
completion, includes all techniques that rely on the intra- and inter-genome correla-
tions to infer unobserved variants [128] to reduce genomic privacy of individuals [175]
and relatives [111]. In this work, we improve previous inference techniques by tak-
ing both familial correlations and intra-genome correlations using genotype completion.
The second category, attribute disclosure via membership inference, exploits knowl-
edge of summary statistics of a given dataset to infer that a known genome is part
of it [62, 107, 113, 176, 207, 210, 220]. As such datasets are typically associated to a
disease of interest, inferring membership unveils very sensitive attributes. Commonly
exploited statistics are allele frequency and genotype counts, or statistics about linkage
disequilibrium. In this work, we explore for the first time the effectiveness of these at-
tacks in presence of incomplete information, and the benefits of genotype completion on
membership inference.
A second group of relevant papers deals with kinship inference. Previous works
show how to exploit inter-genome correlations to infer familial relationships based on
the amount of genomic data shared by individuals in genome-wide association studies
with distinct subpopulations [137] or in admixed populations [199]. Recently, Arthur
et al. have proposed a toolkit for analyzing large cohorts of whole-genome sequenced
samples that includes kinship inference relying on state-of-the-art methods [24]. Our
contribution is the framing of kinship inference as from a privacy perspective, both as
an attack to reveal familial relationship and as complement to genotype completion to
increase the amount of genetic information that can be inferred about an individual.
Finally, we revise re-identification attacks that de-anonymize genomic data by relying
on auxiliary knowledge. Gymrek et al. have proposed an attack of this kind [99], which
uses short tandem repeats on the Y chromosome (Y-STRs) to map anonymous genomes to
those available in a recreational genetic genealogy database online to recover the surname
of their (male) owner. Similarly, Humbert et al. link de-identified genotypes to online
profiles, such as those from online social networks, by relying on genomic variants that
influence phenotypic traits [112]. In this paper, we do not consider these attacks for space
constraints and because they highly rely on the access to external background knowledge
that may be difficult to access (e.g., the Y-STR database used by Gymrek et al. has been
put oﬄine after this attack was made public). Yet, we note that GenoShare’s Attack
Engine can easily accommodate re-identification attacks by integrating it in the different
engines.
Protection mechanisms. In addition to de-identification, which is a necessary but not
sufficient protection method as shown above, there exist two approaches for genomic pri-
vacy protection. The main idea behind the first approach is to properly apply noise, e.g.,
achieving differential privacy, on summary statistics for protecting a study participants’
privacy and thus thwarting attribute disclosure attacks [116, 182, 201, 219]. Fredrikson et
al. show that, however, using differential privacy in pharmacogenetics can lead to an un-
acceptable loss of utility, e.g., exposure of patients to an increased risk of stroke, bleeding
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events, and mortality [88]. Also, practitioners require exact genomic data to avoid false
genotype-phenotype associations. Bhaskar et al. propose a noiseless version of differen-
tial privacy but their solution makes some statistical assumptions on the data that are
too restrictive for the genomics setting [45]. Our solution does not perturb the released
aggregated data at all, regardless of the data distribution. Moreover, the aforementioned
protection mechanisms are not suitable for the release of an individual’s variants. The
second approach relies on secure storage and processing [36, 70, 109, 148, 211, 141] which
are complementary to our proposed solution. In fact, secure processing protects only the
data while processing, but GenoShare considers all the disclosed/shared information,
including also the results of a computation.
8.9 Summary
Academic solutions for privacy-preserving sharing of genomic data have mostly focused
on data perturbation. Such solutions, however, damage the utility of the data and
thus have not been accepted by practitioners. In this work, we introduce GenoShare, a
framework that supports privacy-informed decision-making when sharing genomic data.
GenoShare quantifies the risk of sensitive attribute disclosure, and prevents the automatic
sharing of data if the risk is deemed too high with respect to privacy thresholds encoded
using novel meaningful sensitive attribute-oriented metrics. Otherwise, it releases exact
data as requested by genomics research practitioners. Furthermore, GenoShare imple-
ments avatar genomes to protect individuals’ real genotypes from inferences stemming
from query denials.
To the best of our knowledge, GenoShare is the first framework to jointly consider
relevant attacks in genomic privacy in presence of incomplete information. It provides a
principled answer to the privacy concerns that have plagued the genomic community for
the last decade, and thus it is a firm step forward to enable the responsible and privacy-
respecting use of genomic data in research and medical environments. We hope that it
will dramatically improve the current situation in institutions, thereby accelerating the
slow and costly processes carried out by committees and lawyers by serving as support
for more informed decisions.
Although we have focused on the protection of genomic data, the systematic principles
underlying GenoShare make it suitable to deal with other data types where correlation
with sensitive information can be detrimental for an individual’s privacy, e.g., other
’omics’ data such as transcriptomic. Furthermore, GenoShare can also be used to under-
stand the risk incurred when voluntarily disclosing information to find others who have
a similar rare disease and share experiences as on PatientsLikeMe [153] or to safely enjoy
recreational genomics or direct-to-consumer genomics services. It is also worth noting
that during operation, GenoShare creates evidence that can be associated with deci-
sions related to the release of genomic data, hence providing support for accountability
systems.

Chapter 9
Conclusion
In this thesis, we have investigated the problem of developing new and practical privacy-
enhancing technologies (PETs) for the protection of medical and genomic data in order to
foster their adoption in the medical field. In particular, we have proposed new solutions
for storing, processing and sharing medical and genomic data in a privacy-preserving
way by specifically addressing concerns that affect two main areas of precision medicine:
clinical care and medical research.
In Part I, we began by showing how to securely outsource the storage of raw genomic
data for use in clinical care for in-depth genomic analyses or for clinical trials. We pro-
posed a new privacy-preserving architecture where the raw genomic data of patients is
stored at a centralized biobank in encrypted form. Our scheme enables a medical unit
(e.g., a hospital or a pharmaceutical company) to privately retrieve a subset of the pa-
tients’ raw genomic data, without revealing to the biobank the nature of the analysis to
be performed. Moreover, our proposed scheme enables the biobank to mask particular
parts of the retrieved data that the patient does not want to disclose. We implemented
the proposed scheme and demonstrated its practicality. We then proposed a new system
for privacy-preserving testing in the clinic by using homomorphically encrypted genetic
variants. In order to obtain approval from end users, we used DNA-based prediction of
HIV-related outcomes as a model for exploring its use in a clinical operational environ-
ment. Our solution enables a medical unit to securely compute ancestry information and
genetic risk scores from the encrypted genomic data stored at a storage and processing
unit by exploiting the homomorphic properties of the cryptosystem at the expense of
practical computational and storage overhead. We implemented the proposed model and
deployed it for testing at five outpatient clinics of the the Swiss HIV Cohort Study. We
evaluated the feedback from HIV specialists who tested our system on 230 HIV-positive
patients genotyped at 4,149 genetic markers. This enabled us to gain unprecedented
insights that can guide the design of new PETs for clinical genomics in the future.
In Part II, we first investigated the problem of securely re-using, in research, genomic
and medical data initially generated for clinical care. As such, we developed a new
privacy-preserving system that is built on top of the state-of-the-art framework for clini-
cal research, namely Informatics for Integrating the Biology and the Bedside (i2b2). Our
system improves the basic security guarantees of i2b2 by enabling the outsourcing of large
genomic data to a central untrusted third party, such as a public cloud, and the explo-
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ration of this data under encryption. Our proposed solution makes use of lattice-based
somewhat-homomorphic encryption to protect data confidentiality at rest and during
computation and (optionally) makes use of result-obfuscation to achieve differential pri-
vacy and mitigate the re-identification risk. We implemented the proposed solution and
tested it as a service of the clinical research data-warehouse of the Lausanne University
Hospital. We demonstrated that it facilitates the access to sensitive genomic information
that is otherwise prohibitive due to privacy and security concerns. The performance of
our system is such that it can be efficiently used in standard feasibility studies, as it
enables a researcher to simultaneously obtain aggregate information about 3,000 genetic
variants, from a cohort of 5,000 patients in less than 5 seconds. Then, we studied the
problem of privacy-conscious data sharing, which is crucial for assembling large amounts
of data necessary for medical research, especially when the data cannot be stored at a
central third party. In this context, we first evaluated the privacy risks that affect sim-
ple systems for the discovery of genetic variants (or “beacons”) that enable researchers
to obtain information about the presence of a given genetic variant in the database of
each participating site. As a result, we proposed three practical strategies for thwart-
ing the re-identification risks and discussed the different privacy/utility trade-offs they
introduce. We demonstrated the effectiveness of these strategies on real data from the
1,000 Genomes Project in the context of the Beacon Project of the Global Alliance for
Genomics and Health. Then, still in the context of medical data sharing, we proposed the
first operational system that enables a federation of clinical sites to collectively protect
their data against cyber attacks and to still be able to share it in a privacy-preserving
way. Our system uses collective homomorphic encryption, deterministic encryption and
a new method for generating dummy records in order to enable an investigator to ex-
plore cohorts of clinical and genomic data distributed across several clinical sites and
find eligible patients for research studies. To be easily adopted and used in operational
environments, our solution builds on top of widespread technology from the biomedical
informatics community. We implemented and deployed our system in a real network
of three institutions, and we demonstrated that it scales to millions of encrypted clin-
ical records and hundreds of institutions. Finally, we proposed a new framework that
complements the previous systems and enables practitioners and administrators to sys-
tematically reason about the risk of revealing privacy-sensitive attributes that patients
are unwilling to share (e.g., health status, kinship, physical traits), caused by the disclo-
sure of exact genomic data. In particular, in order to support privacy-informed decisions
for exact genomic data sharing, our framework evaluates the potential loss of genomic
privacy due to potential genomic-oriented inference attacks and their interactions. We
demonstrated the capabilities of the proposed system by instantiating it with three of the
most important inference attacks. We showed how it can be used in practice to detect
leakage of sensitive attributes by using real data from the 1,000 Genomes Project.
In conclusion, we see that privacy protection of sensitive medical data, and particu-
larly genetic data, is an important concern as the healthcare system increasingly suffers
from data breaches. This concern must be addressed in order to fully realize the promise
of personalized medicine. In this thesis, we propose concrete and practical technical
solutions and demonstrate that these solutions can be deployed and have an impact in
the real world. In particular, we show that, despite the general skepticisms around the
apparent unpracticality and difficulty of these technologies, PETs-based solutions can
be made efficient, deployable and usable in real operation settings, both for clinical care
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and research, and can represent concrete enablers to overcome the privacy and security
concerns that are currently slowing down the advancement of personalized medicine.
This thesis bridges the gap between the medical community and the information security
community. Yet, an additional effort, especially on the engineering side, is required to
make these new and sophisticated technologies be core components of next-generation
health information systems. From the research perspective, an important lesson that can
be drawn from this thesis is that we have to remove the unnecessary complexity of these
tools and identify the best privacy, efficiency, and usability trade-offs in order to foster
their acceptance and adoption by end-users.
Finally, we believe that this thesis represents a first systematic guide for future privacy
and security researchers trying to build new PETs-based solutions for protecting medi-
cal and genomic data, as it shows the entire development process by spanning from the
definition of the privacy and security requirements to the design of a potential privacy-
preserving system and its deployment to operational environments. Addressing privacy
issues in healthcare remains a great challenge that will increasingly require long-term and
interdisciplinary collaboration among geneticists, healthcare providers, ethicists, lawmak-
ers, and computer scientists.
Future Work
Despite the concrete solutions provided in this thesis for the secure management of
medical and genomic data, a significant effort remains to be made on the technical side
in order to fully realize the promise of a privacy-conscious personalized medicine. Future
work will have to address unresolved problems such as (a) the long-term protection of
genomic data (current solutions can provide protection for only a few decades), (b) the
identification of optimal trade-offs between the risk of re-identification and the utility
of the data (solutions based on statistical obfuscation are inherently difficult to achieve
due to the high dimensionality of the data), (c) the lack of flexibility of the current
cryptographic-based solutions and their computational cost, and (d) the quantification
of secondary leakage stemming from inferences based on auxiliary meta-data.
Moreover, substantial work will be needed to increase the number of pilot studies
that are relevant to current initiatives in collaborative medical and genomic research.
Technology transfer is key for the widespread adoption of privacy-enhancing technologies
that have the potential to enable applications that are difficult, or even impossible, at
the moment due to of legal and policy restrictions (e.g., cross-border transfer of health
and genomic data). Last but not least, the management of research consent is one of
the major future challenges because of its confidential and dynamic nature. New models
that ensure transparency, integrity and automatic enforcement of the consent will have
to be developed and integrated with current privacy-enhancing technologies in order to
establish a balanced participatory relationship between citizens and researchers.
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WORK 
EXPERIENCE 
École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Switzerland    09/2012 – 03/2018 
Research and Teaching Assistant at Laboratory for Communications and Applications 
Teaching Assistant for: Privacy Protection, Information Computation Communication, Introduction to 
Programming, Practice of Object Oriented Programming, C Programming. 
 
Harvard University, Boston, MA, United States                         06/2017 – 09/2017 
Internship at Department of Biomedical Informatics, Harvard Medical School 
Project: “System for secure sharing of i2b2 aggregate-level data in the cloud.” 
Host: Prof. Shawn Murphy 
 
Lausanne University Hospital (CHUV), Switzerland                    01/2012 – 06/2012 
Privacy and Security Consultant at Direction des Systèmes d’Information (DSI) 
Project: “Privacy and security risk assessment of the clinical research data warehouse.” 
 
École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Switzerland    02/2012 – 09/2012 
Internship at Laboratory for Communications and Applications 
Project: “Privacy-preserving genetic tests in the cloud.” 
Host: Prof. Jean-Pierre Hubaux 
 
Aalborg University, Aalborg, Denmark                                     05/2011 – 09/2011 
Internship at Department of Biomedical Engineering and Informatics 
Project: “Design and implementation of intelligent systems for Medical Terminology SNOMED CT.” 
Host: Prof. Stig K. Andersen 
 
 
 
EDUCATION École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Switzerland    09/2012 – 03/2018 
PhD in Computer, Communication and Information Sciences – Data Privacy and Security 
Ph.D. Thesis: “Privacy-Enhancing Technologies for Medical and Genomic Data: From Theory to Practice” 
Advisor: Prof. Jean-Pierre Hubaux (EPFL) 
 
Università Degli Studi di Pavia, Pavia, Italy                              09/2009 – 02/2012 
MSc in Biomedical Engineering and Medical Informatics 
M.Sc. Thesis: “An Automatic SNOMED CT Encoder for Clinical Free-Text.” (GPA=3.96/4) 
Advisors: Prof. Silvana Quaglini and Prof. Riccardo Bellazzi 
 
Università Degli Studi di Pavia, Pavia, Italy                           09/2006 – 09/2009 
BSc in Biomedical Engineering                                                    
BSc Thesis: “A vocal system for the intelligent management of heart failure patients.” (GPA=3.71/4) 
Advisors: Prof. Mario Stefanelli and Prof. Silvana Quaglini 
 
MAIN 
PROJECTS 
Commission for Technology and Innovation (CTI) Project            03/2016 – 03/2018 
Title: “Privacy-Preserving Personalized Medicine Over Distributed Databases”  
Academic Partner: Laboratory for Communications and Applications (EPFL) 
Industrial partner: Sophia Genetics SA 
Total budget: CHF 800K 
 
Contrat de Mandat de l’Etat de Vaud                                       01/2014 – 03/2018 
Title: “Protection of Genomic and Medical Data of Lausanne Institutional Biobank (BIL)” 
Partners: CHUV and Laboratory for Communications and Applications (EPFL)  
Main achievements:  
•? Development of a prototype of a privacy-preserving solution for personalized medicine based on 
homomorphic encryption (in Java) 
•? Deployment of a secure i2b2 plugin for the exploration of genetic cohorts based on homomorphic 
encryption and differential privacy (in Java and C++) 
•? Development of a system for privacy-preserving sharing of distributed medical and genomic data 
•? 4 scientific publications, 1 patent 
Total budget: CHF 444K 
 
Swiss HIV Cohort Study (SHCS) Project                                  01/2013 – 12/2013 
Title: “Data protection in the SHCS – a pilot study using pharmacogenetics applications” 
Partners: SHCS and Laboratory for Communications and Applications (EPFL) 
Main achievements: 
•? System (back-end and front-end) for pharmacogenetics tests on encrypted genomes (deployed for 
test at 7 cantonal hospitals) (in Java) 
•? 1 scientific publication, 1 patent 
Total budget: CHF 25K 
 
Commission for Technology and Innovation (CTI) Project            03/2013 – 03/2015 
Title: “Privacy-Compliant Genomic Data Storage, Retrieval, and Processing” 
Academic Partner: Laboratory for Communications and Applications (EPFL) 
Industrial partner: Sophia Genetics SA 
Main achievements: 
•? Prototype system for secure management of raw genomic data (BAM/SAM files) (in Java) 
•? 1 scientific publication, 1 patent 
Total budget: CHF 800K 
 
 
 
PATENTS Method for Privacy-Preserving Medical Risk Tests. J. L. Raisaro, A. Erman, P. J. McLaren, J.-P. Hubaux, 
A. Telenti, Publication Nr. EP3016011 / US20160125141, Publication Date: 05.05.2016 
 
Method To Manage Raw Genomic Data in a Privacy Preserving Manner in a Biobank. 
J.-P. Hubaux, E. Ayday, J. L. Raisaro, U. Hengartner, A. Molyneaux, Z. Xu, J. Camblong, P. Hutter, 
Publication Nr. WO/2014/202615, Publication Date: 24.12.2014 
 
Privacy-Enhancing Technologies for Medical Tests Using Genomic Data. E. Ayday, J.-P. Hubaux, J. L. 
Raisaro, A. Telenti, J. Fellay, P. J. McLaren, J. Rougemont, M. Humbert, Publication Nr. WO/2014/040964, 
Publication Date: 20.03.2014 
 
 
 
OTHER 
ACTIVITIES 
Active member of Global Alliance for Genomics and Health (GAGH)  
 
Reviewer for scientific conferences and journals 
USENIX Security’14, IEEE Euro S&P’16, GenoPri’15’16’17, PoPETs’16’17’18, ACM Transactions on Privacy 
and Security , Nature Biotechnology, Computing Surveys, Bioinformatics 
 
 
 
COMPUTING Operating Systems: Windows, Mac OS, Linux 
Scientific Programming: Python, Java, Matlab, Bash, Go 
Web/Database development: HTML, CSS, JSP, SQL 
 
 
 
MISC Languages:  
Italian and French: mother tongues  
English: full professional proficiency 
 
Interests:  
Technology, Sports (volleyball, ski, tennis, hiking), Music, Travelling;  
 INVITED 
TALKS 
“Privacy-Enhancing Technologies for Protecting Genomic and Medical Data,” TriNetX, Cambridge, 
MA, United States, Aug.’17 
 
“Addressing Beacon Re-Identification Attacks: Quantification and Mitigation of Privacy Risks,” 
Global Alliance for Genomics and Health (GA4GH) Plenary Meeting, Vancouver, Canada, Oct.’16 
 
“Protecting Genomic Data: Why and How,” Molecular Medicine Working Group Meeting TMF, 
Germany, Sep.’16 
 
“Design and Deployment of an i2b2 plugin for privacy-preserving exploration of genetic cohorts,” The 
4th i2b2 European Academic User Group Meeting, Pavia, Italy, Sep.’16 
 
“Addressing Beacon Re-Identification Attacks: Quantification and Mitigation of Privacy Risks,” 
GA4GH – Elixir Security Group Meeting, EMBL-EBI, Wellcome Genome Campus, Hinxton, UK, 
Jun.’16 
 
 
 
HONORS  
& AWARDS 
Student Travel Award for Privacy-Aware-Computational-Genomics Workshop (PRIVAGEN), 
Tokyo, Japan, 2015 
 
Student Travel Award for 1st International Workshop on Genome Privacy and Security 
(GenoPri’14), Amsterdam, Netherlands, 2014 
 
 
 
PUBLICATIONS J.L. Raisaro, C. Troncoso, M. Humbert, Z. Kutalik, A. Telenti and J.-P. Hubaux, GenoShare: Supporting 
Privacy-Informed Decisions for Sharing Exact Genomic Data, paper under submission 
 
J.L. Raisaro, J.G. Klann, K.B. Wagholikar, H. Estiri, J.-P. Hubaux and S. N. Murphy, Feasibility of 
Homomorphic Encryption for Sharing i2b2 Aggregate-Level Data in the Cloud, AMIA Informatics Summit, 2018 
 
J.L. Raisaro, P.J. McLaren, J. Fellay, M. Cavassini, C. Klersy and J.-P. Hubaux, Are Privacy-Enhancing 
Technologies for Genomic Data Ready for the Clinic? A Survey of Medical Experts of the Swiss HIV Cohort 
Study, Journal of Biomedical Informatics, 2018 
 
J.L. Raisaro, J.R. Troncoso-Pastoriza, M. Misbach, J. Sa Sousa, S. Pradervand, E. Missiaglia, O. Michielin, 
B. Ford and J.-P. Hubaux, MedCo: Enabling Privacy-Conscious Exploration of Distributed Clinical and 
Genomic Data, 4th International Workshop in Genome Privacy and Security (GenoPri’17) at GA4GH annual 
meeting, Orlando, FL, Oct. 2017 
 
J.L. Raisaro, G. Choi, S. Pradervand, R. Colsenet, N. Jacquemont, N. Rosat, V. Mooser, J.-P. Hubaux, 
Protecting Privacy and Security of Genomic Data in i2b2, to appear in IEEE/ACM Transactions on 
Computational Biology and Bioinformatics, 2017. 
 
D. Froelicher, P. Egger, J. Sá Sousa, J.L. Raisaro, Z. Huang, C. Mouchet, B. Ford and J.-P. Hubaux, UnLynx: 
A Decentralized System for Privacy-Conscious Data Sharing, Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 
2017. 
 
J. Sá Sousa, C. Lefebvre, Z. Huang, J.L. Raisaro, C. Aguilar-Melchor, M.-O. Killijian and J.-P. Hubaux, 
Efficient and Secure Outsourcing of Genomic Data Storage, BMC Medical Genomics, 2017. 
 
J.L. Raisaro, F. Tramer, Z. Ji, et al. Addressing Beacon Re-Identification Attacks: Quantification and 
Mitigation of Privacy Risks, Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, 2017 
 
G. Choi*, J.L. Raisaro*, S. Pradervan, et al. Privacy-Preserving Exploration of Genetic Cohorts with i2b2 At 
Lausanne University Hospital, 3rd International Workshop in Genome Privacy and Security (GenoPri’16) at 
AMIA annual Symposium, Chicago IL, Nov. 2016. *(co-first authors) 
 
P.J. McLaren*, J.L. Raisaro*, M. Aouri, et al., Privacy-preserving genomic testing in the clinic: a model using 
HIV treatment, Genetics in Medicine, Springer Nature, vol. 18, no. 8, pp. 814–822, 2016. *(co-first authors) 
 
L. Barman, M.-T. Elgraini, J.L. Raisaro, E. Ayday and J.-P. Hubaux, Privacy Threats and Practical Solutions 
for Genetic Risk Tests, 2nd International Workshop in Genome Privacy and Security, Security and Privacy 
Workshops (SPW), 2015 IEEE, pp. 27-31. 
 
J.L. Raisaro, E. Ayday, P. J. McLaren, J.-P. Hubaux, A. Telenti, Privacy-Preserving HIV Pharmacogenetics: 
A Real Use Case of Genomic Data Protection, 1st International Workshop in Genome Privacy and Security 
(GenoPri’14), Amsterdam, Neth., Jun. 2014 
 
J.L. Raisaro, E. Ayday, and J.-P. Hubaux, Patient Privacy in the Genomic Era, Praxis (Bern. 1994)., vol. 
103, no. 10, pp. 579–586, 2014. 
 
J. Fellay, J.L. Raisaro, Z. Huang, M. Humbert, E. Ayday, P. J. McLaren, J.-P. Hubaux, and A. Telenti, 
Practical Solutions for Protecting Individual Genomic Privacy, In American Society of Human Genetics 
(ASHG), 2014. 
 
E. Ayday, J.L. Raisaro, P. J. Mclaren, J. Fellay, and J. Hubaux, Privacy-preserving computation of disease 
risk by using genomic, clinical, and environmental data, USENIX Workshop on Health Information Technologies 
(HealthTech’13), 2013. 
 
E. Ayday, J.L. Raisaro, J. Rougemont, and J.-P. Hubaux, Protecting and Evaluating Genomic Privacy in 
Medical Tests and Personalized Medicine, 12th ACM workshop on Workshop on privacy in the electronic society 
(WPES ’13), 2013, pp. 95–106. 
 
E. Ayday, J.L. Raisaro, U. Hengartner, A. Molyneaux, and J.-P. Hubaux, Privacy-preserving processing of 
raw genomic data, Data Privacy Management and Autonomous Spontaneous Security, Springer, 2014, pp. 133–
147. 
 
E. Ayday, J.L. Raisaro, and J.-P. Hubaux, Personal use of the genomic data: Privacy vs. storage cost,  IEEE 
Global Communications Conference (GLOBECOM), IEEE 2013, pp. 2723-2729 
 

